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11. INTRODUCTION
1 • 1 The Integration of Microeconomic and Macroeconomic Theory 
♦
Many contributions to economic theory may be broadly classified 
as microeconomic or macroeconomic, by which it is meant that 
they are concerned with questions about the behaviour of 
rational individual agents in the case of microeconomics or 
large aggregates in the case of macroeconomics. It would seem 
reasonable to expect that the results obtained by studying the 
aggregates should in some sense be compatible with adding up 
of the behaviour of the individuals which comprise those 
aggregates. That micro theory and macro theory should at 
least not be contradictory. On a simple level this may not 
appear to be the case.
Consider the General Equilibrium model originating from the 
work of Arrow-Debreu and the standard 'elasticity pessimism' 
IS/LM representation of Keynesian economics to be the paradigms 
of micro and macro respectively. It may appear that these 
two models are in conflict, the general equilibrium model 
assumes that prices clear markets, such phenomena as unemploy­
ment can only arise by the individual choice of the agents 
concerned, all unemployment is voluntary. One of the crucial 
features of Keynesian macroeconomic models is the presence 
of involuntary unemployment. To present these models in 
this light is to deliberately misinterpret the questions 
which they are addressing.
The basic question to which general equilibrium addresses 
itself is in the words of Weintraub (1979, p. 75):
"how (might) it (be) possible for a decen­
tralised individualistic system, operating 
on principles of self-interest, to produce 
coherent or co-ordinated outcomes? (of the economic system) . "
PREFACE
Despite^ many notable contributions over the last two decades 
economic theory has not yet succeeded in effectively inte­
grating microeconomics and macroeconomics. Macroeconomic 
analysis and its propositions are not derivable from any 
rigorous microeconomic basis, yet microeconomics in the 
form of Walrasian general equilibrium theory cannot explain 
equilibria with inefficient resource utilization, most part­
icularly unemployment equilibria. However recent contributions 
in the area known variously as Neo-Keynesian economics, 
Disequilibrium Theory or Non-Walrasian Economics, have made 
considerable progress. The aim of this thesis is to examine 
these recent developments and to make some contributions in 
the areas of the role of expectations in disequilibrium anal­
ysis and the importance of union employer wane bargaining 
as an explanation of imperfect price adjustment upon the 
labour market.
Many people have given me their comments and encouragement 
whilst writing this thesis, and I regret that I cannot mention 
here the names of all those people to whom I owe a debt of 
thanks. I am most deeply indebted to Paul Stoneman, Avinash 
Dixit and Norman Ireland for supervising this thesis and also 
wish to acknowledge Marcus Miller, Ben Lockwood, John Fender, 
Bob Rothschild, Philip Michel, Torsten Persson, Nick Snowdon 
and Jennifer Ellis for invaluable stimulation and insightful
comments.
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NOTATION
The following notation will be adopted throughout this
thesis, 'any variations will be indicated at the appropriate
point in the text.
X Consumption good sales to consumers
y Output
L Labour
P price of output
w wage rate
M money balances
e Endowments
T Total Time
TT Profit
I Inventories
z net demands or trades
A single bars over a variable 
actual constraint
denote an
I double bars over a variable 
expected constraint.
denote an
2Whilst Keynesian macroeconomics poses itself such questions as, 
why do phenomena such as unemployment and inflation persist, 
and how might policy makers manipulate economic aggregate to
t
alleviate such problems?
General Equilibrium Theory examines the individual choice 
calculus of agents within a market economy and establishes 
the detailed conditions required for the existence of 
an equilibrium brought about by price adjustment. Macro­
economics implicitly takes as a fait accomplie that such 
conditions are violated and asks how economic aggregates 
interreact in reality and seeks to model these in a way that 
appears consistant with observation, with the aim of providing 
solutions to real problems.
Why bother attempting to integrate microeconomic and macro- 
economic theory if macroeconomics fits the facts? indeed, why 
study microeconomics other than on grounds of intellectual 
curiosity? The reasons are two-fold. Firstly a macroeconomic 
model with a firm microeconomic underpinning should have 
greater predictive potential than one based upon the observation 
of aggregate behaviour. If the economic system finds itself 
in a new and previously unexperienced state, how will it 
respond and what policies are required to improve its position?
If the standard aggregate analytical techniques are applied it 
may be the case that they are invalid, the aggregates under _ 
examination'are a summation of individuals, and individuals 
in an entirely new state may respond in a different manner than 
previously observed. Only if the macroeconomics model is correctly 
underpinned by microeconomic analysis of exactly what it is 
rational for individual agents to do will such pitfalls be 
avoided. This is easy to state but not easy to do, but the 
integration of these two branches of economic theory is clearly
a worthy endeavour. The second reason for regarding the 
integration of micro and macro theory as desirable is that it 
should tallow a more accurate assessment of the value and 
implications of any aggregate economic change. Neither of 
these two arguments is novel but they are particularly 
pertinent.
The growing literature about the integration of micro 
and macro economic theory is known collectively as the micro­
foundations of macroeconomics. This literature may be 
regarded as taking 'Keynesian realities' in the form of 
restrictions upon individual agents information sets, per­
forming the constrained choice calculus and examining the 
individual and aggregate outcomes.
The approach of taking a general equilibrium model and 
imposing information restrictions upon agents first appears 
in Hicks 'Value and Capital' (1939). The behaviour of a 
general equilibrium system with incomplete futures markets 
is modelled. Agents cannot contract for all contingent 
commodities, the missing information is the price of commod­
ities in the next period or 'Hicksian week'. On the Monday 
of the Hicksian week agents express transaction demands based 
upon future price expectations and thus planned future trades. 
Current period markets then clear by price adjustment, some 
agents a priori price expectations will be falsified, but 
they do not adjust expectation of next period prices until 
, the beginning of the next Hicksian week. (The time lag in 
revising expectations could be interpreted as defining when 
the next week starts). Thus each periods transactions are 
based on expectations which may be false. Dy this process a 
series of short run 'Temporary Competitive Equilibria' are
defined, in which prices clear markets but in which some
expectations are incorrect. Hicks then continues to define
such an equilibria as dynamically stable if price expectations 
♦
are all confirmed. This approach has generated a consider­
able body of research, and for comprehensive and extremely 
well articulated surveys the reader is referred to Radnor 
(1974) and Grandmont (1977). Hicks's concept of Temporary 
Competitive Equilibria allows agents to make mistakes in 
their expectations, but the absence of information dissemin­
ating futures prices does not cause any of the typical 
macroeconomic problems. Prices clear all current period 
markets. There is no involuntary unemployment, only volun­
tary unemployment based upon mistaken expectations. Perfect 
auction markets function at any moment t , the effect of 
the non-existence of future markets is only to generate 
inter-temporal inefficiency.
General Equilibrium and Temporary Competitive Equilibrium 
theory both utilize the same basic assumption, that trading 
takes place at equilibrium prices. Thus in both models 
the only information required by agents to co-ordinate economic 
activity is the price vector, consisting of all current and 
future prices in the case of General Equilibrium and omitting 
some future prices in the case of Temporary competitive 
Equilibrium. We shall refer to both these price vectors 
hereafter as market clearing prices.
If agents facing Walrasian prices do not display behaviour 
the aggregation of which is consistant with macroeconomic 
experience and theory, then consider what happens if the 
price vector in non-Walrasian. This represents a further 
restriction upon the information available to agents, they
5may no longer take as given that market supplies and demands 
will balance and thus they cannot assume that all planned 
transactions will be feasible. Hicks was aware of the 
problem of 'false prices' as he termed them, but regarded 
the volume of trading which took place at non-Walrasian 
prices to be of a small order of magnitude, which consequently 
could be ignored.
The significance of trading at false prices was first 
analysed by Patinkin (1965) and Clower (1965). Patinkin's 
contribution was the explicit recognition of the role of 
quantity rationing. In his analysis firms perceive that 
they will face constraints on their future sales, they then 
reduce their labour purchases causing consumer-workers to 
face involuntary unemployment. Implicit in this analysis is 
a non-Walrasian wage rate such that more consumers desire 
to work than are required by firms reacting to sales expec­
tations. Clowers contribution represents the true conceptual 
breakthrough since he explicitly realizes the important 
information disseminating role of the Walrasian price system, 
and the implications for a general equilibrium type of 
analysis if the price vector is non-Walrasian. Clower examines 
consumer behaviour, arguing that if relative prices are wrong 
labour supply will exceed employment offered by firms, the 
shortfall in 'planned' income will thus cause a revision of 
workers goods purchases to be consistant with realized income. 
Conceptually the argument reaches far beyond the simple 
analysis of household behaviour. It is argued that Keynesian 
macroeconomics requires a reformulation of the underlying 
general equilibrium theory, recognizing the distinction 
between notional and effective demands. Notional demands
6being those levels of transactions that agents would 
wish to carry out at given prices. Effective demands being 
those transactions agents express, given prices and quantity 
rationing encountered on some markets. Notional and effective 
demands will be equal only if prices are Walrasian. If 
prices are wrong rationing such as involuntary unemployment 
will occur. The seeds of the integration of micro and macro 
economic theory appear to be sown here.
But why do non-Walrasian prices obtain? Clowers' answer is 
to suggest, quite correctly, that excess demand functions 
may only be validly specified using effective demands.
Walrasian prices are typically obtained from the solution of 
excess demand functions specified by notional demands which 
cannot be expressed away from equilibrium. Thus he argues 
that price adjustment based upon effective excess demand 
functions may be incomplete. This argument is persuasive 
but has not yet been satisfactorily formalized. Two remarks 
should be made here, firstly Clower does not present an 
equilibrium concept in his 1965 paper, he is essentially 
looking at disequilibrium. Secondly prices are not assumed 
to be fixed, rather it is argued that they may not move 
sufficiently to clear all markets, and thus quantity constraints 
may persist.
Leijonhufvyd (1968) independently replicated many of'the 
arguments presented by Hicks, Patinkin and Clower. His work 
is an exegesical examination of Keynes's ' General Theory' (1936 ) 
and will not be examined in any great detail here despite its 
great interest in many contexts.
Barro and Grossman (1971, 76) study a representative consumer
producer model of market non-clearance under parametric
prices. They examine the characteristics of the equilibria *
established via quantity adjustments. Attention is paid to 
studying how the different levels of fixed prices and wages 
will determine on which markets quantity constraints arise.
An extensive literature has developed from the early contri­
butions discussed above and is commonly called 'Keynesian 
Temporary Equilibrium Theory' or 'Disequilibrium Theory'. 
Research has been undertaken in two basic directions, firstly 
refinements to the micro-foundations of macroeconomics 
generally termed the 'Theory of Effective Demand' and secondly 
examination of the implications for conventional macroeconomic 
problems, termed 'Neo-Keynesian macroeconomics'. Hereafter 
the abbreviations T.E.D. and N-K.M. will be adopted for these 
two areas.
1.2 The Problems Raised by Disequilibrium Theory 
It is in no sense disparaging to say that the early contri­
butions towards the integration of micro and macro Theory 
raised more questions than they provided answers. A basic 
question raised was 'does a non-Walrasian equilibrium exist, 
and if so what does it look like?' It is argued in the 
previous section that Ctowers' analysis deals analytically 
with the persistance of disequilibrium. What further is 
required for the existence of an equilibrium at non-Walrasian 
prices? An answer is presented by Benassy (1975) and Drcze 
(1975). Both consider models of sufficiently short duration 
that the price vector may be taken as fixed, a tatonnement 
process is assumed to take place on quantities, and an 
equilibrium is shown to exist by proving there is a fixed
8point in the quantity tâtonnement. The two approaches differ 
in the specification of effective demands. Benassy, general­
izing Çlowers approach, assumes that agents calculate their 
effective demands on each market independently, taking into 
account constraints on all other markets. We may thus 
write a Benassy-Clower effective demand for agent i on market 
h as :
Zih = Zih
where
1' ' * * ' Pn ^ ” !»••••» n prices on the n markets
i,l'-*-’Zi,h-l'Zi,h+l""'
z.i,n
upoer bouids on trades on 
each of the oilier n-1 markets
i,1' ’ ‘ '-i ,h-l'-i,h+l'* '* ' lower bounds on trades on each of the other
2 n-1 markets.-i/n
A Benassy K equilibrium is a set of effective demands, Z^, 
which replicate themselves under the given rationing scheme.
Drèze assumes that each agent calculates his effective demand 
on each market, taking into account the quantity constraints 
on all markets. We may thus write the Drèze effective demand 
for agent i on market h as :
Zih = Zih 
where p = p ^  ... ,pn
Z = Z{ i ,....,Zj Upper bounds on trade on
' ' all markets
Z = Z. ,...,Z. lower bounds on trade -
' ' on all markets
A Drèze equilibrium is then a set of such effective demands 
(trades), which replicate themselves. Drèze proves the 
existence of such a non-Walrasian equilibrium under a 
proportional rationing scheme.
9These two approaches have been central in a significant 
proportion of all subsequent work on the T.E.D. and N-K.M. , 
and are responsible for raising many questions. The
I
differences between these two basic models are much more 
significant than it superficially appears. In the Benassy 
equilibrium each demand is calculated independently 
without reference to any constraints that may be in force 
on the market in which the demand is expressed, agents in 
a Benassy K equilibrium may express demands which violate 
their constraints. The equilibrium is a set of effective 
demands which reproduce themselves. In the Dreze case all 
constraints are perceived, thus the constraint on any market 
cannot be violated by the effective demand. Thus a Dreze 
equilibrium is a set of effective demands which replicate 
themselves, where the effective demands are the actual 
transactions. This difference has two important implications, 
firstly the Benassy approach has a natural measure of 
excess demand, the difference between the effective demand 
and the constraint. The Dreze approach has no equivalent. 
Secondly the form of the rationing scheme will be more 
important in the Benassy case since individuals may be able 
to manipulate their ration through their effective demands.
This is not to suggest that all rationing schemes are 
non-manipulable in a Dreze equilibrium, but it is difficult 
to see how an agent in Dreze model would learn how to manipulate 
his ration. Finally it should be noted, as has been pointed out 
by numerous contributors, e.g. Svennson (1977), that the sum 
of the Benassy effective demands may violate the budget 
constraint, but since effective demands are not transactions it 
is not obvious that this implies some underlying transaction . 
irrationality as some have suggested.
10
The non-Walrasian equilibrium concepts of Benassy and Dreze 
do not examine two important questions. How are prices 
determined, and by what process is a non-Walrasian equilibrium 
generated? In both approaches prices are parametric and 
no trading takes place away from the non-Walrasian equilibrium. 
A fully articulated model would need to explain which agents 
set prices and how individual decision making is undertaken 
over both prices and quantities. It would also have to 
examine the actual transaction structure, explaining the 
sequence in which agents visit markets and how this may or 
may not lead to a stable equilibria.
Another question not fully examined in the Benassy and Dreze 
papers of 1975, is the specification of an appropriate 
rationing scheme. It is noted that the choice of rationing 
scheme selects the non-Walrasian equilibria of the system.
But what would be an appropriate rationing scheme?
It would seem sensible that such a scheme should have the 
property that it is generated by the transactions structure 
of the economy under study, rather than being given by 
an arbitrary rule.
All of these questions have been subsequently analysed by more 
recent contributors to the T.E.D. whose contributions 
will be examined in greater detail in later chapters.
The area of N-K.M. also raises many new questions by examining 
well known macroeconomic problems in a new context. Many 
disequilibrium models are based upon either the Dreze or 
Benassy equilibrium concepts and adopt the methods developed 
by Malinvaud (1977) and Muellbauer and Portes (1978). In 
these models a representative consumer and producer are 
adopted to model the behaviour of the aggregates from which
11
they are drawn. The representative agents perform their 
choice calculus at non-Walrasian prices, supplies and demands 
do not match and quantity constraints arise. There are two 
markets, labour and consumption good, and thus four possible 
regimes may be defined according to which agent is constrained 
on which market. The case where consumers are constrained 
on both markets is called classical, where firms are con­
strained on both markets, under-consumption, where firms are 
constrained on the goods market and households on t^e labour 
market, Keynesian, and where firms are constrained for labour 
and households for goods, repressed inflation. Malinvaud 
points out that more markets mean more regimes.
This division of the aggregate macroeconomic model raises 
serious questions in the area of public finance as policies 
effective on one regime may actually be damaging upon another. 
Further, successive application of a particular policy instru­
ment may at first alleviate a problem, for example, an increase 
in government expenditure will reduce involuntary unemployment 
on the Keynesian regime, but will then generate problems due 
to a regime switch. A switch from the Keynesian to the repressed 
inflation regime will occur in our example, with the government 
denying consumption goods to consumers. Similar complexities 
will be encountered with monetary or taxation instruments. 
Muellbauer and Portes^and Dixit (1976) provide good, 
discussions of such problems.
A second important area where N-K.M. raise many questions 
is in the consideration of the formation and effects of 
expectations. Current transaction decisions will be based 
upon expectations of both the prices and the 
associated vector of quantity constraints. These expectations
may well have a bootstrap effect as considered by Neary and 
StigLitz (1979).
The pol’icy implications of N-K.H. and the role of expectations 
in such models will be examined in greater detail in the 
chapters which follow. The reader who is interested in obtaining 
a more extensive overview of the questions raised above is 
referred to Drazen (1980).
1.3 Main Themes of the Thesis
The preceding sections 1.1 and 1.2 have given a brief 
discussion of why an integration of micro and macro theory 
should be considered desirable, and also presented a simple 
discussion of some of the early literature in the area, the 
questions the literature has asked and the concepts developed.
In the rest of this thesis some of these questions will be 
developed further, and where appropriate the more recent 
literature will be examined in greater detail.
Two basic themes run through this thesis, first the role of 
expectations in Neo-Keynesian economics, particularly how 
expectations effect equilibria achieved through a quantity 
tatonnament process, and second, the various explanations for 
price rigidity or sluggish adjustment will be considered, with 
special emphasis placed upon the role of trade unions and 
bargaining as determinants of the wage rate.
Chapter 2 examines the various roles that expectations have 
performed in contemporary analysis. It is noticed that 
essentially there are two types of disequilibrium or non-Walrasian 
equilibrium models in the literature, those where the equilibrium 
is conceptually based upon expectations being validated (or
self-validating), and approaches when rigidities rather than 
expectations,are the central feature. A simple stylized 
model o(f the Malinvaud (1977) type is developed which has 
the characteristics that initial transactions demands are 
based upon constraint expectations held with subjective 
certainty, and that these offers once made may only be revised 
downwards in the short-run. The rationale for considering 
such a model, its potential long run characteristics and its 
policy implications are examined and discussed. In an 
appendix to chapter 2 it is demonstrated that if agents in 
this class of model hold expectations then the trade vectors 
which are typically termed Walrasian equilibria are in fact 
Hicksian Temporary competitive equilibria, and not Walrasian 
in the sense of Debreu (1959).
Chapter 3 examines the introduction of uncertainty and 
adjustment costs into Disequilibrium models. The methods and 
costs of obtaining information and the way in which adjustment may 
take place in a quantity tâtonnement process are considered. A 
model is developed in which workers form subjective probability 
distributions of expected labour demand and firms form subjective 
probability distributions of expected goods demand, where initial 
transaction demands are generated from Von-Neumann Morgenstern 
objective functions. Final market outcomes are derived in 
the face of adjustment costs which agents encounter in revising 
their demands.
Chapter 4 examines the treatment of expectations in tâtonne 
ment and non-tatonnement models with particular emphasis upon 
sequential trading. Dynamic analysis is performed on a 
representative firm-representative consumer sequential trading . 
model. The model'sstability properties are examined and it is
I I
found that although government policy may be used to stabilise 
the economy, this may be at a 'low level' equilibrium
with high unemployment.
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 are concerned with the second theme 
of the thesis, the examination of why prices and most 
particularly wages do not adjust to clear markets. Chapter 5 
considers the various approaches that have or perhaps may be 
adopted to endogenize prices in Neo-Keynesian models. These 
approaches are evaluated in the context of what might be 
considered some desirable properties for a price adjustment 
mechanism. Special attention is given to implicit and 
explicit contracts in the labour market.
In chapter 6 a simple model of labour market bargaining 
is developed and a number of solutions and their comparative 
static properties are derived. The effects of rationing, in 
both the goods market and labour markets, upon the bargain 
struck between a union- and employer is considered.
Finally in chapter 7 several simple models are developed 
to examine the effects of introducing bargaining into a 
Neo-Keynesian type economy. Three basic scenarios are studied.
(i) The whole labour-force is assumed unionised and an efficient 
bargain is continuously struck, in one case with a fixed product price, aid in anther 
where tie product price adjusts to clear the market for output, (ii) Hie labour 
force and hence the economy is divided into a unionised and 
non-unionised sector producing different output. The prices of out­
puts and ncn-unicnised labour adjust to clear their respective markets.
(iii) Is the same as (ii) but makes the further assumption 
that all prices are fixed in the short run. Attention is. 
focused upon the effects of government policy in these models 
and the impact of bargaining upon their comparative static
14
15
properties.
In ,an appendix to the main thesis, there is a brief review 
of the literature on open disequilibrium models.
16
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2• THE ROLE OF EXPECTATION IN NEO-KEYNESIAN 
MACROECONOMIC MODELS
2.1 Tlie Treatment of Expectations in the Literature
In an Arrow-Debreu world, expectations have no role, prices 
for all contingent conmodities exist, and clear their respec­
tive markets. Agents form expectations when information is 
incomplete. In a Temporary Competitive Equilibrium of the 
Hicksian sort discussed earlier, information is missing about 
the market - clearing price in some future markets. The 
absence of a complete intertemporal price vector requires 
agents, in carrying out transactions today, to form price 
expectations for the future. This sort of expectations 
formation occurs in all macroeconomic models of market economics 
that have an intertemporal aspect.
If however, those prices that do exist today do not clear 
current period markets then expectations take on an even more 
important role, since-associated with any expected price 
vector is also a set of feasible trades. Price and quantity 
expectations are formed. In the literature on Neo-Keynesian 
Macroeconomics models, there are two distinct forms of 
models analysed and one of the key distinguishing features 
between the two is their treatment of expectations. These 
two types may be called exogenous and endogenous price models. 
Consider first exogenous price models, such as Malinvaud (1977), 
Muellbauer and Portes (1978), Neary and Stiglitz (1979) and 
Honkapohja and Ito (1979). These are fix-price quantity 
rationing models based upon the Benassy (1975) equilibrium 
formulation. A representative consumer - representative 
producer form is adopted, and the economy operates as follows.
1At the start of the market period the fix-price vector is an­
nounced and the representative agents then compute and announce 
their supplies and demands. If the plans are not mutually con­
sistent, an auctioneer announces a vector of constraints.
Agents then re-evaluate their demands subject to the constraint 
vector and announce their new set of plans. This process 
continues until both agents achieve transactions consistant 
with the constraints they face. Expectations impinge on 
such a process in two ways. Firstly expectations of price 
and quantity constraints held in the previous period about 
the current period affect the current period equilibrium via 
the endowments carried forwards. Secondly expectations of 
next periods prices and quantity constraints determine the 
amounts of goods and money agents wish to carry forwards, and 
thus effect the current period equilibrium.
Malinvaud presents a model in which expectations are 
implicit. He assumes consumers maximize indirect utility 
functions expressed over an aggregate consumption good, 
leisure and end of period money balances. The money balance 
term being included 'because it will permit future consumption' 
(Malinvaud (1977, p.21). The expectations upon which the 
money holding decision is based are not specified. The 
importance of Malinvauds implicit assumptions about expectations 
is demonstrated by Hildenbrand and Hildenbrand (197 8 who 
show that consumers are in fact maximising a two period 
Cobb-Douglas utility function of the following form:
Max u(x^,X2,L^,I<2 ) = a^lnx^+ajlnx^B-^ln (T-I^) + In (T-L2) (2.1.1)
s.t Plxi + = w iLi + ei (2.1.2)
p2x2 + M2 = w 2L2 + e2 (2.1.3)
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For this problem to collapse to the one examined by Malinvaud 
the following assumptions are required:
al = 2 * a2 = ^1 = lf e2 = °' M2 = Pi = P2' wi = w2 
and L2 = 0. Such that (2.1.1) can be collapsed to (2.1.4)
V(x1,L1,M1,p,w) = x^iT-Lj^) (M^p) (2.1.4)
The role of expectations has now been made explicit, at the 
start of the first period consumers expect prices and wages 
to remain constant throughout both periods, and they expect 
to be unemployed in the second period. There is no link 
between current period market experience and expectations, 
indeed even if the worker sells his chosen labour supply
today he still anticipates being totally unemployed tomorrow.
2Muellbauer and Portes (1978) make expectations one of the 
central themes of their work. In their analysis of households 
both deterministic and probabalistic approaches are examined.
A two period utility function is defined over consumption - 
and leisure.
UH = U(x1,T1-L1,x2 ,T2-L2) (2.1.5)
Given that the household has no use for money balances at the 
end of the second period, the second period budget constraint 
is:
+ e2 + w 2L2 > P2x2 (2.1.6)
There are two further possible constraints in the second period, 
the consumer may be rationed for labour L2 = L2 and/or 
consumption goods x2 = x2
L2 = L2 (2.1.7)
(2.1.8)
20
The household in period 1 must have expectations on prices 
W2'I?2' quantity constraints and endowments e^ . Each
expectation is held with subjective certainty.
In general the consumer may expect one of four outcomes in the 
second period, either, neither, one or both of (2.1.7) and 
(2.1.8) to bind. The case of both constraints in the second 
period being expected to bind does not make sense in a two 
period model, but would do so if a third period was added.^
The households maximization problem for period 2 is then 
solved conditional upon x^ and L^, to yield the three follow­
ing conditional indirect utility functions.
(i) LSL2
= d < Lj and X2 < *2 gives
uH = V(x1,T1~L1,Xd ' a2 [(M1l + e 2^ / p 2 ,w2 /,p2 'X1 ' T 1_L J r
V ]^2 t(Ml+e2)/p2'W2/F’2'Xi ' Tr LJ ) ( 2 . 1.9)
(ii) * d> and x2 < h yields
uH =■ V (x^Tj-L^ (M1+e2+w 2L2  ^^ P2 #T2 ~ ^ 2^ ( 2 . 1 . 1 0 )
(iii) 4s i Lj and xd > *2 gives
UH -■ V (x^Tj-I^, x2, T2 - (p2x2 - M1 - e2)/w2) (2 .1.11)
There are four possible constraint combinations in the first 
period, and three alternative utility functions for each 
dependent upon expectations, yielding 12 possible behaviour 
regimes for period 1. An n period model would have 3 ( 4 )  
behaviour regimes for the first period. As Muellbauerand Portes 
point out this approach to expectations is not very tractable. 
Problematic also is the way period 2 expectations are formed as
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there is no link between the wages, prices and trades experienced 
in period 1, and those expected for the second period.
Mhellbauer and Portes suggest that a probabâlistic 
Von Neumann-Morgenstem approach is more attractive. The 
method adopted is as follows: a transformation of the utility 
function (2.1.5) is chosen,the expected value of which will 
be the new utility indicator to be maximized. Its arguments 
will be x^,T^-L^,M^,T2 and the parameters which generate the 
probabalistic expectations of e2,p2,w2,x2 and L2. The effects 
of and on expectations are absorbed into the utility 
function, and the other parameters which govern expectations 
p^,w^,e^ are represented by the vector 0.
Thus the expected indirect utility function may be 
written .*
UH = V (x1,T1-LlfM1,T2,0) (2.1.12)
The current period budget constraint may be written;
Mx = d1+M0+w1L1-p1x1 (2.1.13)
Substituting (2.1.13) into (2.1.12) yields;
UH = V(x1,T1-L1,d1+Mütw1L1-p1x1T2,9) (2.1.14)
d1 is dividends distributed at the end of the period.
The indifference curves generated by (2.1.14) are ellipsoid in 
(x^,L^) space as figure (2.1.1)
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Figure (2.1.1)
This is half of the well known Muellbauer and Portes 'Double 
wedge' diagram,, where point
A is the consumers goods demand if constrained to 
sell units of labour
B labour supply if rationed for goods at
C position of 'forced saving' when constrained4on both markets.
H is the consumers 'bliss' point where he is 
unconstrained on either market.
The role of expectations here is fundamental. The indifference 
curves have an ellipsoid shape because future consumption is 
represented in the utility function (2.1.12) by end of period 
money balances, and because expectations of future price and 
quantity constraints are represented by 9 and also absorbed 
into the x^ and terms. The ellipsoid shaped indifference 
curves based upon probabalistic expectations generate the 
'consumers wedge'. A 'producers wedge' is then constructed 
in a similar fashion. An additively separable two period , 
probabalistic profit function of the following form is examined.
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Max UF = " WjLty^] + f2CIi»Liyi) (2.1.15)
O fy,>O,X,>0 V~2.1. lb)
♦
Substituting (2.1.16) into (2.1.15) yields
UF = fj^ fpj^ Xj^ -Wj^ Lj + f2[h1(I0)+y(L1)-x1,L1,x1,i|i] (2.1.17)
Equation (2.1.17) expresses the firms current profit f^, and
■ kexpected profit f2 , as a function of current endogenous 
variables employment and sales x^, and exogeneous variables 
IQ and the exogenous vector of > •
that component of expectations on L2 , *2, "2 ":acil uoes
not depend on x^ and L.. The interperiod link for the firm 
is inventories, where end of period inventory holdings are 
ueLcnnined by current market experience and expectations. 
Equation (2.1.17) generates ellipsoidal firms indifference 
(multi-period discounted expected profit) curves and thus a 
producer’s wedge in a manner similar to the consumers problem, 
and as represented below in figure (2.1.2).
Figure (2.1.2)
A point such as
D is the firms goods supply if constrained by E units 
of available labour
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G Labour demand if constrained for sales at x 
E Position of 'forced inventory accumulation', when 
i constrained both for current labour and sales.
F The producers bliss point where he is unconstrained 
on either market.
Combining the two analyses allows a representation of five 
different temporary equilibria in sales employment space.6 
Figure (2.1.3)
(a) Temporary (d) Keynesian (c) Repressed Inflation
Competative Unemployment
Equilibrium in 
quantity space
A proof that the equilibrium illustrated in figure (2.1.3)(a) 
is a Temporary Competitive Equilibrium and not Walrasian 
equilibrium as claimed in Muellbauer and Portes (1978) is 
provided in an appendix to this chapter.
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In figure (2.1.3) it is clear that the type of equilibrium 
which obtains, its exact position in quantity space and its 
comparative static properties, will depend upon the position 
and shape of the two wedges. The role of expectations in 
this model is central to generating these results, expectations 
provide the rationale for the inter-temporal transfer of 
resources, and it is this transfer possibility which provides 
firms, for example, with the option of not relating sales 
directly to employment via the production function.
It should be noted that the equilibria represented in 
figure (2.1.3) are defined for a given set of expectations 
based upon the equilibrium conditions. If the comparative 
static exercise of shifting either the F or H system is 
carried out, then expectations will be modified and the 
wedges need to be redrawn. Muellbauer and Portes also suggest 
that this expectations effect may modify or reverse the 
comparative static effects of changes in government policy.
In principle the Muellbauer Portes treatments of expectations 
may be extended to an n agent m period model similar to that of 
Benassy (1975).
Neary and Stiglitz (1981) examine the role of expectations 
in a two period model, two types of expectations are examined: 
arbitrary and rational constraint expectations. A model similar 
to Barro and Grossman (1971) is extended to two periods, and 
is used to examine how expectations of quantity constraints 
in the second period effect the type of equilibrium that will 
obtain in the first. When constraint expectations are arbitrary, 
in the sense that they are exogeneously given, Neary and Stiglitz 
demonstrate three interesting results. Firstly that the vector 
of current and expected future prices which clears current
26
period markets is not unique, rather a different vector 
will be required with each different given configuration of 
constraint expectations* Secondly equilibria in effective 
demands are not uniquely determined by current and expected 
prices, a particular fixed price vector may be consistant 
with either 'Keynesian' or 'Classical' unemployment regimes 
in the current period, given different constraint expectations 
in future periods. Thirdly, exogeneous constraint expectations 
may have a 'bootstrap' effect, in the sense that the expect­
ation of, say, a Keynesian regime in the second period will 
cause households to increase saving and firms to lower employ­
ment in the first period, thus making a Keynesian regime 
more likely in'the first period.
Neary and Stiglitz also study what they term rational con­
straint expectations. Constraint expectations are said to 
be rational if in the first period, household and firms 
expectations of the constraints that they will face in the 
second period, are consistant with the transactions that the 
other side of the market plans to carry out. It is demon­
strated that rational constraint expectations have the same 
'bootstrap' characteristics as discussed above. The obvious 
question to ask is; if agents have sufficient information 
of other agents plans that constraint expectations are 
rational, in the above sense, why do not workers and firms 
communicate and generate Walrasian equilibrium? Neary and 
Stiglitz argue that agents only know the aggregate plans that 
the other side of any particular markets wishes to carry out 
next period. Thus there may not be sufficient detailed 
information available to facilitate price adjustment bargaining.
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In the Neary and Stiglitz approach expectations are assumed 
to be held with certainty. Honkapohja and Ito (1979) 
examine a model based on the recent literature of models 
with trading uncertainty or stocastic rationing schemes.8 
Consumers and producers attach probabilities to their 
succeeding or failing to achieve their initial trade offers. 
The agents calculate these probabilities by observing 
disequilibrium signals defined by (2.1.18) and (2.1.19)
Honkapohja and Ito hypothesise that each agent is a signal 
taker as well as a price taker, and describe how agents cope 
with trading uncertainty as below:
Goods Market
(2.1.18)
s . d v = x /x (2.1.19)
demand side: actual trade (s)x(offer), with
probability </'
offer, with probability 1-
Supply side: actual trade = ( (z)x(offer), with probabili
offer, with probability 1-A
Labour Market
demand side: actual trade ( (t)x(offer), with probabili* ( 9
i offer, with probability 1-9
(
(
(q)x(offer), with probabili)
supply side: actual trade
( offer, with probability 1-n
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where s=s(v), z-z(v), r=r(u), q=q(u) and <p=<l>(v), A =A (v)
0=® (u), n=n (u)
and (r(u)=l for u>*l, q(u)=l for u>l, s(v)=l for vsl 
and z(v)=l for vil
Each agent bases his trade offers on the maximization of 
expected utility, subject to the probabalistic expectation 
<l>,A,e,n . A stocastic rationing equilibrium is defined by 
Honkapohja and Ito as 'a pair of disequilibrium signals u,v 
which induce agents to express effective demands and 
supplies which reproduce the signals’. In this model 
expectations play a different role than in those previously 
examined as here expectations are based upon agents observing 
aggregate disequilibrium signals and attaching probabilities 
to the different outcomes they may achieve. This model re­
quires that aggregate effective demands and quantity constraints 
(signals) replicate themselves. Prices are exogenous and pre­
sumably, although this is not examined in the paper, when 
prices do change a new period begins and a new equilibrium is 
established. Since households carry money stocks forwards, 
these must be based upon expectations in a manner similar to 
the models examined previously.
In exogenous price models expectations are formed on the 
basis of current and previous market experience, and are used 
by economic agents to decide what stocks to carry forwards.
A Temporary equilibrium in exogenous price models requires 
that effective demands and quantity constraints replicate
qthemselves. Expectations do not need to be 'exact' in the sense 
of Michel (1980).*° The confirmation of expectations plays 
no role in defining the equilibrium.
■■k
29
In endogenous price models the validation of expectations is 
central to defining the equilibria.11 A simple but interest­
ing illustration of this approach in the following model due 
to Varian ( 1977) .
hct price setting firms have point expectations of the demand 
for their output x which will constrain their demand for 
labour, by an inverse production function, to f-1(x) if 
w/pOL/3x at x, if not their labour demand will be of Walrasian 
form Ld (w/p).
Thus firms constrained labour demand functions may be written
d = ( _La (w/p»x) = Min ( f i(x) if w/p<3L/3x at x
Let households have a consumption function out of profit 
income x^iw/pjx) and a Walrasian labour supply Ls (w/p). It 
is assumed there are no savings and thus their Wali-asian demand 
for consumption may bp. written (w/p)Ls (w/p)+xu (w/p,x) .
The actual amount of labour that households may sell is
L(w/p,x) = min ( Ls (w/p)
( La (w/pi x)
Therefore effective demand for consumption will be 
x(w/p,x) = w/p L(w/p,x) + x ^ w /PjX)
The economy may now be described by the following dynamical system.
If demand for labour is not equal to supply then the nominal 
wage rate adjusts as:
it = Ld (w/p, x) - LS (w/p) (2 . 1 . 20)
If expected demand for output is not equal to actual effective 
demand expectations will be revised.
x* = x(w/p, x) - x (2.1.21)
If actual demand for output is less than effective supply 
then prices will change.
p = x(w/p, x) - f (L(w/p,x)) (2.1.22)
An equilibrium in Varians model is a real wage, output 
expectation pair (w/p,x) which equates (2.1.2o), (2.1.21) and 
(2.1.22) to zero, such that (a) expected demand is equal to 
actual demand so that expectations are static? (b) actual 
consumption demand equals its supply, so that the price level
• . t , ■■ t , , , ,  .  > . > M . ,- - , ^ » . , , ^ 1  1 I............................... ' . I .. , 1  l  -  * t „
conditional demand so that nominal wage rate is constant. 
Illustration of one such equilibrium is given below in 
figure (2.1.4).
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Define the profit consumption function xn (w/p,x) = x17 to be 
compatible with Walrasian equilibrium. Then the offer
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curve must pass through the endowment point and through the 
transformation frontier at two points, one of which is the 
Walrasian equilibrium denoted (w/p ,x), the other is the 
non-Walrasian equilibrium (w/p,x).12 At the non-Walrasian 
equilibrium firms pessimistic expectations of demand lead them 
to employ very little labour, there is a low real wage w/p, 
thus households supply little labour and have a low demand 
for goods. There is then an equilibrium in the effective 
demand system.^
This is clearly a 'bootstrap' type of model in which expectations 
are essential to the definition of equilibrium. Notice however, 
that the bootstrap effect is different from that presented by 
Neary and Stiglitz . In that model expectations of a particular 
regime tomorrow made that outcome more likely to obtain today, but 
in this case expectations of demand today have a bootstrap effect 
on todays equilibrium. There are, as Drazen ( 1 9 8 0 ) points 
out, some problems with Varian's model. Essentially the 
problem is that firms believe that cutting their prices, when 
price is greater than marginal cost, will not increase demand 
for their output. This is because they expect the following 
to happen, if one firm cuts price all others will follow suit, 
real wages will rise and households will increase their labour 
supplies and the nominal wage will be bid down. Nominal 
wages and prices will be lower but no real variables wi 11 be 
effected, thus the firms will not bother. The problem'is 
that there are no money balances in the model, and no real 
balance effect is associated with a price cut. If these 
were present producers expectations would be that a price cut 
will increase their sales.
Heller and Starr (1978) consider a model which is in many
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respects a multigood version of Varians. Their treatment of 
expectations is however slightly different. The unemployment 
equilibrium they examine is a Nash equilibrium, thus once 
each agent has achieved a constrained maximization plan no 
attempt to break constraints is attempted, because all other 
agents are observed to be in equilibrium, and each agent 
then takes all others behaviour as given. Therefore, expectations in 
the Heller Starr model perform differently than in the 
Varian treatment. In Varian it is an expectation of a 
particular transaction level which if achieved generates the 
equilibrium concept, in Heller and Starr it is the expectation 
that others will not change their behaviour which generates a 
Nash type equilibrium.
Neglishi (1974, 1978, 1979) presents an endogencous price 
model in which firms and consumers perceive kinked demand 
curves for goods and labour respectively. Firms perceive a 
kinked demand for their good since they believe that if they 
raise the price of their good all consumers will immediately 
purchase from a different supplier, but if they lower price 
imperfect information will mean that not all consumers will 
attempt to switch their purchases to the supplier in question.
A worker perceives a kinked demand curve for his services 
since a rise in the wage he charges will cause firms to 
employ another, but a cut in his reservation wage will- not 
ensure employment, because firms will be reluctant to hire 
at a lower wage rate as this will cause dissatisfaction and 
a lowering of productivity amongst other workers. Prices are 
endogenous but sticky with consequent quantity rationing. 
Expectations, here the perceived demand curves, are central to 
the definition of a non-Walrasian equilibrium. Given a starting
■?
point which must be on the kink of the demand curve, workers 
and firms attach probabilities to achieving sales and 
employment at lower respective prices. Both sides of thei
market base their behaviour, price quoting and quantity 
transactions, upon the maximization of their expected 
objective functions and when actual transactions validate 
expectations an equilibrium is achieved. This implies that 
the requirement for an equilibrium in Negishi's model is only 
that the actual and perceived demand curves intersect, away 
from the equilibrium trade on a market all expectations 
may be incorrect. Consider figure (2.1.4) which illustrates 
equilibrium on the labour market.
Figure (2.1.4)
As Drazen (1980) points out, the equilibrium does not require 
actual demand curves to have kinks and it is not entirely clear 
why economic agents should perceive kinked demand curves.1^
Futia (1977) presents an approach in some ways similar to Negishi' 
but which appears more intuitively reasonable. Firms are 
assumed to find it too costly to search the whole labour force 
to find the workers quoting the lowest reservation wages. They
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therefore, sample a random subset of the labour force and employ 
members of the subset up to point where the marginal product 
of labour is equal to the expected average real wage. Given 
firms behaviour households quote a whole distribution of 
reservation wages (not one common wage as in Negishi), because 
they perceive a trade off between the probability of 
employment and the wage rate they quote. Quoting a very high 
reservation wage will not reduce the probability of employment 
to zero since the worker may be lucky enough to find himself 
in the labour pool of a firm which has randomly selected 
many workers also quoting high reservation wages. A 'Keynesian' 
unemployment equilibrium in Futia's model is defined by a 
distribution of reservation wages, an output price level, and 
a level of exogenous demand together with an aggregate average 
real wage which validates firms expectations. Such an 
equilibrium is shown to exist at different levels of exogenous 
demand.
In the two types of models examined, expectations play funda­
mentally different roles. In the exogenous price quantity 
tatonnement models there is no requirement that expectations 
be correct for an equilibrium to exist. Expectations held 
in previous periods determine current period endowments, and 
expectations of future periods determine the amount of goods 
or income agents wish to transfer for consumption in-future 
periods. The economy will be stationary over the period even 
if expectations are invalidated. In the second class of 
Neo-Keynesian macroeconomic models examined correct expectations 
are the essential feature of the equilibria. When expectations 
are realised agents tend to refrain from further market 
experimentation even if mutually beneficial transactions are
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possible. Therefore equilibria with an under usage of resources 
arise.
i
2• 2 Expectations and Limited Quantity Adjustment
In the previous section 2.1 a discussion was presented of how 
expectations are treated in the literature. In this section 
I present an exogenous price model which has the novel 
characteristic that expectations held about the rations 
agents will face in the current period affect the actual 
current period equilibria.
The economy to be studied behaves as follows. At the end of 
any market period agents hold expectations of the quantities 
they will be able to trade in the next period. The money 
balances they carry forwards are therefore based upon expected 
supply and demand curves. At the start of the next market 
period fixed prices are announced and from their expected 
demand and supply curves agents calculate their expected upper 
transaction bounds, they base their initial transaction offers 
upon these expected constraints. In a standard treatment 
such as Muellbauer and Portes these initial non-Walrasian 
transaction offers are unimportant since it ds assumed that there 
is sufficient flexibility within each market period for agents 
to adjust their behaviour on each market to be consistant with 
the quantity constraints experienced on others. Thus'in the 
conventional treatment the starting point of the tatonnement 
is unimportant. In the economy we study below it is argued 
that such flexibility is less than perfect particularly in the 
upward direction. It is argued that it is easier for an agent 
to revise transactionsdownwards, since this requires only that 
he abstains from some trades, than it is to revise transactions
upwards, since this will require that he locates an agent 
on the other side of the market who also wishes to revise his 
trades in the appropriate way.^f
To simplify the analysis we shall work with a representative 
consumer, representative producer model, such as in Muellbauer 
and Portes (1978), Ellis (1980) and Ito (1980). Two strong 
simplifying assumptions will be made:
(Al) Expectations are held with subjective certainty.
(A2) In a given market period transaction demands 
may only be revised downwards.
These assumptions are justified since they allow an easy 
first approach to several interesting and complex questions.
The Microeconomic Model 
(a) Consumers
Assume the representative consumer maximizes a single period 
Cobb-Douglas utility function.
V = xa (T-L)6 (M./p)Y a+8+y=l (2.2.1)
subject to a budget constraint
MQ + wL = px + (2.2.2)
Solution of this problem without quantity constraints yields 
the notional supplies and demands
x = c (ifelSH) -  (2.2.3)
L = (a+y) T - B(^) (2.2.4)
w
fi, = Y(Mo +w T) (2.2.5)
Here subscripts o and 1 refer to beginning and end of period
variables.
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Next consider consumers expectations as described by his 
expected labour demand and goods supply functions (2.2.6) and
(2.2.7),:
E = L(w/p) + A (2.2.6)
x = x(w/p) + B (2.2.7)
where A and B are treated as constants in the current period . 
Their adjustment over time will be examined in a later section.
Utilising the technique of Benassy (1975), discussed in the 
introduction, we may now calculate the consumers initial 
labour supply and initial goods demand given (2.2.6) and (2.2.7) 
and fixed prices w and p.
To calculate the consumers goods demand given the exnected 
labour supply curve we solve the following programme.
Max V = x“ (T-L) 0 (M^p)Y
S.T MQ+wL  ^ p.X + j2 2 8)
L* E.= L(w/p) + A
From the first order conditions of (2.2.8) the choice of x and M^ 
when L = E = L(w/p) + A we get:
x = —  ( ^  ) (2.2.9)a+Y p
M1 = -L- (WE + m0) (2.2.10)a+y u
due to a manipulation first noticed by Ito (1980) we rewrite
(2.2.9) as (2.2.11)
x - * * 1 1 ? [c-£] (2-2-U) •
(2.2.11) is the representative consumers initial goods demand 
if he expects to be constrained on the labour market. As the 
expression illustrates this is comprised of two components,the 
notional goods demand, and the expected spillover effect.
From the Kuhn-Tucker condition (for a formal derivation see 
Ellis (1980)) we may write:
( » «M
* " !  * “  TiTeTT^ E l2-2-12’
‘ 5 + U-i] othervlse
This may be interpreted as that the consumer always bases his 
initial goods purchase offer on the minimum of his notional 
and constrained demands.
Expressing (2.2.3) and (2.2.11) together in (p/w,x) space 
holding p fixed clarifies the proceding analysis.
Figure (2.2.1)
At the point (a,A) in figure (2.2.1) both the notional and 
constrained goods demand curves yield the same initial goods 
demand offer, where 0 = pffreTTT * Above (0, A) offers •
are made according to the notional curve defined by (2.2.3)
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and below (9,A) offers are made according to the expectations 
constrained curve as defined by (2.2.11). Hence the heavy line 
in figure (2.2.1 ) is the consumers initial goods demand curve. 
This is termed the 'expectational' goods demand function and 
may be written.
The consumers behaviour on the labour market given the 
expected goods supply function may be analysed in a similar 
manner. The programme being:
From the first order conditions of (2.2.14) the choice of 
and when x = x(w/p)+B = x is:
(2.2.17) is the representative consumers initial labour supply 
' if he expects to be constrained on the goods market.
x = Ej^PfWfMQ,!.) (2.2.13)
Max V xa (T-L)e (M1/p)Y
S.T Mq '+ wL > px + (2.2.14)
x < x(w/p) + B = x
L
M1 = (B+Y) (Mo + wT " Px) (2.2.16)
where again using Ito (1980) we may rewrite (2.2.15) to 
emphasise the expected spillover effect as (2.2.17):
(2.2.17)
From the Kuhn-Tucker condition of (2.2.14) we may write:
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and below (e,A) offers are made according to the expectations 
constrained curve as defined by (2.2.11). Hence the heavy line 
in figure (2.2.1 ) is the consumers initial goods demand curve. 
This is termed the 'expectational' goods demand function and 
may be written.
The consumers behaviour on the labour market given the 
expected goods supply function may be analysed in a similar 
manner. The programme being:
From the first order conditions of (2.2.14) the choice of 
and when x = x(w/p)+B = x is:
(2.2.17) is the representative consumers initial labour supply 
if he expects to be constrained on the goods market.
x = E^p^Mo,!,) (2.2.13)
Max V xa (T-L)6 (M1/p)Y
S.T Mq '+ wL > px + (2.2.14)
x < x(w/p) + B = x
(2.2.15)
M1 = (e+7) (Mo + wT " px) (2.2.16)
where again using Ito (1980) we may rewrite (2.2.15) to 
emphasise the expected spillover effect as (2.2.17):
(2.2.17)
From the Kuhn-Tucker condition of (2.2.14) we may write:
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( ,
L = ( L if w>(px-o Mq )/aT (2.2.18)
* ( L + [x-x] otherwise
This condition (2.2.18) states that the consumer bases his 
initial labour supply offer upon the minimum of his notional 
and constrained supplies. To illustrate this (2.2.4) and
(2.2.17) are drawn together in (w/p ,L) space, again 
represented for fixed p.
Figure (2.2.2)
At the point (({>,n) in figure (2.2.2) both the notional and 
constrained labour supply curves yield the same initial labour 
supply offer, where <j)= (px-aM^ j) /paT. Above <}> offers are made 
according to the expectations constrained curve defined by 
' (2.2.17) whilst below <|) offers are made along the notional
curve. The heavy line in figure (2.2.2) is termed the 
1expectational‘ labour supply curve, and may be written:
L = E2(p,w,Mo, x) (2.2.19)
4 L
Expressions (2.2.13) and (2.2.19) imply that the demand for 
end of period money balances at the time when initial offers 
are made on the good and labour markets will be of the form:
= E 3(Mo , p , w , E ,5) (2.2.20)
Notice that in both the expectational labours supply and 
goods demand functions, it is the expected spillover effect 
which modifies initial transaction offers. An exoected 
constraint on one market effects the other.
(b) Producers
The producer maximizes profit subject to a short run production 
function:
Max it = py - wL
r
S.T y = kL 0<6<1
(2 .2 .2 1)
where 3y/3L = 6kL6_1> 0 and 3^y/3L^ < 0
The profit maximizing condition of (2.2.21) is the standard
w/p = 6kL6-1 (2.2.22)
Manipulating (2.2.22) the real wage equals to the marginal 
physical product of labour condition yields the producers 
unconstrained labour demand and goods supply functions.
1
T TW 1 l” 1-6 L = (P •
6
(2.2.23)(a)
, .6 . ,w 1 . - y = kL = k(- . ££) ■PTT (2.2.23) (b)
Assuming the producers holds expectations of labour supply 
and goods demand as (2.2.24) and (2.2.25):
-1
L = L(w/p) + C (2.2.24)
ÿ = y(p/w) + D (2.2.25)
1
Where C and D are treated as constants in the current period. 
The adjustment of C and D over time will be examined in a 
later section.
Producers are assumed to have no means of inter-period income 
transfer, we could allow inventories as in Muellbauer and 
Portes (1978) or retained money balances, then the constrained 
good supply and labour demand function would form a wedge. 
However, this provides further complications without yielding 
any conceptually, new results to this model.
Using the production function, (2.2.24) and (2.2.25) we may 
write the producers constrained labour demand and goods supply 
functions as:
y kE 6 (2.2.27)
Notice that if the producer expects a constraint on one market 
this determines his behaviour upon both, since he must be on 
his production function. Thus his initial goods supply is:
y = min ÿ, kLô ,
o - k 1 ”  ] (2.2.28)
(2.2.28) as :
y = E4 (p,w,k,y,E) (2.2.29)
which may be represented in (p/w,y) space as figure (2.2.3)
p/w
r-T
/
<///
/
-- > y
Figure (2.2.3)
in a similar manper the producers labour demand may be written
which we rewrite as the producers initial labour demand curve 
viz (2.2.31).
their initial transaction demands and supplies, all that is 
required to characterise market outcomes is an explanation of 
how initial demands and supplies are revised. The market 
mechanism is as described previously, once made market offers 
may only be varied downwards. Consequently two types of 
market outcome are possible, either both sets of agents achieve
1
1 " 1=7 (2.2.30)
L = Es(p,w,k,y,L) (2.2.31)
Note that the producer cannot expect to meet binding 
constraints simultaneously on both markets.
Characterisation of Microeconomic Outcomes
Having- examined how both representative agents calculate
mutually consistant transactions or one achieves his desired 
trades and the other wishes to revise upwards.
t
It will be assumed for the moment that x=y,all output is 
available for consumption by households, so that the market 
outcome can be characterised by the following minimum conditions.
xd =
s
X =
LS =
Ld =
E  ]_ ( P  » w , Mo, L ,  y  ) if £  <
* d =  E^ (p, w, Mo,L ,y) if Ld<
E^ (p»w r K, L) if Ë  <
E* (p i w , K,I.S) if LS
i (xd,xs)
E2 (p, w , Mo, x) if x < :
*  *E2 (p, w ,Mo, x°) if x < :
E5 (p, w", k, y,L) if x<xd
* d = 
E j (p ,w,k,x ,L) if xd<x
(2.2.32)
(2.2.33)
(2.2.34)
(2.2.35)
(2.2.36)
L = min(Ld,Ls) (2.2.37)
The pairs of expressions (2.2.32), (2.2.33), (2.2.35) and (2.2.36) 
have the same functional forms, and differ only in that the 
first equation in each pair the constraint is expected,whilst 
in the second it is actually generated in (2.2.34) and (2.2.37).
We see from (2.2.32)-(2.2.37) that either household or firms 
expectations may constrain the economic system.
Expectations and Macroeconomic Outcomes
To examine the macroeconomic implications of the preceding 
analysib, some accounting identities are required to define 
the structure of the economy.
y t = x t + 9 t ( I D
s t = W t L t " P t x t (12)
"t = p ty t - w t L t + G t (13)
M t " (Mt - l + V i *  <1-4» + s t (14)
"t-.i+Mt _ i + p g t -4><M t- i +1Tt - i ) + G t (15)
gt = flow of government expenditure in period t: 
which has a prior claim on output.
4> = Government monetary transfer as a proportion
of initial household money holdings.
Gfc = government'tax/subsidy on profits.
It is assumed that all firms profits earned during a period 
are distributed to households at the beginning of the next 
period.
To express the macroeconomic potentialities of this model, 
the familiar wedge diagram developed by Muellbauer and Portes 
(1978) is adopted, this allows consumers constrained labour 
supply and commodity demand/ and the production function to 
' be expressed together in (x,L) space. The interpretation 
of the consumers wedge here is different in one significant 
respect, for the consumers two constrained curves represent 
initial offer curves if the constraint is an expected
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constraint, and represent loci of temporary equilibria if
the constraint is effective. It will later be shown that
the expected constraints (L or x) truncate the wedqe at ♦
the level of the initial market offers they generate. No 
underconsumption case is possible in the analysis since 
the producer has to be on his production function, therefore 
only points on or inside the consumers wedge are of interest.
The system displays the standard quantity constrained 
equilibria as demonstrated by figure (2.2.4)
Figure (2.2.4)
The broken lines in figure (2.2.4) are firms production functions 
net of government goods purchases. Points K, C and R are 
standard Keynesian, Classical and Repressed Inflation temporary
17equilibria with quantity rationing.
To examine the effects of expectations, first assume only firms 
hold constraint expectations, then, given that the firms
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expected constrained input/output combination lies within 
the consuméis wedge and below the unconstrained choice point, 
an exp^ctational classical temporary equilibrium will result 
as indicated in figure (2.2.5). Notice that at the equil­
ibrium point C' the real wage is below the marginal product 
of labour.
At point C' in figure (2.2.5) the firm expecting to encounter 
a constraint on trade in one market adjusts offers to be 
mutually consistent, the household wishes to trade more on 
both markets. Hence the economy has achieved an expectations 
constrained, or expectational classical outcome.
The case of firms expectations is not stressed in the following 
analysis, as the firms behaviour described in this manner, 
without inventories, is rather restricted. Consequently 
the next step is the introduction of household expectations 
into the analysis as major emphasis will be placed upon 
household expectations and hereafter firms expectations will 
be mainly surpressed. The rule that firms must be on their
x ‘ T.C.E
a
b
Fi gure (2.2.5)
Where at C  (a,b) = (Lt,kLt6) if
(a,b) xk
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production functions will of course be enforced. The case 
where households expect a constraint on labour sales is 
described by figure (2.2.6)
Figure (2.2.6)
Households in figure (2.2.6) solve a constrained utility
maximization problem subject to the expectation £fc = L(w/p)+A,
hence they offer xfc on the goods market. Once the initial
transactions offer xfc is made this truncates the wedge of the
consumer as no upward adjustment is allowed, the area above
xfc is now unattainable, and the truncated wedge now describes
actual levels of 5^. as a function of actual labour sales. Firms
are constrained by xfc and employ . At the point t', the
expectational Keynesian unemployment equilibrium, households
achieve L't on the labour market and their expected labour
constrained goods demand. Unanticipated savings of w(L^-£t)
18arise since consumers obtain less consumption good.
V T.C.E.
The important point of figure (2.2.6) is that it is the 
spillover effect of the expected constraint generating 
a low j,nitial trade offer on the goods market which 
constrains the system.
The case where the household expects to be constrained on 
the goods market is described by figure (2.2.7).
In figure (2.2.7) households subjectively certain of being 
constrained on the goods market make an initial transaction 
offer on the labour market of L^ ., thus truncating the wedge 
at this level of employment. Firms constrained by the house- 
holds labour offer provide xfc to the goods market. At point 
R* households achieve their expected goods constrained labour
Isales, and purchase x £, giving unanticipated dissaving 
p(x't-xt) which arises since the consumer cannot realise 
more labour income. The market outcome has repressed inflation 
characteristics, household expectations cause firms to be 
constrained for labour, and households are constrained on both 
markets relative to the usual repressed inflation equilibrium R.
<r
o
Figures (2.2.6) and (2.2.7) demonstrate situations where con­
sumers only hold constraint expectations about one market, but 
since we are using a Benassy formulation to calculate agents 
demands there is no reason why consumers should not anticipate 
an upper bound on trades on both markets simultaneously.
Indeed there is no reason why agents should not make offers 
on markets above the constraints they anticipate to meet on 
those markets, since only the spillover effects matter. This 
aspect of the Benassy formulation has been criticised by, 
for example, Svensson (1977). However, it does have the 
advantage here of allowing agents to find out if their 
constraint expectations are correct. Figure (2.2.8) thus 
describes the consumers wedge when expectations of upper 
transaction bounds on both markets are introduced.
Ë=L(w/p)+A
Figure (2.2.8)
In figure (2.2.8) intersection of a production function with 
the boundary of the truncated wedge along the K' line will 
yield expectational Keynesian Temporary equilibria, inter­
section with the R* line yields expectational repressed
inflation temporary equilibria. The mechanisms being as in 
figures (2.2.6) and (2.2.7).
I
Notice that although termed expectational Keynesian and 
Repressed inflation the outcome K' and R' in figures (2.2.6) 
and (2.2.7) are quite different from their standard Keynesian 
and Repressed inflation counterparts K and R in figure (2.2.4) 
At the K and R equilibria both consumers and producers are 
achieving mutually consistant trades on the two markets. At 
the K' and R' equilibria the consumers level of money 
balances are changing as a residual. The consumer is achieving 
transactions consistant with his expectations, even though 
those expectations may not be fulfilled on the market they 
were formed about. It is therefore argued that consumers 
own expectations will place them in a semi-classical situation. 
The position of the equilibria will depend upon relative 
prices, the production technology and the form of the 
expectations functions. Finally it should be noted that 
these equilibria are not 'bootstrap' in either the sense of 
Varian (1977) or Neary and Stiglitz (1979) since it is the 
market offers generated by expectations which are always 
achieved, the expectations themselves will typically be 
incorrect.
In the next section the way agents may adjust their behaviour 
over successive periods is examined.
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EXPECTATIONS ADJUSTMENT AND MARKET OUTCOMES OVER SEVERAL PERIODS
In the preceding analysis the impact of expectations on a 
single period model with partial quantity adjustment was 
examined. In this section we shall examine how the economic 
system under study may adjust over several market periods.
Two basic questions will be considered. Firstly, if relative 
prices are stable over successive periods will the system 
automatically adjust to higher levels of output and employ­
ment? Secondly, what effects will relative price changes 
have? In considering these two questions it will be found 
that an intuitively reasonable interpretation may be placed 
on the limited quantity adjustment assumption made in the 
preceeding sections.
From this juncture onwards Keynesian cases will be examined 
in detail. Symmetric cases can be constructed for repressed 
inflation outcomes the results of which will be stated but 
not analysed here.
Consider the case where only consumers hold expectations.
Let relative prices be fixed over several successive periods 
and expectations be formed as follows:
Efc = Efc-1 + a(L't_1 - £*._!) (2.2.38)
which using (2.2.6) may be written:
Lfc = L (w/p) + oA't-l + (1-a)At-l (2.2.39)
(2.2.39) is interpreted as follows; when in period t-1 agents 
discover that the constraint they expected to face on the 
labour market is incorrect they do not revise their belief 
about the shape of the expected labour demand curve. Consumers
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assume that they have located the demand curve incorrectly. 
This seems a plausible hypothesis for agents to hold, as in 
a given period fixed-prices mean that they do not observe
The adjustment of consumers behaviour can be decomposed into 
two effects. Firstly, the accumulation of money balances in 
period t-1 will shift the intercepts of the consumers wedge, 
since the solution of the consumer utility maximization 
problem in period t will be based upon a different initial 
money endowment. Secondly the expected quantity constraint 
on the labour market will be revised according to expression
Figure (2.2.9) demonstrates the effect of money balance 
accumulation upon the consumers wedge. Note that the move­
ment of the wedge here is due to involuntary money balance 
accumulation as opposed to a chosen accumulation as in 
Muellbauer and Portes..(1978) .
1 9any movement along a demand curve.
x
t-2
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The locus of consumers unconstrained choice points in figure
(2.2.9) is given by (2.2.40) (solving 2.2.9) and (2.2.15) for
Hence a negatively sloped straight line.
Using (15), (2.2.10) and the expression w(L't_^ - ,) we
note that the change in beginning of period money balances 
must obey the following equation (2.2.42), written in our 
end of period terms.
Expression (2.2.42) is simply an adding up condition, which 
says the total change in the money stock must equal the 
government budget deficit.
Having examined how the wedge shifts with changes in consumers 
money balances, consider how expectations adjust over successive 
periods of constant prices. Figure (2.2.10) examines 
expectation adjustment in a static monetary environment, i.e. 
where the government balances its budget.
L=L ancj x=x)
(2.2.40)
which has slope
dL
dx aB (B+y)
Y < 0 (2.2.41)
A m = Gt-l+P9t-l _<i,(Mt-2 + nt-2  ^= (a+y) (w^t-l+Mt-2+1Tt-2
t-2— 1-1
(2.2.42)
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Figure (2.2.10)
Figure (2.2.10) is drawn for cr=l in equation (2.2.39) the 
expectations adjustment function. As expectations adjust 
consumers initial goods market purchase offers rise from 
xfc_^ to xfc over time period t-1. This has the effect of 
pushing up the ceiling of the truncated wedge as indicated 
by the arrow. Thus over successive time periods the system 
will move out along the production function, through a 
series of expectational Keynesian equilibria, until the 
point K is achieved. At K expectations are correct and 
there is no tendency for the system to move further. A 
similar result holds for r ' equilibria tending to R equilibria.
Figure (2.2.10) furnishes part of the answer to the first 
question posed at the beginning of this section. When the
5G
monetary environment is static, the government is balancing 
its budget, and when prices are fixed over successive periods, 
then the economy does display automatic adjustment to 
higher levels of output and employment. The adjustment, of 
course, is to a standard Keynesian unemployment equilibrium, 
not to the consumers temporary competitive equilibrium point.
To examine the adjustment of consumer behaviour when both 
initial money balances and expectations adjust, figures
(2.2.9) and (2.2.10) are combined to give (2.2.11).
In figure (2.2.11) as the money stock grows the consumers 
wedge shifts upwards and to the left. Expectations adjust 
by the partial adjustment mechanism (2.2.38), and initial 
goods purchase offers correspondingly rise. Thus expectations
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push the system out along the production function in the 
same manner as was described in figure (2.2.10). The sig­
nificance of the shifts in the consumers wedge is also 
apparent) if consumers were at the K't_^ equilibrium we saw 
that given no change in the money stock the system would be 
driven by expectations to the Kfc_1 equilibrium. As the money 
stock grows expectations drive the system towards successively 
higher Keynesian unemployment equilibria Kfc_^+Kt , and as we 
observe on the diagram, may also cause a regime switch as 
indicated by the point Rt+ .^ If on this (Keynesian) regime 
the money supply were to be contracting then the wedge would 
shift in the opposite direction to that indicated, tracing 
out a series of orthodox Keynesian temporary equilibrium 
points. On the repressed inflation regime the same results 
hold but in each case the direction of the money supply 
change is reversed, i.e. a cut in the money supply is required 
to shift the system out to higher levels of output and 
employment. Expectations and money stock adjustments may 
push the system out to an equilibrium at the intersection 
of the production function and the locus of consumers 
unconstrained choice points. The levels of output and 
employment which will thus be achieved are described by 
(2.2.43) and (2.2.44) .
L+L6 _2_ E 2o +y I w k (2.2.43)
x + x^ *5  = L+-- (2.2w
where x=x and E=L
If producers expectations are reintroduced, and are also 
based upon a partial adjustment mechanism, then there will
come a point at which their expectations will place them on 
the short side of the markets. Consequently the consumers 
adjustment process will be halted by the occurrence of an 
expectational classical outcome.20 The market outcomes 
over several periods will thus depend upon three rates of 
change, consumers expectations, producers expectationsand 
exogenous monetary changes. Also highly significant will 
be the 'original' state of agents expectations. There are 
many permutations of rates of change and original expectations 
which will produce quantatively different outcomes, and the 
likelihood of the various possibilities may well be a question 
for empirical study.
The second question to which this analysis addresses itself 
is what impact will changes in the relative price vector 
have upon the model. For the representative consumer a 
change in relative prices will have income, substitution, 
and real balance effects as found in models such as Muellbauer 
and Portes (1978), here there will also be an expectations 
effect, recalling (2.2.6), E=L(w/p)+A, we see that a change 
in relative prices causes the consumer to anticipate his 
being employed at a different point on the labour demand 
curve.
We assume:
1) (w/p) 0 (2.2.45)
3x
7Tw/p) < 0 (2.2.46)
Further to maintain the Keynesian flavour of our analysis 
we shall assume that at the end of a period of Keynesian 
unemployment both the nominal prices of labour and goods fall.
Furthermore it will be assumed that the change in wages and
prices raises the real wage rate, i.e. we shall examine a
case where there is some resistance to a reduction in the *
nominal wage. Surpressing for the moment both producer and 
consumer expectations, it may be seen that in the case 
chosen for analysis the consumers wedge will move as 
described by figure (2.2.12)
Figure (2.2.12)
In figure (2.2.12), the wedge associated with T.C.E^ has 
higher nominal wages and prices than the wedge associated 
with T.C.E.j, but has' a lower real wage rate.
in figure (2.2.12) Pt>Pt+r w
and
+ *t-li
wt / > e, “f a )
Mt + TT
wt+1
A = 1
w.
Pt+l
wt+l
Consumer expectations adjustment over successive periods of 
relative price changes will comprise two components, one, 
the relocation of the expected labour demand curve in (w/p,u
space by the partial adjustment mechanism (2.2.39),and two, the 
relative price effect on consumers expected labour demand 
curve, which in the case under analysis here tightens the 
consumers expected labour sales ration according to (2.2.45). 
Diagramatically consumers expectations are added to figure 
(2.2.12) to produce figure (2.2.13).
Figure (2.2.13)
In figure (2.2.13) consumers start the market period with 
expectations Lfc of the upper bound they will face on labour 
sales. They initially offer xfc on the goods market and this 
truncates the wedge as described previously. In period t an 
expectational Keynesian equilibrium arises at K*t . Between 
periods t and t+1 excess supply on both markets forces both 
nominal prices down and raises the real wage. The consumer 
wedge moves as described by figure (2.2.12), and consumer 
expectations adjust in two ways, the relocation and relative 
price effects discussed above. The relocation of the consumers 
expected labour demand curve in period t+1 is in response 
to the error in expectations, I*'t -Et in the previous period.
r.j
This works to increase output and employment. The relative
price effect lowers the level of labour sales the consumer
anticipates achieving, and thus works to reduce output and
employment. In figure (2.2.13) the net effect of the change
in relative prices moves the economic system from the K't
equilibrium to the K t+1 equilibrium, with a consequent
21increase in both output and employment.
For the producer with expectations formed as (2.2.24) and (2.2.25), 
changes in relative prices will push the system up or down 
the production function in both the expectational and standard 
classical temporary equilibria. Relative price changes will 
an orthodox clasoinl temrorary equilibrium by changing 
the real wage equals the marginal piiysicu^ ' r 1-honr
condition. Relative price changes will move expectational 
classical equilibria along the production function due to 
the relative price effect upon the consumers expected goods 
demand function.
The preceding discussion of expectations adjustment suggests 
two possible interpretations. The analysis of expectations 
adjusting over several periods of fixed prices may be 
interpreted as an analysis of the very short run, where 
expectations adjust in a succession of sub-periods. This 
would be consistant with the argument presented earlier that 
limited quantity adjustment as represented in this model is, 
in the very short run, a consequence of agents being unable 
to locate others who also wish to increase transaction levels 
in a limited time period. Alternatively, the analysis presented 
examining expectations adjustment in tandem with price 
adjustments suggests a rather longer period interpretation, of 
the model,where the length of a market period is the interval
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between relative price adjustments. This may well be more 
consistant with the hypothesis that limited quantity adjust­
ment is based upon the cost of adjustment, rather than short 
run trading opportunities. (This is a point to which I 
shall return and consider in greater detail in chapter 3).
Government Policy
In this section the effectiveness of Government policy in 
the model we have developed is examined. Particular emphasis 
is given to the impact that government policy may have upon 
expectations, it will be considered whether government policy 
has a 'placebo' effect as in Honkapohja and Ito's (1979) 
analysis.
Examination of the models structural identities (II)-(15) 
reveals that the government in our economy has three policy 
instruments: goods purchases g t, beginning of period monetary 
transfers from (to) households -<}>(Mt_^ +1Tt-l^ • anc* an end 
of period tax/subsidy on firms profits Gt>
Again concentrating on a Keynesian regime and consumer 
expectations: consider first an unannounced change in 
government expenditure at a single period expectational 
Keynesian equilibria. By unannounced it is meant that consumers 
are unaware of a change in government expenditure when they 
make their initial transaction demands. This is described 
by figure (2.2.14).
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Figure (2.2.14)
The increase in government goods purchases, Ag, reduces the 
goods available for consumption at any level of employment, 
as indicated on figure (2.2.14). Consumers labour demand 
expectation gives an initial goods purchase offer xt which 
truncates the consumers wedge. Initial government purchases
I Iwould give an equilibrium at K j = (Lfc,xt), the increased govern­
ment purchases give an equilibrium at K ^  = (L^,xt).
Employment rises but consumption is constant. The increase in 
government expenditure, if not financed by increased taxation, 
will have an impact on consumption next period when house­
hold current period forced saving and firms current period 
profits become households initial money endowment. This 
would involve a wedge shifting effect as in figure (2.2.12). 
Figure (2.2.15) shows the effect of an unannounced 
increase in government expenditure, financed by the printing 
of money, over successive periods.
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The increase in government goods purchases, Ag, reduces the 
goods available for consumption at any level of employment, 
as indicated on figure (2.2.14). Consumers labour demand 
expectation gives an initial goods purchase offer xfc which 
truncates the consumers wedge. Initial government purchases
f Iwould give an equilibrium at K = (Lfc,xt), the increased govern­
ment purchases give an equilibrium at K 2 = (I/j.,xt).
Employment rises but consumption is constant. The increase in 
government expenditure, if not financed by increased taxation, 
will have an impact on consumption next period when house­
hold current period forced saving and firms current period 
profits become households initial money endowment. This 
would involve a wedge shifting effect as in figure (2."2.12). 
Figure (2.2.15) shows the effect of an unannounced 
increase in government expenditure, financed by the printing 
of money, over successive periods.
Over successive periods it can be seen from figure (2.2.15), 
that a money financed increase in government expenditure has 
strong expansionary effects on output, employment and con­
sumption on an Expecta-tional Keynesian regime. To clarify 
this we trace the process through. Consumers begin the 
first period with money endowments which generate the wedge 
associated with T.C.E.^, and with expectations this 
generates a wedge truncated at xfc# Prior to the increase in 
government expenditure the equilibrium is Kj . The govern­
ment increases its expenditure,the impact effect of which 
is just a rise in employment and savings. The equilibrium
Ishifts to Lfc. At the beginning of period t+1 households 
' receive previous period profits to add to the forced saving 
they incurred in the previous period, and also adjust their 
expectations to be consistant with last periods labour market 
experience. This generates the wedge associated with T.C.E.j»
6b
truncated at xt+1, which can be seen to give an expectational 
equilibrium at K fc+1, with higher output employment and 
consumption, in the figure we have also allowed the real wage 
to rise with the nominal wage falling less than nominal 
prices. Thus figure (2.2.15) represents the total effect 
°f an unannounced increase in government expenditure, 
financed by the printing of money.
It has been stressed in the preceding section that the 
change in government expenditure is unannounced, and since 
it is not directly observable by consumers, it has been 
implicitly assumed that government behaviour has no direct 
effect upon consumer expectations. If the government 
announces, prior to agents making their initial market offers, 
that it intends to purchase an increased level of consumption 
goods, then consumers should take account of this information 
in forming their expectations. This we shall see has the 
effect of raising consumers initial goods purchase offers, 
and possibly making it unnecessary for governments to bother 
increasing their expenditure. This is the 'placebo effect' 
discussed in Honkopohja and Ito (1979). Figure (2.2.16) examines 
the case where the government announces that it will undertake 
sufficient expenditure to maintain a level of employment L.
Given that households believe the government, and that L>L, 
they will reformulate their expectations to be C=L. "
We see immediately from figure (2.2.16) that the expectation 
of government expenditure is sufficient to generate the 
announced level of employment, and an actual expenditure 
increase is not required.
The governments alternatives to expenditure policy are 
taxes/transfers cn household money balances and firms profits. 
These two policy instruments have a similar effect but differ
Figure (2.2.17)
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In figure (2.2.17) (a) the government levies a negative tax
on households initial money balances, this is done prior to
any transaction demands being expressed. The consumers
wedge shifts as indicated by the arrows, and the expected
labour ration Lt generates a higher goods purchase offer,
Xmt' consequently the consumers wedge is truncated at
a higher level of goods transactions. The equilibrium becomes 
1 •
rather than K with a consequent increase in both 
output employment and consumption in period t. The second 
part of the diagram, figure (2.?.T7>'M .
effect of !1 j .
period t, which does not effect the economy until the beginning 
rf ~cr-od t+1 when orofifs -«•id the subsidy are distributed 
to consumers. This produces a wedge shifting effect as in 
case (a), but the picture will be complicated by relative 
price changes and expectation adjustment as discussed earlier. 
There is no guarantee that output employment and consumption 
will be higher at the Ktm’ equilibrium than at the equilibrium 
although this seems probable. The negative impact of a real 
wage rise on consumers expectations is the complicating 
factor here.
It should be noted when examining government policy instruments, 
that movements of the production function in (xfc,Lt) space, 
and movements of the consumers wedge may lead to a regime 
switch, as constant increases in government expenditure to 
increase employment may well give rise to a classical equilibrium. 
At constant relative prices, and the government maintaining a 
balanced budget, a series of taxation financed expenditure 
increases will trace out a locus of classical temporary 
equilibria as in figure (2.2.18).
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Clearly the shaded area of the consumers wedge in figure 
(2.2.18) will not be attained, as the producer will be at a 
classical profit maximizing equilibrium with lower trans­
action levels on both markets.
Concluding Remarks
In this section (2.2) a simple Malinvaud type model has been 
presented in which expectations play a different role than in the 
literature reviewed in section (2.1). Producers and consumers in th 
model calculate their initial transaction offers on the basis of 
prices and expected quantity constraints. Having made initial mar­
ket offers, agents, it is argued, find it more difficult to revise 
in the upward than the downward direction. The completion 
of an upward revision in trade requires of an agent that 
he find another who is prepared to complete the other side 
of the transaction. A downward revision of trade simply 
requires that the agent refrain from some trades. The model 
presented in this section takes the extreme case of this 
argument and examines the short-run equilibria that will 
result when no upward revisions of trade are possible. With- 
this limited quantity adjustment initial market offers and 
consequently the expectations which generate them arc most
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important.
The analysis presented here is not intended as a representation 
of any real economy, but rather a simple theoretical 
abstraction which allows the impact of expectations in a 
model with limited quantity adjustment to be examined.
Clearly expectations will be important in the period about 
which they are held if transactions adjustment is either 
restricted or costly. In this section it has been assumed 
that agents hold expected supply and demand function with 
subjective certainty. This assumption was adopted for 
simplicity of exposition, and because otherwise the strong 
j • .’.[Li. ' •!".• vrd quantity auju.-'.rv-nt is free and
frictionless would cause agents to make Walrasian initial 
transaction offers no matter what their previous market 
experience. In analysis to be presented in the following 
chapter it will be shown that a model with costly quantity 
adjustment and uncertainty about rationing levels generates 
many similar results to those presented here.
Footnotes - Chapter 2
!• Hildenbrand and Hildenbrand are primarily concerned with 
examining the usefulness of a representative consumer, 
representative producer model, and the specificity of 
the comparative static results of Malinvauds model to 
the functional forms he chooses.
2. Muellbauer and Portes have clearly had a great influence 
on this thesis, considerable space is devoted to a fairly 
full exposition of their model for this reason.
3. This would only defer the problem to the third period, 
but of course as the number of periods becomes large 
the problem becomes unimportant.
4. 'Forced saving' since money balances become the residual
Ml‘Mo = dl + wl V Pl*l
5. 'Forced inventory accumulation' is described by
I j-Iq = y^iL^J-x^, although a residual this still
represents a choice by the producer to carry these goods 
forwards since he could simply reduce his labour 
demand in the current period.
6. The equilibria in figure (2.1.3) which Muellbauer and 
Portes term Walrasian, is a Hicksian temporary competitive 
equilibrium in the virtual price system, see appendix
to this chapter or Ellis (1981) .
7. The stability properties of this model are examined on 
the assumption of inelastic expectations, and if this 
assumption is not made instability may result. Hildenbrand 
and Hildenbrand (1978) discuss this possibility in 
relation to Malinvnud's (1977) contribution, and the
point seems equally valid here.
8. For example Gale (1978), Green (1978), Honkapohja and 
Ito (1979), Svensson (1977).
9. This is the requirement for a Benassy K-equilibrium, a 
Dr^ze equilibrium requires that actual trades replicate 
themselves. The distinction arises from the definition 
of effective demands in the two equilibrium concepts, a 
discussion of which may be found in chapter 1.
10. Exact in Philip Michel's sense means that expected demand 
curves are accurate at equilibrium transaction levels 
but may be inaccurate elsewhere.
11. A conceptually stimulating approach in this area is that 
taken by Hahn (1977a), (1977b) , who examines the concept 
of conjectural equilibria. A rational conjectural 
equilibrium is said to exist if given a set of market 
signals that an agent receives, and the conjectures of 
trading possibilities he forms, his actual trades are 
the best feasible trades which are consistant with the
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equilibrium, and this is true for all agents. Hahn's 
work,despite its influence on aggregate endogcneous 
price models,is omitted from the main text as it has 
not yet been given a reasonable macroeconomic repre­sentation.
12. Clearly given different endowment points and offer 
curves any point on the transformation frontier to 
the right of Walrasian equilibrium may be a non- 
Walrasian equilibrium in Varians model.
13. Varian then demonstrates in a technically complex 
section of his paper that the Walrasian equilibrium 
is unstable and the non-Walrasian equilibria stable.
14. Varian himself is aware of these problems.
15. Negishi in later work (Negishi (1979)) baser, his results 
upon demand curve elasticities rather than kinks, but 
again all that is required is the appropriate inter­
section of the perceived and actual demand curves.
16. This point is similar to Negishi's argument as to 
why perceived demand curves should be kinked. Those 
that already purchase from a supplier will all be 
informed of a price rise, and some will be driven away. 
Those who do not purchase from a supplier may not 
immediately receive the information that price has 
been cut.
17. There may be several intersections between the production 
function and the consumers constrained labour supply
and goods demand curves. Thisisawell known problem 
but not one analysed here.
18. The worker may be prepared to supply L't , if the utility 
of money balances is greater than the disutility of 
labour at the margin. Figure (2.1.1) justifies this.
19. A more complete expectations adjustment function may 
be adopted here but will not qualitatively effect the 
results, unless consumers believe that on average a 
certain constraint will be encountered and that a 'tight' 
constraint in one period will increase the likelihood
of a 'loose' constraint in the next.
20. Infinitely fast adjustment of producers expectations 
would always return the systems to a classical outcome 
after one period. If producers held inventories as in 
Muellbauer and Portes (1978) this would not necessarily 
happen.
21. Clearly there are numerous permutations that may be 
achieved here, depending mainly on whether the real 
wage rises or falls, and the consequent signs and 
relative magnitudes of the expectations adjustment 
effects.
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 2
It was stated during the discussion of the role of expectations 
in Model's with exogenous prices, that the equilibria 
termed Walrasian in such models are actually Hicksian 
Temporary Competitive Equilibria. They only correspond to 
Walrasian equilibria as defined by Debreu (1959) if all 
agent expectations expressed in personalized virtual prices 
are correct.
To demonstrate this we need to establish two propositions.
Proposition 1: If fixed prices clear current markets, this is 
a necessary but not sufficient condition for 
genassy demands to be Walrasian Demands.
Proposition 2: If fixed prices clear current markets this is 
a necessary and sufficient condition for 
Benassy demands to be Hicksian demands.
Let there be i=l,...,n trades ,j=l,...,M goods and
t=l,...,T periods (i,j,t e 2Z + ).
2Each trader: has endowments e, e fR+ , faces fixed prices
2 2peTR+ and upper and lower bounds Zi,ZitlR+ .
We identify demands by agent market and period 
* * *Zijt = zijt <Pfei) Walrasian demand 
^ijt ~ ^ijt (&t»ei* xi> Benassy demand
Zijt = Zijt (Pt»ei»Pi^ Hicksian demand
Where p is the full Walrasian price matrix, pt the vector of 
current market clearing prices, Xi = (pi>Zi,Zi) is the (M x (T-t)) 
matrix of expected signals, where the Pi's are the expected 
fixed prices associated with the expected upper and lower 
bounds Zi,Zi. The p* is an (Mx(T-t)) matrix of (Hicksian)
expected prices.
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To establish proposition 1 we prove the following lemma.
Lemma 1
Pt = (^ Lt'.' • •* Pmt) = Pt = (RLt » • • • »Pmt^ is a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for Zj.j = 2^j Vifj at t.
Proof
By definition the Walrasian price vector pt clears markets 
★1,...,M at t if pt+a clears the same markets at t+a
V(Ua<T-t) e ZZ+ .
•  *Thus (i) If pijt+a Pijt+a any ail, we can find an incorrect
★price expectation, and if we replace pijt+a by 
_ * *Pijt+a in Pi then p cannot clear all markets by 
Walras law.
★ * — also (ii) If Zj^ jt+a < Z^jt+a or Zj.jt+a > Z^jt+a any a£l,
we can find an incorrect quantity constraint
*expectation, and if we replace Zijt+a by Zj.jt+a 
_ *or Zijt+a* then again p will not clear all markets.
If (i) or (ii) holds and we choose t to be a period when 
*Pt does not clear all 1,...,M markets.
★ *  ^ ^
then pt = Pt Zijt = Zjjf Thus pt = £t *s not a
★ asufficient condition. A sufficient condition for Zijt = Zijt
*vijt is that (i) and (ii) do not hold, hence pt = f>t vt*
Thus pfc= at t is a necessary condition. □
Clearly then proposition 1 is true by lemma 1, if fixed 
prices clear all current markets the Benassy demands are not 
the Walrasian demands and the equilibria usually termed 
’Walrasian' as in figure (2.1.31(a) and most of the literature 
are not as defined for example in Debreu (1959). (Unless of 
course (i) and (ii) above do not hold).
To establish proposition 2 we prove the following lemma.
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Lemma 2
At t 3  p* s.t. i£1^ijtB:0 each 1 * *  zijt(£»ei,xi) =Zijt(^,ei ,D^) Vi-
Proof '
We need to show that we may choose a matrix of expected 
prices p* which are identical for trader i to the corr­
esponding triple Xi = (pj.,Zi,Zi) .
Associated with each xj.jt t xi is a planned transaction 
z i j t E 2 i •
jzijt(Pi»zi,Zi) if zijt<zijt(Pi»zi»zi)<zijt 
where Z±jt = (Zijt if zijt(Pi*zi»zi) * Zijt
Uijt otherwise 
M(T-t)If there exist prices qielR+ which support Z i j V i j t
then these are identical to each trader i to the signal xi.
Neary and Roberts (1978) show such virtual prices exist if 
the preference ordering R is convex, continuous and strictly 
monotonic, and that the virtual prices «j/ are of the form 
u)i=(Pifqi) where the 'p^'s the expected prices support the 
non-quantity constrained planned transactions, and the 
expected virtual prices qi support the constrained transactions.
Thus p£ = 5  2 Zijt * 0 each j at t*=* Zi jt (pr ei, xj_) =Zi jt
^ i ei 'Pi )Vij at t □
Thus lemma 2 establishes proposition 2. If fixed prices clear 
all current markets the Benassy demands are equal to the 
Hicksian demands where we choose each agents price expectations 
to be the virtual prices which support the transactions plans 
associated with the price quantity constraint expectations.
Thus if all Hicksian and Benassy demands are identical and pt 
clears current period markets, then the Benassy unconstrained
equilibria are Hicksian Temporary competitive equilibria. 
The equilibria is only Walrasian if it is 'dynamically 
stable'^ in Hicks terms, in our analysis this means that the 
expected virtual prices would clear all markets if they 
obtained.
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3' COSTS AND UNCERTAINTY IN NEO-KEYNES TAN MACROECONOMICS
3.1 Information and the Costs of Economic Activity
t
In the preceding chapter I examined the role played by 
expectations in Neo-Keynesian Macroeconomic Models. Attention 
was concentrated upon the functions performed by expectations, 
rather than on an examination of what characteristics of 
these models make expectations so important.
In this chapter it will be argued that expectations formation 
is the economic agents response to incomplete information and 
the cost of economic activity. Qualification of this state­
ment is clearly required, what information is unavailable and 
precisely what is meant by the cost of economic activity.
It is difficult to discuss incomplete information and 
expectations without introducing some concept of cost into 
the discourse, especially when considering Neo-Keynesian 
economics. However I shall attempt to first examine independ­
ently the question of incomplete information and expectations 
in Neo-Keynesian models. Secondly, I shall provide a more 
general examination of the costs of economic activity and a 
discussion of hew some forms of cost are implicit in Neo- 
Keynesian models and why the introduction of other forms of 
costs may be desirable.
It is useful when considering incomplete information and 
expectations to again consider the literature in two sections, 
endogeneous price models of the Varian (1977) Heller and Starr 
(1978) and Futia (1977) type, and exogenous price - quantity 
rationing models of the Denassy (1975) Muellbauer and Portes 
(1978) and Malinvaud (1977) variety. In endogeneous price • 
models agents do not have, for whatever reason, complete
Expect-information of their current trading possibilities, 
ations take the place of the missing data. Consider the 
Varian (1977) model described in section 2.1 and illustrated 
in figure (2.1. 4)( which displays both a Walrasian and 
non-Walrasian equilibrium. The economy rests at a non-Walrasian 
equilibrium essentially because firms pessimistic sales 
expectations are correct at this level of employment and 
production. Firms in this economy can manipulate their 
output price, and since there are no real balances in the 
model they may thus manipulate the real wage using price 
and labour demand. Firms must be unaware of this possibility 
or they would undertake the necessary corrective measures.*
Firms then cannot have full information of the transformation 
frontier which they face, and thus replace their missing data 
by sales expectations. In Futia's (1977) contribution, workers 
are aware that firms only sample at random some subset of the 
total available labour force when searching for employees, 
thus they attach a positive but diminishing probability to 
being employed if they raise the wage they quote. This is 
interesting, firstly firms do not have full information about 
the wage distribution being quoted by the labour force, and 
secondly workers are aware of this. In the absence of full 
information about wage quotes Futia assumes that firms hire 
workers up to the point where their marginal product equals 
the expected average real wage. The definition of equilibrium 
in Futia's model has already been discussed in chapter 2, 
section 1.
Exogenous price — quantity rationing models allow economic 
agents more information about current trading possibilities 
than endogenous price models. In work such as Nearv and
Stiglitz (1981), Benassy (1975) and Malinvaud (1977) a 
quantity tâtonnement auctioneer informs agents of fixed 
prices 'and what trades are feasible on each market.2 Fix- 
price equilibria are a short-run phenomena and despite 
considerable information about the current period agents 
will have no information about prices or feasible transactions 
that will shortly arrive, in the next period.^ Expectations 
are held about future prices and quantity constraints, which 
are important since agents know the equilibrium will not 
persist and that the current equilibria values taken by 
variables do not provide accurate information about the 
future. The recursive or 'bootstrap' effect of expectations 
ha« Lucn demonstrated by Neary and Stiglitz and investigated 
in a slightly different context by Hildenbrand and Hildenbrand 
(1978). However the fact that expectations about tomorrows 
prices and feasible transactions will make those expectations 
more likely to occur today, does not mean that the 
expectations are more,likely to be correct tomorrow.
Indeed in the Neary Stiglitz paper expec-
4tations fulfilment becomes less probable. Honkapohja and 
Ito (1979) assume agents receive only aggregate information 
about excess demand in markets. They are assumed to know 
the probability distribution of trading uncertainty, and thus 
from the aggregate information calculate the probability 
of either making their choice trade or being constrained, and 
also the expected level of the constraint. An equilibrium 
is a set of trades, based upon expected utility maximization, 
which reproduces the aggregate signals. The missing inform­
ation crucial to the functioning of this model is that 
agents are not aware that if they all announce notional
82
demands based upon only current prices, ignoring the 
probability of being constrained, an equilibrium with more 
output and employment will result. In the Honkapohja Ito 
treatment as in other exogenous price models agents have 
no knowledge of next periods prices and quantity constraints.^
In each of the economic models discussed above the behaviour 
of economic agents can be seen to be related to some form 
of cost minimization. Howevër, rather than pointing out the 
costs implicit in each model,I shall now concentrate upon 
the general concept of cost, using the models discussed 
above as examples where appropriate.
Costs may be divided into three categories:
(i) Costs of setting up markets, establishing and calling 
prices and quantity constraints.
(ii) Opportunity costs associated with agents making 
transactions which are inter-temporally inefficient.
(iii) Transactions costs of actually arranging or revising trades. 
Little attention will be paid to the first category of costs,
the setting up of markets, except to note that this will 
require increasing returns to sale at some point. The work 
of Heller (1972) and Heller and Starr (1973) demonstrates 
the necessary techniques.
The second category of costs, opportunity costs associated 
with inter-temporally inefficient transactions appears 
particularly important in fix-price quantity rationing models.
This may occur in one of two contexts. Firstly in quantity 
tâtonnement fix-price models such as Neary and Stiglitz (1981) 
inter-temporal inefficiency arises in the following manner; 
agents current transactions are based upon information about' 
current prices, quantity constraints and expectations of
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(i) Costs of setting up markets, establishing and calling 
prices and quantity constraints.
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transactions which are inter-temporally inefficient.
(iii) Transactions costs of actually arranging or revising trades 
Little attention will be paid to the first category of costs, 
the setting up of markets, except to note that this will 
require increasing returns to sale at some point. The work
of Heller (1972) and Heller and Starr (1973) demonstrates 
the necessary techniques.
The second category of costs, opportunity costs associated 
with inter-temporally inefficient transactions appears 
particularly important in fix-price quantity rationing models. 
This may occur in one of two contexts. Firstly in quantity 
tâtonnement fix-price models such as Neary and Stiglitz (1981) 
inter-temporal inefficiency arises in the following manner; 
agents current transactions are based upon information about' 
current prices, quantity constraints and expectations of
those that will obtain in the future. If expectations are 
incorrect the transactions carried out are not those that 
agents would have wished to have performed ex ante , thus there i 
inter-temporal inefficiency and implied opportunity cost. The 
expectations agents hold represent their attempts to minimize 
this cost, which is well illustrated in Muellbauer and Portes 
(1978) paper which was given a reasonably lengthy exposition 
in chapter 2 section 1. In Muellbauer and Portes agents 
know, or believe they know, tomorrows prices/but are 
uncertain about which [known level J constraints they will 
face. Probability weighted mixed indirect objective functions 
are the maximands in agents optimization programmes, and 
maximization maybe viewed as minimizing the expected level 
of inter-temporal inefficiency. The opportunity cost 
arises from not knowing tomorrows ration. Secondly, in 
sequential trading models such as Benassy (1977, and 1975 
appendix) and Ellis (1981c) inter-temporal inefficiency 
arises in the current period since an agent visiting markets 
sequentially will base his demand x^ on market i upon 
prices (pi,...pn) and the quantity rations he expects to 
encounter upon the markets he has yet to visit (x^+^ ,... ,xn).
If for any market j, i<j<n, the x^ is incorrect then the 
preceding demands(x ,...,x._^) will be inter-temporally 
inefficient. This implies an opportunity cost in addition 
to that arising from not correctly anticipating the fix-price 
vectors that will obtain in future periods and their associated 
quantity rations.
The third category of costs, transactions costs arising from 
the arrangement or revision of trade, are perhaps the most 
interesting, especially in the context of Neo-Keynesian 
macroeconomics. In this category are a number of different
types of costs, which are listed below.
(i) Cost of actually attending a market - transportation 
( costs, the utility cost of leisure foregone whilst 
engaged in trading, etc.
(ii) Costs of disseminating information about prices, 
stock availability and characteristics of goods.
(iii) Search costs involved in finding trading 
partners.
(iv) Costs of adjustment in disequilibrium situations. 
Clearly (i)-(iv) are not mutually exclusive or exhaustive.6 
A considerable literature has developed on the costs of 
carrying out transactions at equilibrium prices. Notable 
contributions in- this area are Kurz (1974), Hahn (1971, 1973) 
and Foley (1970), these and other relevant works are 
succinctly surveyed by Ulph and Ulph (1975). Models of this 
sort incorporate transaction costs in one of two ways.
Firstly, individual agents directly employ the resources 
required to carry out transactions themselves. Each agent 
has a set of feasible transaction activities and a transactions 
technology which specifies what will be required to carry 
out any planned trades. Thus plans will be calculated to 
maximize agents objectives given the costs associated with 
the particular agents transaction technology set. Kurz (1974) 
is a good example of this sort of model. Secondly, trans­
actions resources may be employed by some intermediary who 
earns a margin between his buying and selling price as 
payment for his services. Foley (1970) considers a model 
of this type.
This literature developed in the context of equilibrium 
price models has clearly had some impact on Neo-Keynesian
economic models, where one might argue that transaction 
costs are in their most appropriate and influential setting. 
Benassy (1977) remarks that transaction costs may be 
associated either with demands or realized transactions, and 
suggests that oosts should vary monotonically with transactions 
and be of the fixed cost variety when associated with demands. 
Costs Ci are associated with either demands Z^ or trades Z^ 
such that Ci = x[Zi,Zi], Benassy suggests that these costs 
appear alongside transactions in agents utility functions, 
making agents maximization programmes as (3.1.1)
)
(3.1.1)
Max u^(ei+Zi-Ci)
Z i  = » i L Z i l O i i t j ]
Ci = *[Zi,zJ 
pZi = 0
ei + Zi - Ci > 0
where <t>i describes the perceived rationing scheme, 0^(t) 
is information available at t, p is price and ei 
endowment.
Cost^here c^may be interpreted as transactions resources 
utilized by the agent himself in expressing demand or 
completing a transaction. Benassy continues to make the 
interesting observation that rationing schemes may be manip- 
ulable through transactions costs. A queueing or priority 
systems of rationing may not be manipulated once the ranking 
is known. However an agent may manipulate his ranking by 
for example arriving earlier in a queue, this of course 
implies the costs involved with queueing for a longer period.
The idea of adjustment costs associated with waiting in line
in a queueing system has been investigated in a Non-Wnlras1an j
equilibrium context by Varian (1975). Varian demonstrates the 
effects of transactions costs in his treatment with the 
following simple model.
Workers maximize a utility function of the following form (3.1.2) 
Max u = a log x + (1-a) log (1-L) (3.1.2)
s.t px = L (3.1.3)
a is a positive constant, a<l, total time is l unit and p 
here is the price of the consumption good x in terms of 
labour services.
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From (3.1.2) and (3.1.3) the consumers Walrasian demand may 
be found to be
xd =' a/p (3.1.4)
Assuming a fixed supply of the consumption good equAl to 
unity the Walrasian excess demand may be written as (3.1.5).
Z = (a/p) - 1 (3.1.5)
Varian then argues that if Z/0, i.e., there is a positive excess 
demand,consumers incur disutility since they must wait in a 
queue to receive the good, further the magnitude of this 
transactions cost in foregone leisure time is monotonically 
increasing in both Z and x. Hence the utility function 
becomes
u = a log x + (1-a) log (l-L-4pZx) (3.1.6)
and maximization subject to the budget constraint (3.1.3)
yields a new goods demand (3.1.7) 
xd = a/(p+4pZ)
This gives an 'accumulated' excess demand (3.1.8) 
Z' = a/p + a/(p+4a-4p) - 2 
and thus a non-Walvasian equilibrium price 
p = 2a/3}
(3.1.7)
(3.1.8)
(3.1.9)
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giving the system two equilibria, one at p=a which is the 
Walrasian equilibrium, and another at p=2a/3 which is the 
non-Walrasian equilibrium. Thus if this model is perturbed 
away from Walrasian equilibrium the transactions costs 
involved in returning, due to the excess demand, effect 
individuals behaviour and the system may settle at the 
non-Walrasian equilibrium with p=2a/3. To reconcile this 
with the production side of the economy we may suggest that 
as workers have 'spent some leisure time' in obtaining the 
good, then the disutilityof work will rise and effective 
labour supply will be revised down to equate it with effective 
labour demand. Transactions costs in the models of Denassy 
(1977) and Varian (1975) may be loosely described as belonging 
to our type (i) costs of actually attending a market. If, 
as seems appropriate in neo-Keynesian models, agents do not 
know in advance whether a visit to a particular market will 
yield any trade, their expectations of the level of transactions 
they may successfully complete will be important in this 
context. Agents will not be prepared to incur the trans­
actions costs if they attach a low probability to obtaining 
any supply or if they expect to be severely constrained in 
the transaction.
Costs of types (ii) and (iii) may well be considered as 
naturally going together. Agents may either send out signals 
about the transactions they wish to carry out at different 
prices, or alternatively they may go to the market themselves, 
and search for other agents willing to carry out the other 
side of their desired transactions. These are the costs of 
disseminating or collecting information. In reality we may 
think of informative advertising as a cost of disseminating
information and job search as involving information collecting 
costs. Futia (1977) constructs a non-Walrasian equilibrium 
model which implicitly relies on both the cost of dissemin­
ating and collecting information about wage rates. Futia's 
approach is to consider a continuum of workers who quote 
different nominal wage rates, they attach to each wage a 
probability of employment and thus their quotes maximize 
expected utility. There is a positive probability of employ­
ment attached to each nominal wage as they know firms only 
sample a subset of all workers in their search for employees 
and thus workers perceive a chance of employment even at a 
high wage quote since they may 'get lucky' and end up in a 
labour pool where all workers are quoting high wages. Futia 
suggests that firms only sample some subset of potential 
employees because 'information is costly'tclearly he means 
that there are search cost associated with looking for 
employees, although these are not explicitly modelled. The 
model also requires, snd this Futia does not appear to notice, 
that there are costs to the workers in disseminating infor­
mation about their wage quotes, otherwise all workers will 
send signals to all firms, and thus,they may believe, 
guarantee themselves employment, indeed these costs must 
be infinitely large since Futia does not allow workers to 
engage in this activity at all. Firms facing search costs 
are then assumed to employ workers from their sample up to 
the point of the expected average real wage.
Cost of adjusting in disequilibrium situations may be of two 
types. Costs of adjusting trades and costs of adjusting 
demands. These are the same costs as discussed above,but 
they are more important in the context of disequilibrium since
they are incurred more frequently, in a disequilibrium 
situation information rapidly loses its value. Economic 
agents are required to gather and transmit information often. 
In the Neo-Keynesian macroeconomic literature little attention 
has been given to disequilibrium situations, interest has 
been directed towards showing that non-Walrasian equilibrium 
exist and examining their properties. This has probably 
obscured the importance of transactions costs to this liter­
ature.
In the following section (3.2) a fix-price model of an 
aggregate macro economy will be presented in which agents 
face adjustment costs in revising demands. These costs 
are assumed to vary monotonically with demand adjustments.
3.2 Uncertainty, Adjustment Costs and Expected Keynesian 
Unemployment
Most macroeconomic models with quantity rationing follow the 
lead of Clower (1965) in assuming that when consumers and 
producers face a new vector of fixed prices at the beginning 
of a market period they calculate and express notional 
supplies and demands. Previous market experience may lead 
traders to place a low probability upon realising these 
supplies and demands, but since quantity adjustment is.assumed 
both costless and frictionless, traders will always try these 
out first. If however there are costs involved in adjusting 
transactions demands then agents initial trade offers must 
take these into account.
In this model quantity adjustment costs are introduced in 
the form of resources consumed in the adjustment process.7
Agents are aware of adjustment costs, but have to state 
initial transactions demands before the state of the world 
is known, consequently these transactions demands will be 
based upon the maximization of Von Neumann-Morgenstem 
objective functions. On learning the true state-of the 
world, as characterised by their trade opportunities, agents 
then adjust optimally away from their initial trade vector.
The model developed in this section will demonstrate that the 
introduction of transactions costs gives results significantly 
different from standard fix-price models such as Malinvaud 
(1977) and Muellbauer and Portes (1978). Three new character­
istics arise. Firstly, agents initial transactions demands 
will respond discontinuously to changes in the models 
parameters, a marginal rise in the subjective probability 
attached to a state of unconstrained trade may, for example, 
lead to a large upward jump in consumer demand. Secondly, 
transaction levels are less variable in the presence of 
adjustment costs. Thirdly the comparative static properties 
of the short-run equilibria that emerge will be found to be 
considerably modified by this treatment.
In the analysis to follow we examine only 'Keynesian' cases, 
however a very similar treatment may be used to examine the 
'Repressed Inflation' possibilities of the model. These are 
omitted for brevity.
The Consumers Problem
Consider a representative consumer whose utility
depends on the amount of labour he will be able 
to sell to a representative firm at the end of the quantity ,
tâtonnement.
Let f(L) be the consumers subjective probability density 
function over states of the world.
Lç be the level of labour sales that the consumer 
would choose at given prices in the absence of 
uncertainty and adjustment costs.8 
thus define:
the probability of being unrationed
the probability of being rationed
the expected ration level.
The mathematical expectation of the 
distribution truncated at L = Lc
Assume that the consumer behaves as if there are two possible 
states of the world, a good state hereafter labelled i 
characterised by L > Lc to which is attached the probability 
e, and a bad state labelled j characterised by L = Ë with 
attached probability 1 - e .
The consumer faces a two-stage maximization problem. First to 
maximize expected utility, and state initial transactions 
demand. Second having learned the true state of the world, he 
maximizes utility subject to the costs of adjusting away from 
the initial trade vector.
Stage 1: Expected Utility Maximization, Initial Transactions 
Demands
Assume the consumer maximizes a Von Neumann-Morgenstern
gutility function of the following form:
c = |  f(L)dt 
c
iLl*£ ‘ L f(L)dL
E(L) = L
■u
Max E(u) = ci log (Xi - c|X*-Xi |) + log(T-L) + log M£ }
+ (1-c) {log (Xj-c| X - Xj | ) + log(T-L) + log M j ) (3.2.1)
S.T.
(i) ’ Mq + wL = pXi + Mi (3.2.2)
(j) Mo + wÊ = pXj + M. 0 .2.3)
where MQ ,Tfp, w are parameters representing initial money 
balances, total work,time, good and labour price respectively.
X and M are variables representing goods and final money 
balances. c is the adjustment cost parameter (1 > c > 0), 
and superscript * indicates initial transactions demind.
To make the programme (3.2.1 )••(?. 2. 3) differentiable note that 
* 11'•< y X j must hold, and rewrite the maximand as
*
Max E (u) = c{log(X i - cfx^X) ) + log(T-L) + log (Mo+wL-pXl) } 
Xi,Xj,X,L
+ (1-e) {log (Xj -c(X*-Xj) ) + log(T-L) + log(Mo4wL-pXj)} (3.2.4)
S.T.
xi " x > 0 (3.2.5)
x ~ xj > 0 (3.2.6)
The problem now satisfies the Arrow-Endhoven sufficiency 
conditions for quasi-concave programming.
Forming the Lagrangian from (3.2.4)-(3.2.6) and from the
Kuhn-Tucker conditions it can be shown that there are three 
12cases of interest. These are:
(i) Xi > X* > Xj
(ii) Xi = X* > Xj
Xi > X* = Xj(iii)
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Examining each of these three cases in turn
(i) > X > Xj Here the expected utility maximizing
initial transaction demand lies between 
the two transactions levels that the 
consumer expects to adjust to once the 
state of the world has been revealed.
' From the Kuhn-Tucker first order conditions we obtain:
X = cp [(2e-1+c >Mo + w( e ( 1+c )L - (l-O(l-c)T)] (3.2.7)
M +wT o
P (
c
(3.2.8)
(3.2.9)
L - i [ (2+w)T * (l-2/»)M0 - p l ^ lX*] (3.2.10
Using (3.2.7)— (3.2.9) we may define the range of parameter
values over which the consumer will make the decision XJ>X*>X.,i J'
this range is as below:
2 2 2 = 9 •)c (1+2e+c )Mq + wc(l+e + C + C C  )L > 2(2e-l+ec+c )M + we(2+3c+c )
- wT[2-c +c 2(e-ec+c-2) - e (2+c-3c e 2)] > 2ec2Mq +w c (1+c)L (3.2.11)
Interpretation of (3.2.7)-(3.2.10) is as follows. If (3.2.11)
*holds with two inequalities, then X is initial goods trans­
actions demand, L initial labour supply, and and X^ are the 
goods transactions that the consumer plans in the good and 
bad states of the world, given that case (i) is appropriate 
to the parameters of the model.
r-n
(ii) - X > xj Here the consumers expected utility
maximizing initial transaction demand is 
t equal to the transactions he plans to
undertake if the good state of the 
world occurs.
From the Kuhn-Tucker conditions we obtain the following 
quadratic in XA .
xi (p3(l+c) (2e + 2 ( 1-c) + 1) - 2(1 +e ) p } + X ^  (l+c)p2/(Mo+wE)
(2e-2(1-c) + 1) + (e+l-c)(2Mq +4w T) - (1-e)(2Mq +4w T)}
+ (e-l+c) (1+c) p(MQ+wL) (2Mq + 4wT) = 0 (3.2.12)
Assume (3.2.12) has only one positive real root.
The range of parameter values over which this case obtains 
are given when the left-hand inequality of (3.2.11) is violated. 
*
(iii) X^ > X = Xj Here the consumer expected utility maxi­
mizing initial transaction demand is 
equal to the transactions he plans to 
undertake if the bad state of the 
world occurs.
From the Kuhn-Tucker conditions we find the consumers initial 
transaction demand is given by the following quadratic:
Xj2 c[j((l+c) + (1-e) c) 3p2-3p3+ep)J + X^ {(l+c)+(l-e) c)-p2
f 3c(M + w E )  - t (1-c){M +wT) - p2-6(1-c)(M + wT)L o ° J °
- ec {M0+wL} + [Ql+c) + (l-e)c] [ Mo +wlJh[6 (1-c) [m q 4w T] pj 1 = 0
(3.2.13)
95
It is assumed that (3.2.13) has only one positive real root 
The range of parameter values over which this case obtains 
are given when the right-hand inequality of (3.2.11) is 
violated.
We have thus established the first of our results, since a 
small change in one of the parameter values may cause one of 
the inequalities of (3.2.11) to be reversed, this will cause 
our consumer to make a switch from (3.2.7) to (3.2.12) or
(3.2.13) in determining initial good demand, X* . To
clarify that this is in fact the case we illustrate this result 
with the following diagram (3.2.1).
If we define a and b such that
(3.2.7) if a ^ c i b*X = (3.2.12) if a < e
(3.2.13) if b > e
where a and b are defined by the other parameters
c, M , L and o T in (3:2.11).
As figure (3.2.1) demonstrates if e is the neighbourhood of 
a or b then a small change in the probability attached to the 
good state of the world will cause the consumer to base 
initial goods demand X upon a different function. In 
general we observe that variations in the models parameters 
will induce switching between the different forms of the con­
sumers initial transaction demand function.
Stage 2: Final Transactions
Having determined the consumers initial transaction demands 
we now examine how these will be revised once he has learned 
the true state of the world. We recall that E was the consumers 
subjective mathematical expectation of the rationing level, 
which need not be correct. We denote the actual rationing 
level, the firms labour demand, by L.
To discover how the consumers initial transaction demands are 
revised in response to L we write this maximand as below:
Max U = log(X*-X1-X2-cX1-cX2) + log(T-L)+ log (3.2.14
S.T.
Mq + wL = p(X* + X1 - Xj) + M x (3.2.15
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The two new variables and X2 r 
*adjustments from X respectively.
 ^ and X2 represent upward and downward 
pectively. We require these variables
to identify the range of L over which the consumer will choose 
to revise trades upwards downwards or not at all.
Substituting (3.2.15) into (3.2.14) differentiating and 
evaluating the Kuhn-Tucker conditions at X^=X2=0 we obtain:
From expression (3.2.18) we may define the range of ration levels 
L over which the consumer decides to adjust his goods demand 
upwards, downwards, or to leave it unaltered.
Define LT and L,. as the ration levels at which (3.2.18) holds ii u
with L as an equality with the left and right hand terms 
respectively.
We may make the following statements:
(i) If L > Then the consumer will revise his goods purchases 
upwards. The consumers maximand becomes:
(ii) If L > L > L. Then the consumer will leave his goods
U Li
1-c
X _ ---- rMQ + wL - pX (3.2.16)
-( 1 *-c _ ---- rMq + wL - pX (3.2.17)X
From (3.2.16) and (3.2.17) we obtain:
Max U = log(X-c(X-X )) + log(T-L)+log(MQ+wL-pX) (3.2.19)*
Maximization yields
(3.2.20)
purchases unaltered
hence: X - X
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(üi) If L < L The consumer will revise his goods
purchases downwards.
The consumers maximand becomes! 
Max U = log(X-c (X*-X) ) + 1log{X-c (X -X) ) + log (T-L) + log(MQ + wL - pX) (3.2.22
which yields:
['
M + wLo
P (3.2.23)
Expressions (3.2.20), (3.2.21) and (3.2.23) describe the 
consumers response to all levels of employment L which he 
regards as constraining his behaviour. If no binding con- 
straint occurs it can be shown that goods purchases and 
labour sales are as defined by (3.2.8) and (3.2.10) these 
trades the consumer planned to adjust to in the good state 
of the world.
Using (3.2.20), (3.2.21) and (3.2.23) we may now represent 
the consumers labour constrained goods demand curve diagram- 
atically, as in figure (3.2.2)
Fig.3.2.2 *x x = |~ {5M + 2wT) - ( ~ ) X 6p o 1-c
0 LL
The effects of uncertainty and adjustment costs upon the 
representative consumers are clearly illustrated by our
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diagram. The broken diagonal line represents the labour 
constrained goods demand curve that the consumer would 
express in the absence of uncertainty and adjustment costs.^ 
The solid kinked line is the goods demand curve developed 
above. Over the range 0-L^ the consumers goods demand curve 
is given by (3.2.23). We notice immediately that the effects 
of uncertainty and adjustment costs are to increase goods 
purchases, for any L in the range, above the level that 
would be demanded in their absence.
AIn the range Lu~L consumer goods demand is given by (3.2.2»') 
and will be lower than iri the :ir:=n^re of uncertainty and 
adjustment costs. Whilst for the range - Ly we see that 
changes in the level of the ration have no effect upon goods 
demand, initial trades are left unaltered.
We now turn our attention to the representative producer 
anticipating a shortfall in effective demand.
Joo
3» The Producers Problem
We treat our producer in a symmetric manner to the consumer, as
t
he too has a subjective probability distribution over possible 
states of the world, with states characterised by the level of 
effective demand. The producer behaves as though one of two 
possible states of the world may occur. A good state 
characterised by free trade and a bad state characterised by 
a 'known' sales ration X. Probabilities ij> and 1-<I> are 
attached to the good and bad states respectively.
The producer faces a two stage maximization problem, first,to 
maximize expected profit and express initial transactions 
demand for labour, secondly, when the true state of the world 
is learned maximize actual profit subject to costs of adjustment.
Stage 1; Expected Profit Maximization, Initial Transaction Demand 
We assume our producer maximizes the following expected 
profit function*5:
Max E ( it) = {pX - w L r  - 0  (L* - LR) 2}
Xr Lk, Lm ,L*
+ (l-i|/)lpX - wLm - <J> (L* - Lm )2 } (3.2.24)
S.T. X < AL
All notation as in the consumers problem, except k and m, 
subscripts refer to the producers characterization of good 
and bad states. Adjustment costs are quadratic and () is a 
constant 0 < <t> < 1.
The producer may choose any point within the production set, 
he may thus hoard labour rather than incur adjustment costs. 
We forn) the Lagrangian from (3.2.24)
e = iHpX-wLk-  <t>(L*~Lj^ ) 2 ) + (p^-wLm-  <t>(L*-Lm) 2 }
+ qm (Lm"X/A) + qk (Lk-X/A) (3.2.25)
where qk and qm are the shadow prices on the production 
constraints in the two states of the world.
Differentiating (3.2.25) and examining the Kuhn-Tucker first 
order conditions we see that our producer considers the two 
following cases.
(i) qk , qm > 0 The production constraint binds in both 
expected states of the world.
From the first order conditions of (3.2.25) we obtain:
qm = w - ijiAp (3.2 .26)
**Ic = ÿAp (3.2 .27)
Lm = X/A (3.2 .28)
Lk H >1X
11 + i r T RTi (a p - w} (3.2 .29)
X = X + A2(J> (1-11>) • (Ap - w) (3.2,.30)
*L - I * fw TT^) (Ap - w) (3.2..31)
> 0, qm = 0 The production constraint binds only
in the good state.
Lk " . (2-ip) 24> (2pA - (l+3</<) w) (3.2.32)
x  - 1 (2p - (1+3*) £  )(2-*) 2<j) (3.2.33)
*
L - 1 (ijipA - ( 2 - 1 )  w ) (3.2.34)
♦
(2-i)i) 2<J)
L - 1 (ijipA - (1+3*) w ) (3.2.35)m (2-i¡i) 2<J)
iiJX
O
' AiJ/p (3.2.36)
The producer decides whether to base initial transactions 
demand upon (3.2.26)-(3.2.31) or (3.2.32)-(3.2.36) by 
choosing the set which yields the higher expected profits 
at the given parameter values.
This produces initial transactions demand for labour as 
given by either .(3.2.31) or (3.2.34). We now investigate 
how these initial demands will be revised once the true 
state of the world has been learned.
Stage 2; Final Transactions
Denote the actual ration level which characterizes the true 
state of the world X. The producer may find himself in 
one of two circumstances. Consider first the case when x  
binds, we write the producers maximand as (3.2.37):
Max n = pX - w (L + 1^) - <j)(L* - L - Lh)2 1^ (3.2.37)
where L is labour used to produce output 
is non-productive hoarded labour
hence
L = X/A (3.2.38)
From (3.2.37) and (3.2.38) we obtain:
( *Lh » max ( L - X/A - w/2<p (3.2.39)
( 0
Expression (3.2.39) describes how the producer will respond . 
to a shortfall in effective demand. By either employing just
1 in­
sufficient labour to produce the goods ration X, in which 
case 1^ = 0, or by withdrawing some labour from the productive 
process^ but hoarding it to avoid the adjustment costs, in 
this case Lh = L* - X/A - w/2(J).
If X does not constrain the producer then his maximand may 
be written as (3.2.40):
Max ir = pAL - wL - <|> (L* - L) 2 (3.2.40)
maximization yields
(3.2.41)
Expression (3.2.41) defines the maximum employment level, 
the producers optimal upward adjustment point if trades are 
unconstrained. Notice however that the producers initial 
subjective probability distribution over states of the world 
effects his final transactions via L
We may now represent the producers goods constrained labour 
demand curve as figure (3.2. 3)
L_L +
Having now established consumer and producer behaviour given 
that each anticipated a Keynesian unemployment regime in the 
forthcoming market period we may now turn our attention to 
the equilibria this behaviour generates.
T<H
m ar ke t p e r io d e q u i l i b r i a
We define a market period equilibria as the pair (X,L) which 
satisfy* both the consumers labour constrained goods demand 
function and the producers goods constrained labour demand 
function. Combining figures (3.2.2) and (3.2.5) we may now 
define and illustrate six different Keynesian outcomes.
Type 5 Type 6
Algebraically these 6 equilibria types are categorized as in 
table (3.2.1).
Table (3.2.1)
\  X 
L N,
1
1
*X 12 h r -  - f e y  j
X
A TYPE kj TYPE k2 TYPE k3
T * w 
L - ^ TYPE k4 TYPE k5 TYPE k6
Figure (3.2.4) -<l)-(6) demonstrates the effects uncertainty
and adjustment costs have upon the equilibria.*7 In each diagram 
the broken lines represent the demands the agents would express 
in the absence of uncertainty and adjustment costs and the
1 ftpoints denoted K c are the equilibria that would thus obtain.
The equilibria denoted are defined by the functions
incorporating uncertainty and adjustment costs, developed
earlier. Inspection of figure (3.2.7) (1) — (6) reveals how
the position of the equilibria in goods labour space are
modified by our treatment, in each case we see that adjustment,
* *either from L , X or both has been restricted by adjustment costs.
This is the second way in which our treatment is significantly
different from the standard Malinvaud type approach. Notice
however that in type 6 equilibria the producers adjustment
*costs of moving away from L and the consumers cost of moving
*away from X conflict, and adjustment in one variable may be 
greater than in the non-adjustment cost case, (kQ), depending 
upon the form and magnitude of the adjustment costs.
Finally let us examine the comparative static effects of a 
change in agents expectations, this may be due to a reloca­
tion of the mean of their subjective probability distributions, 
an agent adjusting or introducing skewdness into the 
distribution, or the adoption of a different form of prob­
ability distribution entirely.19
Our earlier analysis ensures
*
ai,
d \l l
and
*
a x
ac > 0
3X
dill '
8L
3<|«'
a x
3c '
3 L
3e take the sign of
3X —  , 
a x *
ax— V
a L
3L*3L
respectively
We now examine the comparative static effects of change in 
the subjective probability agents attach to states. From 
the definition of equilibria presented in table 1 we obtain
table (3.2.2).20 
Table (3.2.2 )
3X # 3X* 
3X* 3e
3L a x *  
*3X 3e
a x  _ 3 l *
3L 3di
aL _ 3l *
3L diji
E K 1 + + o 0 :Q f
U K2 + + 0 0
I
L K3 - - 0 o'
I
B K 4 + 0 + • +
R
i K5 + 0 0 +
A
K6 - 0 + +
Table (3.2.2) tells us how a change In the subjective prob­
ability the consumer Oe) and producer (3iJj) attaches to the 
state of the world occurring in which he is unrationed will 
effect final goods and labour sales.
To discuss the results of table 2 in detail would be somewhat 
repetitive, and inspection of figures (3.2.3), (3.2.4) and 
(3.2.5) should provide the reader sufficient intuition. We 
wish to demonstrate how this approach gives different compar­
ative static results from the standard treatments and illus­
trate this by considering an example using a tvrr> V . n t'i' 1 ; • t la.
represented in a standard type treatment. We shall assume 
that increased optimism means that the consumer expects to 
be able to sell more labour, and places a greater probability 
on selling his choice labour supply, in the next period. We 
assume that his intertemporal preferences are such that this 
will imply that he gains less utility from additions to money 
balance at the current period. Thus if his maximand is as
(3.2.42)
Max u = log X + log (T-L) + log (3.2.42)
where is the optimistic and cij the pessimistic weight of 
current period money balances in the utility function, < a
It may easily be shown that an increase in consumer optimism 
and subsequent reweighting a2 ■* dj will yield the following 
change in current period goods demand.
Example
»• an increase in consumer optimism may be
X
i = 1,2
AX =
P
(3.2.43)
1C8
Expression (3.2.43) simply states that an increase in consumer 
optimism yields an upward shift in his current period goods
We have imposed .the production function upon figure (3.2.5), 
illustrating that an increase in consumer optimism moves the 
equilibrium from A to B, thus having the comparative static 
effect of raising both output and employment. In contrast 
now consider how an increase in consumer optimism will effect 
output and employment in our type k3 equilibrium. From our 
preceding analysis and table ( 3.2.2) it follows that figure (3.2.6) 
describes the comparative statics in this case. We see that 
the equilibria moves from A to B as the consumer attaches a 
high probability to the good state of the world occurring, 
but that this has the comparative static effect of reducing 
both output and employment, the opposite effect to the standard 
case. The effect will persist until the equilibria changes to
demand,as indicated in Fig. (3.2.5): 
Fig. (3.2.5) Xf X = AL
■» L
M +wLo
type k2, then the comparative static effects will revert to 
those found in the standard type treatments.
t
Conclusion
In this model we examined the behaviour of agents who are 
aware of uncertainty and adjustment costs. We argued that 
they will base their initial transaction demands upon the 
maximization of Von Neumann-Morgenstem objective functions, 
and that these initial demands would be revised once the 
true state of the world has been revealed. It was found 
that to allow agents to behave in this sophisticated manner, 
brings traders expectations in the form of subjective prob­
ability distribution over states of the world to the fore, 
giving the model several new features. We noticed that 
initial transactions demands took different functional forms 
depending upon parameter magnitudes. Also we saw how
adjustment costs and uncertainty altered the shape of the 
constrained demand curves for both goods and labour. The 
new demand curves were' used to define six different Keynesian 
short-run equilibria, which were characterized by transaction 
levels and/or comparative static properties at variance from 
those found in a more standard treatment. Introducing 
uncertainty and adjustment costs, has made expectations 
crucial and has introduced rigidities in quantity adjustment 
which modify the equilibria, not in any ad hoc fashion but as 
a result of standard maximization procedures. Thus it'may 
be seen in this section that the introduction of transactions 
costs has an important impact on this class of Neo-Keynesian 
models. Indeed it may be argued that the approach becomes 
more Keynesian in spirit.
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FOOTNOTES
1. It may however be the case In Varians model that a Nash 
type equilibrium obtains where no one individual firm 
will view it as in its own interest to manipulate its 
labour demand.
2. The maximizing behaviour of this agent is never considered.
3. This of course ties in with Leijonhufvud comments about 
futures markets being incomplete.
4. For example,expected unemployment tomorrow leads to a 
greater supply of labour today and some accumulation
of money balances. These money balances will be carried 
forwards and will be associated with a high marginal 
disutility of labour tomorrow lowering the notional 
labour supply, making a Keynesian unemoloyment equilibrium 
less likely.
5. In this model it is unclear what happens when new 
relative prices are announced, aqents must exoress 
demands before they can receive aggregate signals. These 
demands can only be based upon prices and expectations.
It is difficult to envisage how a signal reproducing 
equilibrium different from a Muellbauer and Portes 
standard fix-price equilibrium will arise.
6. Salop (1973) for example has examined involuntary 
unemployment arising from the presence of training costs.
7. Agents organise their own transactions in this model, and as 
there are no middle men the adjustment costs will 
depend upon individual transactions technologies. These 
are assumed identical for expositional purposes.
8. Since it is assumed that the model is on the 'Keynesian 
regime' Lc will be assumed to not depend upon goods 
availability.
9. The functional form is chosen for ease of exposition.
10. Adjustment costs here are symmetric, whereas in reality 
it may be that strong assymetries exist, these would 
only modify the results of the model quantatively.
11. This condition states that the initial transactions 
demand.must fall between the planned good and bad* 
transactions levels. A simple proof that this is so 
may be found in the appendix to this chapter.
12. The case where xjl = x* = xj is the other possibility 
here but is clearly uninteresting.
13. The demand curve is obtained by rearranging the first 
order conditions of the following programme.
Max u = log x + log(T-L) + log(MQ + wL-px)
x
14. Again the mathematical expectation of the truncated 
subjective probability distribution, where the distri­
bution is truncated at the notional level of output.
15. A l(inear production function is assumed for ease of 
exposition.
16. q, = 0 would imply that the producer plans to hoard
labour, not apply it to capital, when he can sell 
all he can produce. Clearly this will never be chosen.
17. It is clear that multiple equilibria will exist when 
the models parameters take certain values.
18. The Equilibria Kc would occur in the Muellbauer and 
Portes (1978) or Malinvaud (1977) type structures.
19. We cannot explain exactly how the subjective 
probability may change without some examination of 
the learning processes of agents, which is beyond the 
scope of this analysis.
20. The comparative static effects may be signed but cannot 
be quantified since x* and L* may jump due to the 
discontinuity in the first stage of agents maximization 
problems.
Ill
a p p e n d i x
We wish to establish Xi > X* > Xj .
♦
Vie know Xi > Xj V p,w since Xj^ represents unconstrained 
trade and we do not allow forced consumption. Hence to 
establish our proposition we need only demonstrate X* falls 
within the range - 0Xj .
A
Define 0Xi - OXj as A.
Let us choose a point outside the range labelled a and a point 
inside the range labelled b, such that
eu[-c(a)] = euf-c(b)]
The expected utility loss of adjusting back to X^ from each 
of the two points is êqual.
If we now consider the expected utility loss of adjusting back 
to Xj from a and b we may write:
( 1—e) u[-c(A+a)J + euQ-c(a)3 < (l-e)u£ -c(A-b)]] + tu[j-c(b)J
Hence any point above X^ is clearly dominated by a point inside 
the range OX^ - OXj .
*Hence X^ > X > Xj clearly follows if we use the same
argument applied to points below Xj .
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4. EXPECTATIONS IN EQUILIBRIUM AND 
 DISEQUILIBRIUM
4 .1 Tatonnement and Non-Tatonnemcnt Models 
♦
Chapters 2 and 3 examined the roles played by expectations 
in Neo-Keynesian Models, and the properties of these classes 
of models which make expectations so important. This chapter 
looks at expectations in tatonnement and sequential trading 
models and considers their importance in the dynamic adjust­
ment processes which take place in the different transactions 
structures. Grossman (1969) poses the basic questions 
succinctly:
'The assumption of recontracting permits 
an ingenious simplification of the theory 
of markets. Moreover it may provide a 
rough approximation of the process by 
which market equilibrium is attained.
However, ever since Walras invented his 
tatonnement process, economists have 
conjectured that the assumption of recon­
tracting may seriously obscure under­
standing of markets while in disequilibrium.
The essential theoretical question involved 
here is the following: what is the Causal 
relationship between trading at non market 
clearing prices and the true paths of 
prices and quantities? In particular, 
how does the absence of recontracting 
effect the characteristics of the market 
equilibrium and its stability properties?'
A full answer to this question should explain how individual
agents respond to different market situations by adjusting
their transactions demands and the prices they wish to trade
at, given their information and expectations. Generally the
Neo-Keynesian literature has not attempted to answer the
question in this manner.^ Most approaches follow the initial
, hypothesis of Leijonhufvud (1966) and assume that quantity
adjustment precedes price adjustment. An equilibrium in
quantities is first established and then price adjustment
takes place upon the basis of effective demands. The economy
goes through three adjustment processes.
(i) Adjustment to the short-run fix-price equilibriums 
, agents adjust their trades to be consistent with
the constraints they face.
(ii) Adjustment of non-perishable goods or asset stocks, 
over successive periods of fixed relative prices.
(iii) Adjustment of prices.
The importance of expectations in each of these adjustment 
processes will now be considered in turn.
Adjustment to the Short-run Fix-Price Equilibrium
Many Neo-Keynesian models do not examine the adjustment process 
to the fix-price equilibrium. They assume that quantity 
adjustment occurs sufficiently rapidly that the process may 
be approximated by a tâtonnement on quantities. This 
obscures both the importance of expectations in the adjustment 
process and avoids the problem of describing 'false quantity 
trades'. Benassy (1975 appendix) bring these points out. 
Assuming that markets are visited in the sequence in which they 
are numbered,individual i's maximization problem during the 
adjustment process may be written as (4.1.1)
Max = U1 (ei + Zi,Mi) (4.1.
S.T. pZt + Mi < M^t) (i)
ei + Zi > 0, > 0 (ii)
Zih' - Zih' h'<h (iii)
Zih' £ l?h»(t) h'>h h cDi (iv)
Zih' > Zjh .(t) h»>h h'cSi (v)
Mih’ > 0 h'>h (vi)
Agent i chooses a vector of trades Z^ which given his
J. I V
endowments ei imply money st#ck Mi, which maximizes his utility. 
This optimal trade vector must satisfy the constraints (i)-(vi). 
(i) is the budget constraint. (ii) the conditions that net 
trades and final money stocks cannot be negative. (iii) states 
that on all markets h' which have already been visited the 
elements of the transactions vector should be equal to those 
trades that have already been carried out, Zih' describes 
trades that have already been made. Constraints (iv) and (v) 
state that on all markets h' to be visited after h, whether 
the agent is a supplier h'cSi or a demander h'eD^ on that 
market, he should not plan to exceed his expected constraints, 
^ih' Finally (vi) states that the individual never
plans to hold a negative quantity of money at any point in 
the transaction sequence. In Denassy's tâtonnement model the 
ex-ante constraints (iii)-(iv) collapse to a set of perceived 
constraints given for all markets and an overall liquidity 
constraint as (4.1.1) (ii). This obscures the importance of 
expectations which are fundamental in the sequential approach. 
Although Benassy does not examine the stability properties of 
his model under the sequential trading formulation, some 
aspects of the problem have been studied in an aggregated 
context by Varian (1977) and Honkapohja and Ito (1980). The 
Varian paper has already been extensively discussed in 
previous sections, its relevance here is because its results 
depend upon its sequential trading structure. The labour 
market meets before the goods market and thus employment 
depends upon sales expectations.
Honkapohja and Ito (1980) also assume that transactions first 
take place upon the labour market, firms attempt to purchase 
sufficient labour in order to produce an optimal inventory 
stock which will satisfy expected goods demand with sufficient J
11 »
stock that any random fluctuation in that demand may be 
satisfied. Firms are assumed to have rational expectations 
of goods demand, so when the good market opens a stock-outI
will only occur if firms have been constrained for labour. 
Also rational expectations of goods demand imply that no 
classical unemployment can arise. Inventories are the only 
dynamic link in the model since households are assumed to 
supply d units of labour inelastically and to consume a 
constant proportion of labour income. Thus different 
initial inventory stocks will cause firms to attempt to 
purchase different amounts of labour to achieve optimal 
inventories. Labour purchases,constrained or notional,will 
determine goods■purchases via workers incomes and therefore, 
end of period inventories.
Honkapohja and Ito examine equilibria where beginning and 
end of period inventories are in equality, and examine their 
stability properties under different quantity constraint 
regimes. Their results are summarised in figure (4.1.1) (a) 
and (b) :
Figure (4.1.1)
lli
In figure (4.1.1)(a) a steady state occurs in the Keynesian 
region; in (b) a steady state occurs in the repressed 
inflation region. No steady state occurs in the under 
consumption region,
Honkapohja and Ito demonstrate that the motion around 
a Keynesian steady state is always oscillatory, and may be 
either stable or of limit cycles. If no steady state 
exists on the Keynesian regime then the steady state in the 
Repressed Inflation regime is stable with monotonie conver­
gence .
It is interesting to note the part played by producers 
'rational' expectations in these dynamics. Expectations are 
termed rational because their expected value is assumed 
equal to the actual value of goods sales, as predicted by 
the model. The implication here being that producers can 
solve the model to obtain its sales prediction for each regime. 
The dynamics are given by three first order piecewise linear 
stocastic difference équations in inventory stocks which 
describe the following process. Given the models parameters 
which include initial inventory stocks,firms calculate their 
rational expectations of goods demand and an associated 
optional inventory stock. Required labour purchases are 
calculated and actually achieved if less than labour supply. 
Goods sales are carried out and provided no constraint- on 
the labour market has been met mean plans of goods sales 
are achieved without a stock-out. Mean end of period 
inventories are equal to the planned inventory stock. Next 
periods calculations are then made using last periods end 
of period inventory stock as a data, a new sales prediction 
and associated optional inventory stock obtained. A differ­
ence equation in inventory stocks is derived which yields
I J  il
stationary states where the expectation of goods demand and 
inventory stocks replicate themselves.
Interesting though this treatment is it examines only some 
of the problems of adjustment to the short run fix-price 
equilibrium,the dynamics of consumer behaviour and expectations 
are surpressed and it is assumed that firms have sufficient 
information that they make only random errors in expectations 
formation.
Benassy (1976) examines a much more general approach to the 
determination of dynamics in a short-run disequilibrium model. 
Again the basic assumption is that the labour market operates 
before the goods' market. The sequence of activities within 
the market period is as follows. Capitalists advance money 
to firms on the basis of expected prices, wages, constraints 
and the rate of profit. Firms then set wages make production 
plans and demand specific quantities of labour. The labour 
market then operates. Consumers visit firms and labour 
transactions take place at the quoted wage rates. These 
transactions reflect producer and consumer expectations of 
constraints and prices that will obtain on the forthcoming 
goods market. Firms then produce and fix goods market prices. 
The goods market then operates. Consumers again visit firms 
and transactions take place upon the goods market. Finally, 
from their receipts firms reimburse capitalists. Benassy 
does not model the dynamics of this process but simplifies 
the model and reports a series of simulations. He does 
however stress the importance of expectations in this process 
and suggests that expectations should be rational at the 
steady state of the economy. The idea of expectations as 
rational at the steady state is a point to which we shall return
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Adjustment of Non-Perishable Goods and Asset Stocks over 
Successive Periods of Fixed Relative Prices
The preceding section examines sequential adjustments to 
the short run fix-price equilibrium. In this section the 
dynamics of asset or inventory accumulation (decumulation) 
over a succession of short-run fix-price equilibria are 
examined. Analysis which examine this sort of dynamics 
implicitly assume a tatonnement upon quantities keeping 
agents behaviour upon the various markets mutually consistant. 
Models of this type include the multiplier analysis models 
of Barro and Grossman (1974) (1976) Honkapohja (19Cu) and 
the stability analysis of Btthm (1978) .
Barro and Grossman's (1976) analysis of the supply multiplier 
examines the effect that a decrease in goods availability will 
have upon output and employment in the repressed inflation 
regime of their fix-price model. The 'story' behind the 
supply multiplier is as follows. Faced by a tightening of 
the goods supply ration households have two types of response, 
to adjust their savings behaviour or their labour supply or 
a mixture of the two. If households reduce their labour 
supply firms who are constrained for labour reduce their 
output and goods availability to consumers is reduced further. 
The firms maximand is atemporal in Barro and Grossman and 
the inter-temporal link in the process is provided by^houser 
holds money balances. The representative households 
maximization problem is as follows (4.1.2):
Max
*T __ ( T  /T
u = | u[x(t)jf (t)]dt + J^u[xd (t),LS (t)]dt + u[xd (t),0]dt
(4.1.2)
(4.1.2) says that the representative household maximizes utility
1by planning its goods purchases and labour supply over three 
distinct periods. During the first period 0-T the household 
expect^ to be constrained to purchasing x and maximizes 
utility by planning to work L (t). In the second period
A
T T the household anticipates facing no constraints and 
freely chooses xd (t) and L ’(t). In the final period the 
household has retired L'(t)=0 and consumes savings to 
achieve xd (t).
Maximization is dependent upon the expected time path of the 
goods constraint. In the Barro Grossman treatment it is 
assumed that households expect the current goods constraint 
x to remain constant at that given level until time T. House­
holds have the option of substituting either current period 
leisure or future consumption, in the period T-T, for current 
constrained consumption. The magnitude of the supply multi­
plier depends upon expectations in two ways, the expected size 
and the duration of the goods constraint. It is demonstrated 
that if the constraint" is regarded as purely transitory then 
it will have negligible effect upon the households life plan 
and will not significantly reduce labour supply, also if 
the goods constraint expectation is close to the notional 
goods demand there will be little effect upon labour supply.
In the slightly longer run the effect of the supply multiplier 
will be to reduce profits, reducing household non-wage 
income and so increase labour supply, lower goods demand and 
moderate the impact of the multiplier. In extreme circumstances 
this effect may reverse the sign of the supply multiplier. 
Honkapohja (1980) modifies the Barro Grossman short run 
analysis of fix-price multipliers to the medium-run by
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utilizing the steady state multiplier of government expend­
iture taking into account changes in asset stocks. Honkapohja 
demonstrates that the steady state demand multiplier is
t
larger than the short-run analysis suggests whilst the 
supply multiplier changes sign.
Analysis' of the Barro Grossman (1976) or Honkapohja (1980) 
type examine the comparative static shifts of the short-run 
fix-price equilibrium in response to some parameter change. 
Implicit in such treatments is the assumption that the 
adjustment processes underlying such a change are stable.
Bflhm (1978) considers the underlying dynamics. A sequence 
of fix-price equilibria are considered, a steady state is 
an equilibrium money stock,real wage pair,at which households 
desired money stock changes are zero. No saving or disaving 
occurs. It is demonstrated that such steady states are 
globally unstable on the repressed inflation regime, but are 
monotonically convergent upon the Keynesian regime for all 
initial money stocks which are not too large. Bfihms results 
have been taken as demonstrating that the repressed inflation 
regime and supply multiplier are unimportant, see Honkapohja 
(1980), however Bflhm's analysis is based upon some special 
assumptions. The model used assumes that money balances 
held by households provide the only link between periods.
There are no inventory stocks, expectations are static. The 
government levies a 100% profits tax. Discussion of both 
demand and supply multipliers given by Barro and Grossman 
and Honkapohja, suggests that Bfihms results are based upon 
strong assumptions which are at variance with some aspects 
of multiplier theory. The dynamics of adjustment through a 
succession of fix-price equilibria requires an explanation
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of inventory stock, asset stock and expectations adjustment. 
Comparative static multiplier analysis will be valid upon 
those regimes and over those ranges of parameter values
i
for which a dynamical system, which places both firms and 
households in an inter-temporal decision making setting, 
is stable.
Adjustment of Prices
Most Neo-Keynesian models obtain equilibria in which resources 
are not fully utilized because relative prices are wrong, 
and persist in being wrong for some meaningful period.^ The 
obvious question is why do not relative prices adjust to 
their market clearing levels? The literature has approached 
this question in two distinct ways. One approach is to 
examine endogeneous price setting by individual economic 
actors or institutions, and to consider under what circum­
stances agents will choose to keep prices constant. The 
second approach has been to consider the dynamics of price 
adjustment and the possibility of effective demand failures.
In this section the question of price dynamics and effective 
demand failures will be examined, the question of endogeneous 
price setting and its implications will be the main theme 
of chapters 5-7 and will be examined there. Conventional price 
adjustment equations express the time derivative of prices 
as a function of the difference between the notional supplies 
and demands for the good in question, as (4.1.3) and (4.1.4):
p - f(xd - xs) Hi V O f(0)=0 (4. 1.3)
w  ■ g(Ld - L s) g' >0 g (0) =0 (4. 1.4)
whoro p ■ af and; w  =
dw
dt
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and x*1 - x d(w/p), x* = x*(w/p), Ld * L* (w/p) , L5, -LS (w/p)
The equations (4.1.3) and (4.1.4) represent the traditional 
excess demand hypothesis, this price adjustment mechanism 
can easily be shown to be locally asymptotically stable.5 
The problem with such an adjustment mechanism is that it is 
based upon the difference between notional supplies and 
demands which can only be expressed at market clearing prices. 
As was first pointed out by Leijonhufvud (1973) away from 
the market clearing price vector the correct functional forms 
to work with when formulating excess demands are the effective 
supplies and demands. The form taken by effective excess 
demands will depend upon which constraint regime the system 
is upon. In principle there are four basic formulations:6
Keynesian:
f> = fk (xd '-xs) fk ' > 0 (4.1.5)
w = gk (Ld - Ls) gk ' > 0 (4.1.6)
Repressed inflation:
p = fR (xd - xs') ’•fR ' > 0 (4.1.7)
* = gR (Ld - Ls') R'g > 0 (4.1.8)
Classical:
. _c, d' s'. p = f (x - x ) fc ' > 0 (4.1.9)
. c /rd .s', w = g (L - L ) c'g > 0 (4.1.10)
Under Consumption:
É» - fU (xd - x S') fu ’ > 0 (4.1.11)
* = gu (Ld - LS) u ’g > 0 (4.1.12)
where: xa /w/p »IJ , x (w/p,L), Ld (w/p,x), LS (w/p, x)
Equations (4.1.5)-(4.1.12) describe the effective excess 
demand hypothesis. Two essentially inter-related controversies
are associated with this hypothesis<both of which stem from 
Leijonhufvud (1973) who argues that if the economy is close 
to the equilibrium generating price vector, within thef
corridor, then this system is characterised by good stability 
properties. If however the system is outside the corridor 
then effective demand failures will occur and prices will 
not adjust. Leijonhufvud argues that large unanticipated 
deviations drain the system of liquid buffer stocks, causing 
households to revise downwards subjective estimates of 
permanent income, these are self fulfilling because of large 
downward multiplier effects. Self fulfilling expectations 
of permanent income cause effective demand failure. Thus 
it is argued that prices(when well away from their Walrasian 
values<may not adjust and the economy may be in a state of 
lasting unemployment. This is the first of the two inter­
related controversies, the idea that for some prices and 
corresponding effective demands the expectations of permanent 
income held by households will equate (4.1.5)-(4.1.12) to 
zero. Grossman (1974)’ and Veendorp (1975) have disputed 
Leijonhufvud's idea of effective demand failures. Assuming 
an underlying 'fast' or rather tatonnement quantity adjust­
ment Grossman argues that prices will adjust towards their 
full equilibrium values even if the system is initially far 
away from the Walrasian price vector. Veendorp's paper 
initiated the second controversy. He provides stability 
analysis of price adjustments based upon effective excess 
demands in a two consumer three commodity pure exchange economy 
The results obtained are that if the notional excess demand 
functions have the property of gross substitutability, then 
both price mechanisms based on notional and effective excess 
demand functions are locally asymptotically stable. Veendorp
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also demonstrates numerically that In economy where the excess
demand functions lack the property of gross substitutability
the system can be stabilised by replacing the notional excess »
demands with the effective excess demands. This leads 
Veendorp to conjecture that a sufficient condition for local 
stability of a price mechanism based upon effective excess 
demands is that a price mechanism based upon the notional 
excess demands is stable. This conjecture and indeed Veendorp's 
other results have been partially refuted by LOfgren (1979). 
Ldfgren examines an economy with production introduced in
nthe form of a simple atemporal production function. Using a 
version of the Barro-Grossman model it is demonstrated that 
an economy which.is stable under price adjustments based upon 
notional excess demands can be unstable under the effective 
excess demand hypothesis.
The two inter-related controversies are whether the effective 
excess demands may be zero away from the Walrasian price 
vector as Leijonhufvud argues, and whether or not the price 
adjustment mechanism based on the effective excess demands 
is stable.
Even if it seems reasonable to treat the price and quantity 
adjustment processes separately, and this is perhaps in doubt, 
there are other problems associated with the effective excess 
demand hypothesis as described by equations (4.1.5) - (4*. 1.12) .
As Veendorp notes it may not be correct to include the 
notional supplies or demands in the price adjustment equation 
even when these are on the long side of their respective markets. 
It may not be optional for agents to express their notional 
supplies or demands on a market upon which they are rationed 
if there are costs associated with expressing a demand, as
A
were discussed in chapter 3.® it may also be the case that 
agents will express demands in excess of their notional 
demand^ upon markets where they face rationing. Agents may 
attempt to manipulate the rationing scheme through their 
demands, this could cause serious problems for the stability 
of the price adjustment mechanism. Honkapohja and Ito 
(1980) also suggest that agents may become discouraged by 
rationing and understate their notional demands, which could 
cause sluggishness in the price adjustment mechanism. It 
seems likely that the correct specification of the effective 
demand hypothesis will depend crucially upon the properties 
of the rationing scheme in operation, and whether there are 
costs associated in expressing demands.
The price adjustment process as defined by the effective 
excess demand hypothesis assumes that the underlying quantity 
adjustments are stable, establishing a series of fix-price 
equilibria in which the trades agents conduct upon markets 
are mutually consistarit. Contributicns to the literature 
which make this point usually cite Bfihm (1978) as calling 
this into question. Btthnfs analysis is based upon a 
series of periods of constant fixed prices and medium 
run asset stock adjustments by consumers.
The analysis itself assumes 
the short run adjustment to the fix-price equilibria is stable 
that agents trade upon markets in any period are consistent 
with the solutions to their constrained maximization problems. 
' it could be argued that the dynamical process which is relevant to the 
demands and supplies expressed is the quantity adjustment equation in the 
short-run adjustment process to the fix-price equilibrium not 
the evolution of these equilibria over successive periods of
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arbitrary fixed prices. In the next section a simple model 
of the short-run adjustment process under Keynesian 
unemployment and repressed inflation regimes will be developed. 
Its major features will be the seauential nature of the 
short-run adjustment mechanism and the importance of 
expectations in such a process.
4.2 A Neo-Keynesian Disequilibrium Trading Model:
Sequential Adjustment to the Short-Run Fix-Price 
Equilibrium
In the preceding section (4.1) some of the adjustment processes 
that have been analysed in the Neo-Keynesian literature were 
discussed. Starting from the conceptual foundation of the 
Clower/Leijonhufvud fix-price equilibrium three adjustment 
processes were identified. Adjustment to the short-run 
fix-price equilibrium. Adjustment of Non-Perishable goods 
and asset stocks over successive periods of fixed relative 
prices, and the adjustment of prices. It was argued in the 
section on the adjustment of prices that it was necessary 
to examine the stability of the underlying quantity adjust­
ment mechanism to provide an underpinning for price adjust­
ments. The analysis' discussed in the section upon adjust­
ments to the short-run fix-price equilibria, Benassy (1975 
appendix) Honkapohja and Ito (1980), do not examine inventory 
and money stock adjustments together, this is required for a 
satisfactory examination of the quantity adjustment process.
In this section a sequential trading fix-price model will 
be developed in which consumers hold money and firms 
inventory stocks. Dynamic analysis of the quantity adjust­
ment process to the fix-price equilibrium will be carried 
out for the Keynesian and Repressed Inflation cases. This
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analysis, it is argued, provides the correct underpinning
for the effective excess demand hypothesis on these regimes.
It also places emphasis upon the role of exoectations »
adjustment in the dynamics of quantity adjustment.
It will be shown that the equilibria of this model has for 
the most part nice stability properties contrary to the 
results of BOhm (1978) and similar in some cases to Honkapohja and 
Ito (1980) which were discussed in section (4.1). Here it 
will be demonstrated that in certain circumstances the 
Keynesian equilibria have saddle point or cyclically diver­
gent dynamic properties, and that the application of 
government monetary and fiscal policy may be required to 
stabilize the system, whilst the Repressed Inflation regime 
has either stable, spiral or saddle point characteristics.
The Model
There are three types of economic agents in the economy 
studied, a representative consumer/worker, a representative 
producer and the government. There are three goods, labour, 
consumption good and money, the prices of which are w, p and 
1 respectively. Money and the consumption good are storeable.
It is assumed that the consumption good and labour markets
9open sequentially. Producers and consumers current
transactions will be dependent upon the trading possibilities 
they anticipate when the other market opens.10 In using a 
representative consumer, representative producer model there 
are clearly questions associated with sequential trading in 
disaggregated models which cannot be considered.11 However 
it is argued that this model is adequate to describe the 
fundamental dicotomy between the good and labour markets and
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the decision making processor therein. This is not of 
course a description of any real economy but rather an 
abstraction to examine some of the implications of dis-I
equilibrium trading that occurs in the quantity adjustment 
process to the fix-price equilibrium. Consider first the 
Keynesian regime.
The Keynesian Regime
There are two possible decision making processes here. First 
the consumer may decide to purchase consumption goods by 
spending money balances which he plans to rebuild when the 
labour market opens. In this rase it will be assumed that 
the producer holds a sufficiently large inventory stock to 
accommodate the consumers purchases, and when the labour 
market opens the producer then hires sufficient lhbour to 
rebuild his stocks. Second, the producer decides to purchase 
labour and produce consumption goods in anticipation of the 
demand he will face when the consumption good market opens.
It is assumed that the consumer is willing to supply the 
producers labour demand, and when the goods market is open 
to purchase consumption goods consistent with realised labour 
sales}^
Case 1: The first component of any pair of trades occurs 
on the goods market.
Assume the consumer behaves according to a short-run Keynesian 
consumption function as (4.2.1):
x (t) = x(E(t), m(t) | p, w, M) (4.2.1)
where
X(t) is goods purchased at time t, L(t) anticipated
*(planned) labour sales, m(t) money stock. M is 
a long run target money stock which reflects the
consumers long-run expectations.
The consumer money stock m(t) an any t is given by
m('t) = m(o) + fi(t) dt + Ô (t) dt
(4.2.2) :
(4.2.2)
where
M(t) = dM/dt planned money stock changes,
Q(t) = dQ/dt unanticipated money stock changes.
The planned money stock adjustment of the consumer is as (4.2.
M(t) = A(M - m(t) ) (4.2.3)
However plans may not be realised and actual money stock 
adjustment is described by (4.2.4):
ii(t) = M (t) + Q (t) (4.2.4)
To explain why unanticipated changes in the consumers money 
stock occur consider the producers behaviour. Let the 
producer behave according to the inverse production function 
(4.2.5)
L(t) = *(Y(t)) = Mx(t) + g (t) ) (4.2.5)
L(t) actual employment at t, g(t) is government goods demand.
Transactions are allowed to take place out of equilibrium, 
hence realised labour sales L(t) may not equal planned 
labour sales L(t) - there is rationing. This implies that 
the consumer will accumulate (decumulate) unanticipated 
money balances as in (4.2.6) and will also have to revise 
planned labour sales towards the ration L(t) as in (4.2.7)
Q(t) = w(L(t) - E(t) ) (4.2.6)
£(t) = 4>(L(t) - L(t) ) (4.2.7)
4> is a constant adjustment parameter.
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A clearer understanding of the processes involved in the 
model may be achieved by considering figure (4.2.1)
*
where
p - (Y ,L ) is the producer unconstrained choice 
point
U c cc = (X ,L ) is the consumers unconstrained choice 
•point
To explain figure 1 hypothesize the following, the relative 
price vector has just been announced and both agents trade 
first upon the goods market. The initial goods market 
trade will be Y(O) = min(YF,Xc+g(o) ) and we see from the 
diagram that the producer faces a shortfall in effective 
demand (Y(o) represents a ration). The consumers goods 
purchase was based upon the anticipation that L(o) labour 
cou)d be sold in the next instant such that he may reolace
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model may be achieved by considering figure (4.2.1)
whe re
p - (Y ,L ) is the producer unconstrained choice 
point
u  C  Cc = (X ,L ) is the consumers unconstrained choice 
•point
To explain figure 1 hypothesize the following, the relative 
price vector has just been announced and both agents trade 
first upon the goods market. The initial goods market 
trade will be Y(0) = min(YF ,Xc+g(o)) and we see from the 
diagram that the producer faces a shortfall in effective 
demand (Y(o) represents a ration). The consumers goods 
purchase was based upon the anticipation that L(o) labour 
could be sold in the next instant such that he may replace
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his money balances, but this does not occur as the producer 
requires only L(o) to produce output to exactly replace 
the stiock he has just sold.^ The consumer thus finds 
that he cannot sell his planned labour supply and con­
sequently cannot fully replenish his money balances.
The consumer then adjusts his goods demand downwards, due 
to the loss of money stock he has just experienced 
(indicated rti on diagram); and also revises his expected 
labour sales downwards (indicated E on diagram). This 
process continues until L(t) = L(t) and an equilibrium 
is established.
By manipulation- of (4.2.1), (4.2.3) - (4.2.7) we may describe 
the dynamics of our model by the differential equations
(4.2.8) and (4.2.9).14
ih(t ) = A(M-m(t)) + w(i,[x(E(t) ,m(t) |p,w,M)
+ g(t) ] - E(t)) (4.2.8)
L(t) = <M£[x(E(t), m(t) | p,w,M) + g(t)] - E (t)) (4.2.9)
An equilibrium is thus defined when (4.2.8) and (4.2.9)
* = 1 5are both zero, when m(t) = M and L(t) = L(t).
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Before examining the stability properties of this economy 
first note that (4.2.4) implies (4.2.1) may be rewritten:16
X(t) = x(E(t),m(t)|p,w,M) = yI(t)-A^M-m(t) ) (4 2>1,
the linear consumption function (4.2.10)
ii'i' - £ and . A¡tL(t) P 3mit) P
yields:
(4.2.11)
These properties will be useful in what follows.
It may perhaps be anticipated that as we allow income effects 
the stability properties of our model will be problematic, but 
counter to our intuition,this does not prove to be the case. 
Taking first order Taylors approximation to (4.2.1) and
(4.2.9) and using (4.2.11) write2
*m(t> = flZm (t) + f2Z£(t) = 0 (4.2.12)
¿=(t) = g ^ i t )  + g2z_(t) = o (4.2.13)
L
where
Zm (t) = rti(t), Z-=(t) = L(t), Zm (t) = m(t)-M, Z = (t) = L(t)-m
[9H "_1 1 < n f - „rat w~[_3x (t) P J ° f2 ' W|ji(t) P
dl A . „ „ .fa* w~ITx (t) — > 0  P g2 - ♦[55(t) P
(4.2.14)
Each partial in (4.2.14) is evaluated at the equilibrium.
Assuming no forced trading, the standard condition w/p .< m pl 
allows us to sign the partials in (4.2.14).
Using (4.2.14) we may now describe the dynamics of our economy 
by the phase diagram figure (4.2.2):
t-*»
 «■
Fig. (4.2.2)
This equilibrium is clearly stable, since f1#g,<o, the real 
parts of both complex conjugate roots of the system are 
negative.
Since the equilibria are stable the comparative statics of 
a change in government expenditure will be the standard 
multipliers (4.2.15) and (4.2.16):
dY (t) _ w 3JL + 1dg(t) p 3g(t)
dL(t) = oT ï 11 + i 1dg (tj " *|_ p- 3g (t) + 1 J
(4.2.15)
(4.2.16)
at m(t) = M all changes in consumers wage income are trans­
lated into consumption demand (MPC=1).
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Note: The slopes of the stationeries are
w3Zm (t) . f2
3Z=(t)
V t)=0
fl
» V 11 I ‘g2 3£
i - (t)=0 gl
Si
A
< 0
3x ( t).w/p—1 
3x(t)./p > 0
Arrows on phase diagram
3Z (t) 3 Z =(t)m  L
3Z (t) fl * 0 ' 3Z_ (t) 
m L
= g, < 0
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So far it has been demonstrated that an economy characterised 
by a decision making process where transactions upon the goods 
market essentially precede those on the labour market will,
given the qualificaticns previously stated, display a stable 
Keynesian equilibria.
The foregoing analysis assumes consumers expectations and 
hence their target money stock to be unaffected by current 
market experience. Now relax this heroic assumption by 
rewriting (4.2.4) as (4.2.4)'
Thus the money stock the consumer wishes to carry forward to 
the next period depends upon the expected current labour
to specify an expectations formation mechanism and then the
consumers preferences over periods, this is omitted since
here interest is focused on the question of whether the expectations
the answer to this question is somewhat counter intuitive, 
the effect of expectations as expressed through (4.2.4)' can 
at worst cause cyclically unstable equilibria but in most 
cases will generate equilibria which are stable, or may be 
stabilized by the operation of standard government policy 
instruments.
Carrying through the previous analysis with (4.2.4) ' replacing 
(4.2.4) gives a new set of partial derivatives for (4.2.14)
M(t) = A(M (L (t) |p,w) - m(t)) (4.2.4)'
= 17 .= *ration L(t) . To know how L(t) effects M it is necessary
* 18effect through M be destabilizing? It will be found that
(4.2. 4)'
From (4.2.14)' it is clear that to describe the stability 
properties of the model with endogenous expectations,inform- 
ation about the signs of f2 and g2 is required. The new 
component in the partials (4.2.14)' over (4.2.14) is the 
expectations effect 9M/DE(t), this term cannot be signed 
without specifying a multi-period model with functional
form. Now examine the possibilities.
★
c\ M(i) Let — —  < 0 : A tightening of the current periodDL(t)
labour ration raises the consumers 
desired savings.
This might be called the 'Pessimistic' case. The consumer 
anticipates that things will become worse in the next period. 
The signs of the partials in (4.2.14)' are now as in table 
(4.2.1)
Table (4.2.1)
where
a
1
fl
t
f2
1
g l
1
*2
a < o - - + -
o<a<b - - + +
o<b<a - + + +
w ADM
9Ë(t)
. . DMb - A ---- - w
DL (t)
Note that a<o is only possible with negative production or 
prices and will not be examined in what follows. Inspection 
of table 1 reveals three possible cases represented in 
figure (4.2.3) (a) (b) and (c).
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In figure (4.2.3)
(a) fL < 0,
. «X1. -a > 0
(b)
<
1 1
fl '  f2 A o tQ h-* vQ ro > 0 and -f2 '/fi' < "g2 ,/gl
(c) • »fl '  f2 < ° '  gl ' g2 > 0 and -f2 '/f ' > "g2 ,/gl
As the phase diagrams in figure (4.2.3) indicate, endogenizing 
expectations changes the stability properties of the model. 
Note; The slopes of the stationeries are:
3Z (t) m
7zl(t)L
II 1 1 ^
 
1 1
0
★9M
A
. w 3£ '
f p Txjt) r - A
*3M _ 
Shit).
f,Z (t) =0 •• 1 m
A  F9#-
A L^(t)
W
P a
pH [w A 9M
1 AV
 
O3Z (t) V-9* ♦ "5x(t) P p 3Ë(t) -  1
3Z.it)L 2 £(t)=0 5x(t)
Arrows in phase diagram
3 Z ( t) m
^ (t>
= f x ’ < 0
3zE(t)
3S£ (t)
1
= g2 = * pu fw |_3xTt) (p 3L(t) ' - l ]  I 0
There are two questions which immediately spring to mind on 
examining figure (4.2.3). Firstly,is the cyclical equilibrium 
stable? Secondly,is there any action that the government may
undertake which will ensure that the system is on the stable 
manifold in the saddle point cases? To examine these questions 
rewrite the differential equation system in matrix form.
[z (t)1 " i i
Z(t) = m
2_(t)L e J
,A - fif
Lg!
f 21
g2
,Z(t) = Z(t)m
Z (t) . L
The characteristic equation of the system (4.2.15) is (4.2.16)
To examine the stability properties the eigenvalues are 
obtained by applying the quadratic formula to (4.2.16)
If the solution path is cyclical as in figure (4.2.3) (b) then 
stability requires that the real part of the complex conjugate
Can the government ensure that (4.2.18) holds, and ensure that 
the solution path of the system is a stable spiral? This is 
likely, inspection of (4.2.18) reveals that the left hand 
side is decreasing in x(t) whilst the right hand side is 
increasing in x(t) , from (4.2.5) it is clear that 3«./9x(t)
= 3i/3g (t) Vg (t) , x(t),g(t)^0, x(t)#>. Hence by lowering 
government expenditure the inequality in (4.2.18) may be
0 (4.2.16)
(4.2.17)
roots 8^, of (4.2.17) be negative. Hence stability requires
(f: + g2 ) < 0
which is equivalent to
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ensured and the solution path will be a stable spiral.19 
Heuristically regard this as the case where the system 
becomes over responsive, small changes in goods purchases 
lead to large employment level responses, due to a very low 
marginal product of labour, and large expectations and desired 
money balance adjustments in response to employment fluctu­
ations. By cutting back government expenditure, the system 
is forced back down the production function, employment 
fluctuations are diminished and the system becomes more 
stable.
If the equilibrium is a saddle point as in figure (4.2.3)(a) 
and (c), then both roots of (4.2.16) are real. Denote 02 
as the stable (negative) root. The Government in such an 
equilibrium can stabilise the system if it can place the 
system upon the stable manifold. The equation of the stable 
path of a saddle point of our system (4.2.15) is given by
(4.2.19).
m(t) Tan
ifi-e2 L(t) + M (t) ifr e2I TT~ E(t) (4.2.19)
(4.2.19) is only an approximation to the stable path since we 
are working with linear approximations. From (4.2.19) an 
(approximate) lump sum transfer rule may be defined, which 
the government may follow to stabilize the system. If E(o), 
m(o) are the initial conditions the lump sum transfer'rule is
(4.2.20)
LST(o) f fr 02i =Tan -j L(t) + M(t) ( ¥ ■ ) E(o)-m(o)
Note: To obtain the equation of the stable branch
use the following method (due to Dixit, 1980):
(4.2.20)
fr e2 f2 "vl‘ s 'o' where ’V1
_9i g2-P2_ v2 0 v2
is the eigenvector
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Choose v: = 1 and solve for 
using the properties of the 
slope of the stable branch
v2 to obtain v2 = 
unit circle write
as ¿2 = ~
v. fr s2
and
the
Given a point on the line M(t), L(t) and its slope v2/vl the 
equation of the stable branch now follows from basic trigonometry.
Note that as (4.2.20) only places the system upon cm approx­
imation to the stable manifold it will be necessary for the 
government to repeatedly adjust money balances according to
(4.2.20) until the system is within a neighbourhood of the *
equilibrium M(t) , L(t). Effectively (4.2.20) defines a money 
supply rule to stabilise the system.
Having thus examined the possible equilibria that will occur 
upon the Keynesian regime when consumers are pessimistic, in 
the sense that a tightening of the current period labour 
ration induces them to believe that things will become worse 
in the next period and hence raises their desired level of 
money balances. Next consider the 'optimistic' case.
(ii) Let — —  > 0 :
3L(t)
A tightening of the current period 
labour ration lowers desired savings.
It may be shown that the sign of the partials in (4.2.14) 
are now as in table (4.2.2)^°.
Table (4.2.2)
fi' f’’
•
*1
1
*2
. . 9M w > A----
3L(t)
_ + -
w < A----
3L(t)
- + + -
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Again there are three possible cases, as described by figure 
(4.2.4).
Fig. (4.2.4)
(b) (c)
In figure (4. 2.4)
(a) •fl '
•
f2
1
» ?2 < 0 g^' >0
(b) 1fl '
V
^2 <0 ^ ' ^ ’>0 -f2
1 1
/fl
(c) fl’'
•
92 <0 f2 ''5i'>0 -f2'
r i
/fi
Again is it possible for the government to utilize standard 
policy instruments to stabilise the system. It would appear 
that stabilization policy is required in the cases depicted 
by figure (4.2.4)(a) and (b) but it may be easily shown 
that (a) is a stable spiral. The instability of (b) is due 
to the system being off the (unique) stable branch the 
equation of which will be (4.2.19) as in the previous case._ 
Thus again the government may stabilize the system by follow­
ing the approximate lump sum transfer rule defined by 
expression (4.2.20). Thus if consumers are optimistic, in 
the sense that a tightening of the current period labour 
ration lowers their desired savings, then on the Keynesian 
regime the government can stabilize the system by a lump sum
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transfer/money supply rule.
Having examined the stability proDerties of a fix-price 
representative consumer, producer model, where transactions 
are permitted away from the quantity tatonnement equilibrium, 
and where the first leg of any pair of transactions takes 
place upon the goods market. We now turn attention to the 
case where trading takes place first on the labour market.
Case 2: The first component of any pair of trades occurs 
on the labour market.
Again assume that the consumer behaves according to some 
short-run Keynesian consumption function.
X(t) = x(L(t) , m(t) | p, w, M) (4.2.21)
(4.2.21) differs from (4.2.1) the consumption function in 
case 1, since L(t) actual labour sales replaces, E(t) expected 
labour sales, because in the second case L(t) is experienced 
prior to trading on the goods market.
Since trading takes place first upon the labour market, the 
onus is upon the producer to predict the level of goods 
sales that will be achieved when that market opens, and 
purchase sufficient labour L(t), to produce sufficient goods 
to meet predicted goods demand net of undesired inventories. 
Labour demand is thus given by the inverse production 
function (4.2.22):
L(t) = £ (y (t) - I (t)) (4.2.22)
where y(t) is predicted goods demand, I(t) undesired 
inventories.
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Clearly then the dynamics of this case are generated by the 
discrepancy between predicted and actual goods demand. 
Producers will respond to this discrepancy by adjustingI
their prediction of demand and hence their labour purchases. 
Consumers will respond to changes in labour sales by adjust­
ing money balances and goods purchases.
The difference between goods demand and predicted demand 
will be observed in the level of undesired inventories, as 
(4.2.23)21:
I(t) = y(t) - I(t) - X(t) - g(t) (4.2.23)
The producers response will be to adjust anticipated demand 
as W.2.24) and thus employment as (4.2.25)
y(t) = p[x(t) + g(t) - y(t) ] (4.2.24)
L(t) = £[y(t) - I (t) + y (t) - i(t)]-L(t) (4.2.25)
In response to change in the labour ration the consumer 
will adjust his goods purchases and money stock. Thus 
write
A(t) = wL(t) - px(L(t), m(t)|p,w,M) (4.2.26)
Expressions (4.2.25) and (4.2.26) represent the dynamics of 
the model. With some substitution (4.2.25) may be rewritten 
as (4.2.27).
L(t) =■ £^(l+p) [x(L(t) ,m(t) |p,w,M) + g(t)] - py(t)J-L(t)
(4.2.27)
The stability properties of the model may be analysed in the 
same manner as case 1. Using a Taylors approximation rewrite 
the differential equation system (4.2.26), (4.2.27) in 
matrix form as (4.2.28).
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Z(t) = AZ(t)
whe re
Z(t) =
and
Z(t)m
Z_(t)L
9x
A =
fl f2 
gl *2
Z(t) =
fl ~ _p 9m(t) < °' fz = W"P
Zm (t)m
Z_(t)L
9x 
9L(t) ~< 0
gl " (1+p)!£ ls(t) > g2 = 99L(t) < 0
Following the same procedure as in case 1 it may be shown 
that the phase diagrams of figure (4.2.5) describe the
systems possible dynamic characteristics. 
Fig. (4.2.5)
'Hie possible outcomes demonstrated in figure (4.2.5) (1)— (6) 
are characterised as follows;
(1 )
(2)
^1'*2'^2 <
f2<®' ^l'^2*® ~ ^ 2 ^ 1  >
(3)
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fi'f2 < °' V 9 2 > ° ~ f2/fl < _g2/gl
(4) fi'g2 < °' f2'gl > 0 -f2/fl > ‘g2/gl
(51) f^»g2 < ^2'gl > ® “f2/^1 * -g2^gl
(6) < 0, f2 ,glfg2 > 0
The solution path of each of the systems dynamics depicted 
in figure (4.2.5) has either a spiral or saddle point pattern. 
Here the government attempting to stabilize the system has 
one of two problems to solve, if there is a saddle point 
case, can it ensure that the economy stays on or approx­
imately upon the stable manifold? If there is a spiral 
solution path, can it be ensured that it is convergent? The 
answers to the first question is a qualified affirmative, 
the lump sum transfer rule defined by expression (4.2.20) 
can be rewritten as (4.2.29)^
If the government effects the transfers defined by (4.2.29) the 
system will be repeatedly returned to the approximation to the
In the case depicted in figure (4.2.5) (1 )#(3) and (5) the 
problem faced by the government is to ensure that the spiral 
converges. This requires that the real parts of the systems 
characteristic roots be negative. That f^+g2 < °* This 
clearly follows in (1) and (5) since f^,g2 < 0 in these 
cases. In (3) f^ < 0,’"g2 > 0 thus stability requires | f^ | > .
C
To achieve this stability condition the government needs to 
cut its expenditure, thus movinq the equilibrium down the 
production function, raising the marginal product of labour 
and so reducing g2, since g2 contains the term 3£/3x - 3£/3g(t).
f -a 1 *
r l P2 -L (t) + M* ■i— - L (t) - m(t) (4.2.29) 
r2
LST(t) = Tan -i-*- 
r 2
stable branch, and will achieve a stable equilibrium at (L,M).
Hence on the Keynesian Regime of a representative consumer, 
producer model, with fixed prices and no quantity tatonnement, 
and where the decision making process involves transactions
t
effectively taking place first upon the labour market, the 
Government may stabilize the system by utilizing lump sum 
transfers or expenditure policies. Consider next the 
possibilities that may occur upon the Repressed Inflation 
Regime.
The Repressed Inflation Regime
As on the Keynesian regime there are two possible decision 
making processes that may occur here. First the producer 
may decide to sell from stock a certain quantity of con­
sumption good given his expectation of how much labour will 
be available, and their replenishment of stock, when the 
labour market opens. Here it will be assumed consumers are 
willing to purchase however much stock the producer releases 
for sale. Second the consumer may decide to sell its labour 
services in anticipation of goods availability when the 
labour market opens. In this case it will be assumed that
producers are willing to employ all consumers who wish to
, 24 work.
Case Is The first component of any pair of trades occurs 
on the goods market.
Assume the consumer behaves according to the short-run labour 
supply function (4.3.30)
L(t) = l(x(t),m(t)| p ,w,M) (4.2.30)
where
L(t) is the planned labour supply, x(t) is goods 
available for consumption by the consumer at time t.
m(t) is money stock at t.
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Since x(t) is known to the consumer and his planned labour
sales (L(t)) will be realised the change in the consumers
money stock may be written as (4.2.31).«
m(t) = wl(x(t) ,m(t) |p,w,M) - px(t) (4.2.31)
The amount of consumption good made available to the consumer 
for consumption at t, will be producers planned output net 
of any desired inventory accumulation and government 
purchases as (4.2.32)
x (t) = y(t) - i(t) - g(t) (4.2.32)
planned output will depend upon the producers expectation 
of labour availability when the labour market opens.
y(t) = £[L(t)] (4.2.33)
Thus using (4.2.33),' (4.2.32) may be written as (4.2.34) 
x(t) = Jt[E(t)] - i(t) - g (t) (4.2.34)
Adjustment of producers expectations may be described as
(4.2.35)
E(t) = *[L(t) - L(t)] (4.2.35)
where is a constant adjustment parameter. L(t) = L(t) 
from (4.2.30). With some substitutions the dynamics of the 
quantity adjustment process may be described as (4.2.36) and
(4.2.37) .
iMt) = wlU[E(t)]-i(t)-g(t) ,m(t) | p, w,M) -p[i ¡L (t)]-i (t) -g (t)]
(4.2.36)
L(t)H'CL(*[E(t)3-i (t)-g(t) ,m(t) ]p,w,M)-E(t)] (4.2.37)
A repressed inflntion..equilibrium is defined by (4.2.36) and
(4.2.37) both being zero, when m(t)=M and L(t)=E(t). Initially 
i(t) the producers desired change in inventory stocks^will be 
assumed to represent the producers response to the previous 
instants experience and may be treated as exogenously
determined at time t. This is of course the effect that labour 
supply rationing in the previous instance has upon the firms 
behaviour if the firm does not adjust its desired level of 
inventories.
To examine the stability properties of the system take 
first order Taylors approximations to linearise (4.2.36) 
and (4.2.37) which may now be written as (4.2.38) and (4.2.39) 
Zm (t) = flzm<t> + f2Z- (t) = 0Ij
2= (t) = giZm(t) + g_z (t) = oL ' *
where
Zm (t)= rh( t) . Z (t) = L (t) f Zm (t) = m(t)-M, Z_(t)=E(t)-E(t) b L
-  < 0 f 2 = w I t
a t a t
dmT t j  u ' 3 E ( t ) 3 L ( t )
"  ^' 5mTt) < ° ' g 2 = * [ f l
a t  _ 1  
a E ( t ) i__
_
i
1 V
A
Again each partial is evaluated at the equilibrium, f^ and g^ 
are negative since it is assumed an increase in the consumers
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determined at time t. This is of course the effect that labour# /
supply rationing in the previous instance has upon the firms 
behaviour if the firm does not adjust its desired level of 
inventories.
To examine the stability properties of the system take 
first order Taylors approximations to linearise (4.2.36) 
and (4.2.37) which may now be written as (4.2.38) and (4.2.39)
Zm (t) = + f2Z= (t) = 0  (4.2.38)Li
2=(t) = giZm(t) + = 0 (4.2.39)L L
where
zm (t)= ih(t) • Z-(t)
L i
= L(t), Zm (t) i
jj£II Z (t)=L(t)-L(t) L
and
, 31 
fl ~ w 3iiTt) < 0, f2 . 31w 3 r
3«
3L(t)
31
~ P — —  
3L(t) < 0 !)
gi = ^-dsit) A O yQ to II r—
—
i 3«
3E(t) > ] i
) (4.2.40)
0 )
)
)
Again each partial is evaluated at the equilibrium, f^ and g^ 
are negative since it is assumed an increase in the consumers 
money stock reduces his labour supply. f2<0 since it is 
assumed |-p/w| >31/3«, .
Using (4.2.40) the dynamics of the economy upon this regime 
may be described by the phase diagrams in figure (4.2.6)
Fig. (4.2.6)
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Note: The slopes of the stationeries are:
w 91
TZ P 3L(t)3L(t)
3Z=(t) >< 0
Arrows in phase diagrams
Figure (4.2.6) (ja) , (b) and (c) demonstrates the stability 
properties of the repressed inflation regime where the 
decision making process is such that the first component of 
any pair of trades effectively takes place upon the labour 
market. The system has either stable or saddle point 
characteristics.
In an entirely similar manner to the Keynesian saddle point 
cases examined earlier an approximate government lump sum 
transfer/money supply rule may be defined, which maintains 
the system upon the stable branch in the saddle point 
equilibrium possibilities described by figure (4.2.6)(a) and 
(c). The stable branch is defined by (4.2.41)
and (4.2.39). Thus the approximate lump sum transfer rule
(4.2.41)
Owhere Bj is the stable root of the dynamical system (4.2.38)
may be defined as (4.2.42) 25 :
152
LST(o) = M(t) - Tan* L(o) - m(o) (4.2.42)
The government can thus stabilize the system by levying 
successive lump sum transfers according to (4.2.42).
There are two immediate implications of the result that 
repressed inflation equilibria may be stable, firstly the 
comparative statics associated with the supply multiplier 
may be a legitimate exercise, and secondly the excess 
effective demand hypothesis may be reasonably analysed in 
the context of the Repressed Inflation regime. This 
contradicts the results obtained by BOhm (1978) who found 
the repressed inflation regime unstable and Honkapohja and 
Ito who argue that the dynamics are monotonically convergent. 
This is because the analysis considered here is considerably 
different from their treatments as discussed previously.
The treatment of inventories in the preceding analysis argues 
that producers will adjust stocks to their desired level by 
withholding goods from, the market. Stock discrepancies were 
generated by an inability on the part of the producer to 
achieve expected labour supplies, causing output to fall 
short of its planned level. Thus the quantity of consumption 
goods withheld from the market could be taken as predetermined. 
Such an approach assumes that the desired level of inventory 
stocks is not influenced by expectations at t. It may be 
argued that the target inventory stock is positively correlated 
with expected labour Supply and output. Thus write the 
desired inventory stock adjustment as (4.2.43)
i(t) = 4[i[^t)]] - i(t) ] (4.2.43)
where
5 is a constant adjustment parameter, I(t) is the
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previous instants desired inventory stock, which was achieved. 
To examine the dynamics of the regime substitute (4.2.43)
into (4.2.36) and (4.2.37) to obtain (4.2.44) and (4.2.45)
1
m(t) = wl(£[L(t)] -c[.i [i [E(t)]]-i(t)-g(t) ,m(t) | 
p,w,M)-p[£[L(t)J- S[l[£[E(t)]] - I(t)-g(t)] (4.2.44)
L(t)«il>[lU[E(t)]-S[i[£|L(t)]]-i(t)]-g(t) ,m(t) |p,w,M)-L(t)]
(4.2.45)
From (4.2.44) and (4.2.45) differentiation yieldsthe partial 
derivatives (4.2.46)
fl'= Wli(t)< °' f2'=w
31 3£1ST +t>3L(t) 31
31 31 3)1
3L(t) -P
3 £ ai 3£
~~  -t,3E(t) 3L(t) <0
< 0
(4.2.46)
Thus the Taylors approximation may be used to linearise the
system (4.2.44) and (4.2.45) to yield
Zm<t) = f: 'zm(t) + f2 ' Z=(t) = 0 L (4.2.47)
Z=(t) = 9l Li + 92 ' z£ (t) = 0 (4.2.48)
The possible configurations of the systems dynamics are 
described by the phase diagrams in figure (4.2.7). The 
non-postivity of the partial, f.<0, ensures that the system 
does not display a cas.e of complete instability. The real 
parts of the characteristic roots of the system are not 
unambiguously positive.
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Fig. (4.2.7)
figure (4.2 .7)
(a) tfl '
1
91
r t
' g2
OAfM<4-1OV
(b) 1fl '
1
f2
i •
' gi
•< 0 , g2 > 0
(c) •fl '
1
f2
i
' 9i »
•g2 < 0  and - ' ¿ / h <-g2'/gl
(d) •fl '
t
f2
i
• 9^ t <¡2 < 0 and - h ' h >-g2 /gl
(e) 1fl '
1
gl < 0
• 1
f2 i g2 > 0 and - h ' >_g2 /gl
(f) fi’'
1
gl < 0
1 1
f2 , 2^ > 0 311(5 - h ' ^ 2 /gl
As figure (4.2.7) demonstrates in cases (a) and (d) the 
dynamics of the repressed inflation regime quantity adjustment 
may be stable. Cases (b),(c),(d) and (f) show that saddle
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point outcomes are possible, here the stabilization rule 
for lump sum transfer will be as (4.2.49).
where 02 is the stable characteristic root of the system 
(4.2.47), (4.2.48).
Instability may arise in case (e), spiraling divergent 
behaviour may be observed. Stability would require the real 
parts of the characteristic roots of the system to be negative, 
this may easily be shown to require that (4.2.50) holds.
A reversal of the inequalities in (4.2.50) cannot be ruled 
out, however inspection suggests that this is improbable.
Despite the potential source of instability, the repressed 
Inflation regime, when the first component of any pair of 
trades occur on the goods marke^has reasonably good stability 
properties. Consider now the behaviour of the model when 
the labour market opens first.
Case 2: The first component of any pair of trades occurs 
upon the labour market.
<7
Again assume the consumer to behave according to the short-run 
labour supply function (4.2.51)
LST(o) = M( t) -Tan -1. /
L  *2 L(t) + — ,---- L(o)-m(o) (4.2.49)L  r2 -1
-fi > g2' (4.2.50)
OR EQUIVALENTLY
*
L (t) = l(x(t), m(t) |p,w,M) (4.2.51)
Here x(t) is the quantity of consumption good the consumer 
expects to be available when the §oodsmarket opens.
The consumer thus accumulates money balances by selling 
labour in the anticipation of feasible good purchases. The 
actual change in the money stock will depend upon the goods 
ration he actually faces. (4.2.52) describes the consumers 
money stock dynamics
rti(t) = wL(t) - px(t) (4.2.52)
where x(t) is the realised goods ration.
The actual goods availability will depend upon the output 
producers can achieve from the labour supply, L(t), net of 
any inventory stock adjustment and government purchases.
Goods supply to the consumer is defined by (4.2.53).
x(t) = y(t) - g(t) - i(t) (4.2.53)
Which may be rewritten, (4.2.54), substituting the production 
function for the output level to recognise the producers 
labour supply constraint.
x (t) = t£L(t)] - g (t) - i (t) (4.2.54)
It will initially be assumed that desired inventory stock 
adjustment i(t) represents the accumulation (decumulation) 
of producers inventory stocks, that will rectify the discrepancy 
between target inventory stock and the last instants market 
experience, and may tjhen be treated as exogenous.
C
Adjustment of consumers goods rationing expectations will 
depend upon the expectations held when the labour market meets 
and the actual transaction carried out when the goods market 
meets as (4.2.55)
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(4.2.55)
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x(t) = 4» [x(t) - x(t)J
where <f> is a constant adjustment parameter.
With some substitution into (4.2.52) and (4.2.55) the 
dynamics of the repressed inflation regime in this case may 
be described as (4.2.56) and (4.2.57).
m(t) = wL(x(t) , m(t) |p,w,M) - p [i [l (x(t) ,m(t) | p, w ,m]]
+ pi(t) + pg(t) (4.2.56)
x(t) = 4>CA[l(x(t) ,m(t) |p,w,M)_]-g(t)-i(t)-x(t)J (4.2.57)
A repressed inflation equilibrium in this case is defined 
by (4.2.56) and (4.2.57) being equal to zero, m(t)=M and 
x(t) = x(t) .
Again the system is linearised by taking a first order 
Taylors approximation as (4.2.58) and (4.2.59)
2ra(t) = f1zm (t) + f2Z=(t) = 0 
= g ^ U )  * gzZ = (t) = 0
(4.2.58)
(4.2.59)
where
Zm (t) = rfi(t) , Zx(t) x (t), Zm (t) m(t)-M,
*
ZX (t)= x(t)-x(t)
and
(4.2.60)
Again each of the partials is evaluated at the equilibrium.
The signs of the partials follow from the properties w/p > 31/31 
31/3m(t) < o, 3i/31>0, 31/3x(t)> 0.
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Figure (4.2.8) describes the systems dynamics.
Fig. (4.2.8)
I  , (a) (b) (c)
v t! y «-0 v *  y « - °  y t f
Zp (t) =o___^ ---- 5 ------
Z=(t) SADDLESTABLE Z=(t) SPIRAL Z=(t)x x X
In figure (4.2.8)
(a) < 0 f2 > 0
(b) < 0 f2*g2 > 0 and "f2^fl > ~ ^ 2 ^ \
(c) f^gj^ < 0 f2'g2 > 0 311(1 < “g2/,gl
The slopes of the stationaries and the arrows on the phase 
diagrams are derived as in previous cases.
In case (a) there is stability of the quantity adjustment 
process. In (c) a saddle point equilibrium arises, and 
the lump sum transfer/money supply rule which places the 
system upon the stable branch will be as (4.2.61)
where 6, is the stable root of the system (4.2.58) (4.2.59) .* £!
In case (b) the system may be unstable, stability would 
require that (4.2.62) holds.
LST(t) = M (t) - Tan (4.2.61)
fl + g2 < 0 (4.2.62)
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Equivalently „ 31 31 31P 3l Sit) “ w 3S(t) >
There appears to be no obvious policy rule which will corr­
that if the marginal product of labour is low, the economy 
is operating at a high level of activity, then case (b) 
will be a stable spiral.
These results again reinforce the previous findings that the 
repressed inflation regime may not be as unstable as suggested 
in some studies.
In this case,where the labour market precedes the goods 
market, producers may adjust their target inventory stocks in 
response to their labour constrained output. Thus let 
desired inventory stock adjustment be written as (4.2.63)
where t is a constant adjustment parameter, I(t) is the 
initial inventory stock at t.
The dynamics of this case may now be rewritten as (4.2.64) 
and (4.2.65)
ect this situation. However inspection of (4.2.62) suggests
i(t) = i[î[Y(t)] - I(t) ] (4.2.63)
m(t) =wl (x(t) ,m(t) |p,w,M) - p [ l Q. (x(t) ,m(t) | p,w,M)J]
+ pt[lU[l(x(t) ,m(t) |p,w,M)]) - î(t) J + pg(t) (4.2.64)
x (t) =d> [[l [l(x(t) ,m(t) •! p,w,M)}-g(t) - T [i (1 Ql (x(t) ,m(t) |p,w,M)]-I (t)|
O
(4.2.65)
The system is linearised using first order Taylors approximations 
to yield (4.2.66) and (4.2.67)
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■ /  1 •
— zm ■*" ^2 Z* {t) = ® (4.2.66)
Z=(t) = g1 ' z m(t) + g2 'z=(t) = 0 (4.2.67)
Here tiie partials are defined as (4.2.68)
^2
31 n 9* 31 31 3«, 31 „ _TfinTt) p 91 3m(t) + px ■71 31 TSÏÏTt) 0
31 dZ 31 +
*___ ai 3)1 31 > 0‘ P3x(t) 31 3x(t) px ji 31 3x(t)
fa«, si 31 3i 31 1 £[TT 3m(t) TZ ITT 3m(t).J  * °
Pa£ 3i 31 3d 31
1J3T 9m(t) r TT TT (t) 1 < 0
again the partial, derivatives in (4.2.68) are evaluated at
» fequilibrium. The signs of the terms f1 and f2 follow
from the previous arguments and the negativity of 31/3m(t)
81and positivity of j - [t) . The phase diagrams in (4.2.9)
x
illustrate the possibilities.
Fig. (4.2.9)
STABLE SADDLE STABLE
<d> (e) (f) 161
In figure (4.2.9)
(a) fl
• • •
*9^ *92  ^ 2^
i > 0
(b) fl
• i i i
< ^2 '^1 9^2 > 0
(c) fl
• • ' • « i
'92  ^ ^2 '^1 > 0 and - W < -g2'/gx
(d) Ifl
i t  i t
•^2 < ^2 > 0 and - h ' h > -g2'/g1
(e) 1fl
i i  i i
,91 < 0, f2 ,g2 > 0 and -f 1 't2 /f1 < -gj'/g].
(f) tfl , gL < 0 f2 \ g 2 ' > 0 and - h ' h > -gj'/gj.
As the diagram figure (4.2.9) illustrates, cases (a) and (c) 
are stable. Cases (b) and (d) are saddle point equilibria 
which may be stabilized by the lump sum transfer rule (4.2.69)
LST(o) = M (t) + Tan
*
x(t) (4.2.69)
The saddle point equilibrium of case (e) can be stabilized 
by (4.2.70)
* rfi rfiLST(o) = M(t) - Tan =--r=jx(t) + — r^Jx(o)-m(o) (4.2.70)** -6,1 = 
f.
where 62 is again the stable root.
The spiral case may be unstable, stability would require,
t •
fl +^2 < 0 insPection of these terms in (4.2.68) suggests
that this cannot be determined.
Thus ori the repressed inflation regime in the case where 
the labour market transactions precede those on the goods market,and 
target inventory stock depends upon firms labour constrained 
output, the system displays no completely unstable case.
Government lump sum transfer rules may be devised to place 
the system on the stable manifold in the saddle point cases.
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Conclusions
In the preceding analysis a simple aggregate disequilibrium 
trading model was considered. Trade occurred sequentially 
upon the good and labour markets. Since an agent cannot be 
simultaneously on both markets some trades must be made 
in anticipation of the trading opportunities that will be 
available upon the other. Keynesian unemployment and 
Repressed inflation regimes were examined under two scenarios 
Case 1/where the first component of any pair of trades 
occurs upon the goods market, or the decision making 
process is as if the goods market opens first. Case 2, 
where the decision making process is as if the first compon­
ent of any pair of trades occurs on the labour market.
Both regimes and cases were studied under different assum­
ptions about how consumers decide upon their desired money 
stock holdings and how firms decide upon their desired 
Inventory stock. Firstly, inventory and money stock ad­
justments were considered to be corrective measures in 
response to the discrepancy between the previous instants 
actual and desired stock levels. Secondly, stock adjust­
ments were assumed forward looking and to depend upon 
anticipated trades.
The dynamics of the quantity adjustment process were analysed 
by examining differential equations in money stock and 
expectations. The various forms which the differential 
equation in expectations adjustment took generated the 
numerous dynamic possibilities. The manner in which expect­
ations are formed and revised is therefore very important. 
Tatonnement treatments of the quantity adjustment process
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obscure the importance of expectations adjustment.
The results obtained from the analysis show that when both 
stocks'of goods and money are examined numerous dynamic 
possibilities are generated. Stable, saddle point and 
cyclical possibilities arose. On the Keynesian regime it 
was argued that in the saddle point cases a lump sum 
transfer/money supply rule can be derived which keeps the 
system upon the stable manifold, whilst in spiral cases, a 
cut in government expenditure may result in generating a 
stable spiral. This generated the implication that in the 
spiral cases in this regime there may be a trade off between 
the stability of the equilibrium which may require a cut 
in government expenditure, and the level of unemployment 
displayed at that equilibrium.
Upon the Repressed inflation regime it was also possible to 
derive lump sum transfer/money supply rules which would 
yield stability in saddle point cases. However in the 
spiral possibilities no government stabilization rule is 
immediately apparent.
The analysis in this section cannot be compared directly 
with either Bohm's (1978) or Honkapohja and Ito's (1980).
Here money and inventory stock adjustments are taken together, 
and there are consequently considerable complexities.
Firm conclusions cannot be-drawn without further information 
about parameter magnitudes and expectations formation.
However, the analysis does provide certain insights, many
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of the configurations examined suggest that there is a 
role for government intervention to stabilize the equilibria. 
Further, it may be concluded that, in the absence of govern­
ment intervention, comparative statics exercises such as 
calculating supply and demand multipliers may not be 
legitimate.
These conclusions are, however, tentative. An unstable 
dynamical process on a regime may be terminated by a 
regime switch which halts the movement. Further, the 
introduction of endogenous price adjustment may change the 
picture.
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FOOTNOTES
1. Hahn (1977) (1978), Varian (1977) and Futla (1977) have 
made contributions in which prices and quantities are 
endogenously simultaneously determined.
2. Models in the preceding section,although expressed as 
operating over a sequence of periods, may also be 
interpreted as adjustment processes within a period.
3. BOhmfe(1978) analysis is about the dynamics of household 
money stock adjustment over a succession of periods, 
and may be regarded as different from the actual adjust­
ment to the short-run fix-price equilibrium.
4. The period is sufficiently long for quantity adjustments 
to establish the fix-price equilibria.
5. This can be established by linearising the system using 
a Taylors approximation and demonstrating that the 
characteristic roots of the system have negative real 
parts.
6. There will of course be intermediate formulations where 
one market clears. This will occur upon the boundary 
between regimes.
7. This of course rules out the possibility of an under­
consumption regime and this may be important for 
Lflfgrens results.
8. Benassy (1977) provides such a treatment of transaction 
costs.
9. Benassy (1977) considers the maximization problem faced 
by an individual trader in a sequential trading context.
10. In some sense this analysis combines the approaches 
taken by Btthm (1978) and Honkapohja and Ito (1980).
11. The sequence in which agents visit markets would in a 
disaggregated model be part of an agents choice calculus, 
and may well effect the nature of the equilibrium of
the economy.
12. These assumptions simply state that the Keynesian case is 
being analysed here.
13. At low levels of economic activity the producer may wish 
to hold smaller stocks, and if this occurs, the stability 
properties of the model may worsen. However since this 
is a short-run approach such adjustments associated with 
long run expectations will be neglected.
14. It is assumed that the government levies a 100% profits 
tax, see Bflhm (1978) and Futia (1977) who use the same 
assumption.
167
15. If there is no exogenous government expenditure the 
existence of a non-trivial equilibria may be problematic.
It may be shown that if 0<g (t) <y (t) F [Tan(w/p)] (F indicates full 
enployment) then a ncn-trivial Keynesian equilibrium exists for the nodel.
16. Tjie assumption that consumers adjust to a given target 
money stock is a first approximation, the
target will be made endogenous in subsequent analysis.
17. A period is defined by the length of time the price 
vector is fixed.
18. For an explicit multi-period model see Muellbauer and 
Portes (1978) or Neary and Stiglitz (1980).
19. If when government expenditure is zero, g(t)=0, 
the system is unstable then government expenditure 
policy is ineffective upon this regime.
20. The signs of the partial derivatives again follow 
from the standard w/p < MPL condition, which must 
hold in the absence of forced trading.
21. It is assumed that the total inventory stock of the 
firm is S(t)=i+I(t) and that i is sufficiently large 
that any excess consumer demand over production may 
always be met.
22. The two decisions are not independent because of the 
budget constraint.
23. Here anticipated labour sales have replaced actual 
labour sales, L(t) by L(t) and the tenre f1 ,f2 ,g1 ,g2 
and 62 have been redefined according to tne 
parameters of this problem. The technique is 
identical to case 1.
24. These assumptions simply indicate the economy is upon 
the repressed inflation regime.
25. The definition of the stable branch on the Repressed 
inflation regime differs from that on the Keynesian 
regime_since the stable manifold has positive slope
in (m,L) space in the former and negative slope in the 
latter.
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5. THE DETERMINATION OF PRICES
Desirable Properties of a Price Adjustment Mechanism
The preceding four chapters examined various characteristics 
of disequilibrium macroeconomic models and introduced some 
new extensions. Most of the models presented do not provide 
an adequate explanation of price determination and adjustment. 
This chapter considers various explanations of price 
determination and adjustment that have been suggested in the 
literature and discusses them in the light of some desirable 
properties to be outlined below.
It should perhaps be remarked that although disequilibrium 
models have been, heavily criticised for failing to explain 
why market clearing prices are not realised, the problem of 
price determination is equally pertinent to models of 
continuous equilibrium which fail to provide an adequate 
explanation for continuous perfect price adjustment.
Before examining suggested explanations of price adjustment 
and determination it is useful to consider what might be 
desirable properties for an adjustment mechanism. Most of 
these are self-evident and well known however a clear 
statement of each will clarify the arguments to follow.
(a) Price adjustments should be made simultaneously with
quantity adjustments, and should be determined as part 
of the solution to individual or groups of agents 
maximization problems.:
This requirement is of course closely related to often quoted 
observation of Arrow (1959) , that when there is excess demand 
(supply) agents must abandon the perfectly competitive assum­
ption that they can buy (sell) all that they wish at the
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going market price. Agents are price setters who must 
choose both prices and consequently quantities simultaneously 
according to some known or perceived finite elasticity
I
supply and demand curves.
(b) Price and Quantity adjustments should be related 
explicitly to the non-synchronized nature of trading, 
and consequent discontinuous reception of signals.
Since agents visit markets sequentially they cannot base 
price adjustments upon information to be gained upon markets 
as yet unvisited. Consequently both expected signals, 
extrapolated from past experience, and information deducible. 
from other agents behaviour should play an important role 
in an adjustment process. In this context information 
transferred between agents about their future market behaviour 
must be incentive compatible to be useful.
(c) Price adjustments or agreements should be made upon 
the basis of verifiable information.
If prices upon one market are to be agreed or adjusted upon 
the basis of anticipations or 'second hand' information 
then agents should be able to verify whether the inform­
ation or anticipations were correct. This form of require­
ments for a price agreement or adjustment will be important 
in the context of implicit contracts and asymmetric 
information to be discussed in relation to the contributions 
of Bailey (1974) Azariades (1975) Grossman and Hart (1581) 
and others.
(d) Adjustment of both prices and quantities should not 
be costless.
Either to search for another agent who is willing to complete 
the other side of a desired new transaction, or to disseminate 
information to potential trading partners is a costly process.
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Such costs should be explicit in planned optimal adjustments,
(e) Any mechanism which explains price adjustment should 
explain as extreme cases both fixed and perfectly 
flexible prices.
This is a more prosaic requirement but observation of reality 
quickly indicates that prices are in some periods and on some 
markets perfectly flexible, giving the appearance of perfect 
auction markets, yet are, on other occasions, fixed. It would 
be desirable that a proposed adjustment mechanism should 
explain why under certain parameter configurations the 
two extremes occur.
In the next section candidates for an adequate price adjust­
ment mechanism will be considered in the light of (a)-(e). 
However, before doing so a remark about price determination 
is perhaps required. Several of the mechanisms to be 
considered shortly involve interesting arguments 
relating to when prices and when quantities adjust,however, 
frequently the initial.price vector adopted is arbitrary 
(or historically given), and the models explain why and 
how prices adjust but they do not determine the actual 
level of prices.
<3
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5.2 A Consideration of Price Adjustment Mechanisms
It is widely understood that if prices are fixed at non-market 
clearing values then an equilibrium must be established by 
some quantity allocation rule. (Rationing Scheme) Despite 
the attractive macroeconomic models that such an approach 
generates, the theory cannot be considered a reliable tool 
for making policy prescriptions unless an acceptable price 
adjustment mechanism is incorporated.
In this section various adjustment mechanisms will be 
considered firstly in the light of the discussion about 
the desirable properties of an adjustment mechanism given 
in Section 5.1, and secondly in the light of the implications 
the mechanisms have for the macroeconomics of the theory.
Numerous arguments for either fixed or imperfectly adjusting 
prices have been advanced, however five basic approaches, 
or potential approaches to the problem may be identified.^
(i) The Effective Excess Demand Approach
Previously discussed in section 4.1, the effective excess 
demand approach develops Leijonhufvud's initial idea that 
prices may not adjust due to effective demand failures. He 
argues that quantities adjust very rapidly and thus the 
correct formulation of excess demand functions must include 
effective rather than notional demands and supplies. The 
reasons why quantities move faster than prices are based upon 
arguments about informational problems and liquidity con­
straints. Effective excess demand functions it is then argued 
may not cause prices to return to their market clearing 
values. Whatever the characteristics of an effective excess 
demand function may be it is clear that such a price
adjustment mechanism is not adequate given the desirable 
criteria that have been proposed. Most importantly it 
can be seen that this adjustment mechanism does not allow 
simultaneous price and quantity adjustment as part of the 
solution to individual agents maximization problems.
Benassy (1976, 1980) suggests a price adjustment mechanism 
conceptually somewhat similar to Leijonhufvud but explicitly 
introducing monopolistic price setting. He assumes that 
there are two types of good in the economy studied, Hq 
being the set of goods the prices of which are exogenously 
fixed,and the set of goods the prices of which are deter­
mined by agents. Further it is assumed that H i n H^ = {<i>}
V i^j i.e. each goocj is priced by a monopolist, also it is 
assumed that only suppliers set prices and each produces 
only one good. The economy is assumed to behave as follows. 
Monopolists perceive demand curves for their goods
Zih(Pil°i) (5.2.1)
where is the signal of prices and upper and
lower bounds that trader i has observed. The perceived demand 
curves are assumed to have the natural property of going 
through the currently observed point.
Traders maximize their utility subject to the perceived 
demand curves, the solution to which is an optimal price 
as (5.2.2).
Pi*(V  = pi* <P*V2i> (5.2.2)
C
Once each agent has calculated and announced his
optimal • price, each then maximizes again subject to the
set of all quoted prices and the set of fixed prices H0 .
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By the usual mechanism a Benassy K-equilibrium in quantities
is then established. If an excess of effective demands Z
★over realised trades Z is observed agents re-estimate 
<their perceived demand curves and quote a new set of 
optimal prices. This process continues until a monopolistic
equilibrium is established which is defined as a price
* + ^vector p , net trades Z^, effective demands Z^, perceived
constraints Zi and such that
•k —
(1) (Z^), (Zj), (Zif Z^) are a fix price equilibrium
★with respect to p
* *
(2) P* = P L (P^ h .  Zi) Vi e Hi
Heuristically a monopolistic equilibrium is a fix price 
Benassy K-equilibrium, where upon the basis of perceived 
demand curves agents have no desire to adjust the prices 
in their control.
This mechanism may perhaps appear superficially attractive, 
especially as Benassy presents it with his customary elegance. 
Indeed the mechanism is consistant with the desirable 
property (e) discussed above. If the set of prices Hq are 
Walrasian and the perceived demand curves Z£h(Pi»°i) are 
identical to the market demand curves of atomistic traders 
a full flex-price general equilibrium will result. If 
however perceived demand curves are finitely elastic, but 
produce mutually compatible behaviour by agents,then a fix 
price quantity constrained equilibrium will obtain since 
agents cannot express the effective demand signals to 
induce further price adjustment.^
However Benassy's approach is not satisfactory in a number of
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respects. Properties (a) and (b) in section 5.1 argue
that agents should select optimal price and quantity
adjustments upon an individual market simultaneously, but 1
that adjustments should be made sequentially across markets. 
Benassy's mechanism does the opposite, price adjustments 
occur simultaneously across all markets and then are followed 
sequentially by simultaneous quantity adjustments across 
markets. Evidently Leijonhufvud's dictum that quantities 
adjust faster than prices is being adopted without any 
justification as to why agents should decide to make adjust­
ments in this manner. The rule imposed that only suppliers 
set prices is arbitrary (the 1980 paper makes the slightly 
weaker assumption.that only one side of the market may 
set prices) and is only justified by the author expressing 
the desire not to get involved in any game
theoretic aspects of price setting. One brief comment in 
support for Benassy should be made. Drazen (1980) 
criticises the mechanism because
'excess demands Z sent to a market out of 
K-equilibrium are not reasonable indicators 
of the size of the disequilibrium and, 
therefore, do not present price setting agents 
with the information necessary to change 
prices.'
This criticism is ill directed as given Benassy ' s formulations 
only those signals received when the system is in a K-equilibrium 
are allowed to have any effect upon price setting agents.
Further adjustments can only be made upon the basis of signals 
agents may receive, anrfthe only information upon excess demand 
they receive when prices 'require' adjustment is based upon 
effective excess demands. In this sense Benassy is correct.
Grandmont and Laroque (1976) present an endogenous price
Vmodel somewhat similar to Benassy's utilising the Dreze
framework. This paper will be discussed in section (iii) 
which considers conjectural and expectations models.
The Macroeconomic implications of this type of approach are 
well understood and are best expressed in the work of 
Muellbauer and Portes (1978) considered in some depth in 
section 2.1. The price adjustment mechanism proposed by 
Benassy requires very little modification of their model 
except that changes in government behaviour may have pro­
found effects upon perceived demand curves, and consequent 
effects upon prices. Placebo effects may then be significant. 
However since this price adjustment mechanism itself is 
unsatisfactory any macroeconomic implications it has are 
uninteresting.
(ii) Kinked Demand and Supply Curves and Approaches 
Arising from Discontinuities
Sweezy (1939) first suggested that the cause of price rigidities 
might be due to the demand curve of a firm in an oligopolistic 
industry being kinked at the prevailing market price. The 
kink causes a discontinuity in the marginal revenue curve 
and consequently a marginal cost curve passing through the 
discontinuity could move within a certain parameter range 
without disturbing price or output. Sweezy argued that the 
demand curve faced by the oligopolist is less elastic below 
the prevailing market price than above it. Rival oligopolists 
were supposed to defend, their market shares by following 
price cuts that any of their number made, but to accept an 
increased market share by not responding when one raises its 
price. The familiar picture figure (5.2.1) illustrates this:
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Fig. (5.2.1)
It is not immediately obvious why firms should be concerned 
with their market share, unless this is their short-run 
strategy to maximize expected discounted future profits 
in some form of.int^r-temporal game.
Negishi (1961, 74, 79) derives a general equilibrium model 
based upon kinked demand curves, where the reasoning behind 
the existence of a perceived kink differs from Sweezy's, 
and where the usual criteria of profit and utility maximiz­
ation are in operation. Using a monopolistic competition 
paradigm Negishi argues that firm i perceives an inverse 
demand curve of the following form
Pi = Pi (yir Pi, Yi) (5.2.3)
which has the following properties
(1) pi = pi(yi, Pi,yi) The perceived demand curvp goes
through the currently experienced 
price output pair (pi,yi).
(2) Pi = P i  v yi <  y i ,  3pi/3yi <0 V  yi>?i . The firm
is a price taker facing a horizontal 
demand curve for all levels of output 
below its current output, but faces
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a finitely elastic demand curve 
for any output in excess of y^
The argument is that if price rises above pi all consumers 
who habitually purchase from the firm will observe the 
price rise and gain their supply elsewhere in the economy, 
if price falls below pi, this information will only be 
disseminated to some subset of the firms potential new 
customers and thus only a finite number will switch to it 
as their source of supply. The perceived inverse demand 
curve thus displays a kink at (Pi,ÿi).
How let labour Li, be the only variable input and the pro­
duction function be written yi = Fi(Li), the firmsmaximand 
may be written ds (5.2.4).
"i = Pi(yi»Pi/ÿi) Fi(Li) - wLi (5.2.4)
Thus when the short-run expectations yi = yi and pi = pi are 
realised the first order conditions yield.
IPi(l-ei) Fi (Li) < w )
, ) (5.2.5)
Pi Fi (Li) > w )
Implying
Pi > — t--- > Pi(l - e,) (5.2.6)
F± (L±)
where ti is the R.H.S. elasticity of the inverse demand 
curve with respect to yi.
(5.2.6) states that £he first order conditions are satisfied 
when marginal cost lies between the price and marginal revenue, 
and has the implication that excess capacity exists and 
there is no incentive for the producer to adjust prices or 
quantity. Indeed small changes in effective demand will 
affect only output and will not disturb prices. Diagramatically
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Negishi's analysis of the firms output/price decision is 
as figure (5.2.2)
Fig.(5.2.2)
It is argued that since consumers are upon their demand 
curves and facing.no. quantity rationing on the goods market 
at the prevailing market price they too will have no 
incentive to attempt to adjust prices. This outcome 
Neglishi calls a 'Keynesian conjectural Equilibrium' for 
the firm.
In the treatment of the labour market it is argued that 
workers are either wholly unemployed receiving no income, 
or fully employed for an institutionally determined working 
week at the current wage rate w. Homogeneous workers 
perceive probabalistic inverse labour demand curves as (5.2.7).
w = g(k,w,k) (5.2.7)
where 0 i k < 1 is the ratio of emoloyed workers to total 
workers interpreted as the probability of employment.
The perceived labour demand curve has the following properties. 
(1) w * g(k, w, k) The perceived inverse demand curve goes 
through the currently observed wage, 
employment probability pair (w,k).
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(2) w = w V k<k 3w/3k<0 V k>k workers face a hori­
zontal probabalistic inverse demand 
curve for all employment levels
yielding a probability below k, but 
face a finitely elastic demand curve 
for all probabilities above k.
It is argued that workers perceive a finitely elastic demand 
curve to the right of k since they believe offering to work 
at an infinitesimally smaller wage to w will not guarantee 
them employment. This is so since firms are assumed not 
prepared to replace one worker by another at a marginally 
lower wage as this will effect moral and the productivity 
of other workers’. Thus the perceived inverse demand curve 
displays a kink at (w,k) .
Subject to the perceived inverse labour demand curve, workers 
maximize the following utility function4 (5.2.8).
where u is the utility of being unemployed.
The first order conditions maximizing (5.2.8) subject to
(5.2.7) by choice of k are
where c'is the R.H.S. elasticity of (5.2.7) with respect to 
k evaluated at k=k.
The first condition in (5.2.9) states that the utility value 
of the wage should exceed the utility of leisure foregone and 
defines a minimum wage. The second condition defines the 
wage at which any marginal increase will set the probability
ku(w,p) + (l-k)u (5.2.8)
u(w,p)-u > 0
u(w,p) - u-e'w(3u(w,p)/3w) < 0
(5.2.9)
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of employment to zero, and thus defines the maximum wage.
If the conditions In (5.2.9) are satisfied workers will not 
reduce*(or accept a reduction in) wages since the implied 
utility loss is not compensated by the expected utility gain 
arising from the increase in k. Workers are in a Keynesian 
conjectural equilibrium.
As in the case of the firm, the second inequality constraint 
in (5.2.8)/ if not strictly binding/implies changes in 
effective demand will be absorbed completely by changes in 
employment with no effect upon wages. It is also interesting 
to note that changes in the price level p will have no 
effect upon wages unless it causes one of the inequality 
constraints in (5.2.9) to be violated, but any change in 
the nominal wage that results is as Negishi remarks not 
merely due to the existence of unemployment.
As an explanation of price rigidities Negishi's arguments, 
especially the analysis of the firms perceived goods demand 
curve,are very persuasive. The price adjustment (non­
adjustment) mechanism is consistant with the desirable 
properties (a),(b), (c) and (e) and may easily be made 
consistant with (d) by assuming that there are costs involved 
in disseminating information about price cuts. This would 
explain why the firm cutting its price cannot capture the 
whole market. The analysis appears a good candidate for a 
price adjustment mechanism, and may continue to be a fruitful 
line of inquiry. However there are some problems with the 
analysis; the initial price quantity pair on each market is 
historically given and not endogenous to the model, and the 
actual level of prices is arbitrary/being required only to
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satisfy the first order conditions (5.2.5) and (5.2.8). it
is also assumed that in the Keynesian demand deficient
equilibrium the model describes, demanders of «
goods do not perceive the possibility of obtaining the 
same quantities at lower prices, they are described as on 
their demand curves and are thus argued to have no incentive 
to try to adjust prices. This seems unreasonable, especially 
in the case of the labour market when high unemployment exists, 
firms will worry less about the productivity effects of 
employing lower wage workers when the unproductive can be 
easily and inexpensively replaced. This may not be an over­
riding criticism as the inclusion of hiring and training costs 
in the analysis woul.d reduce the likelihood of firms turning 
over their labour force in periods of high unemployment.
In terms of providing a price endogenous microeconomic basis 
for macroeconomics, this analysis appears promising. It may 
well be compatible with the fix price approaches of 
Malinvaud (1977) Muellbauer and Portes (1978) and indeed 
with the suggestions made in chapter 2 and 3 of this thesis.
The arbitrariness of prices presents no problem to the 
policy maker since initial prices are data in his calculations, 
however the persistence of inflation appears to be an inexplicable 
phenomenon within Negishi's current framework,but may perhaps 
be handled by introducing inflationary expectations into 
perceived demand curves.
Heal (1982) has also suggested how discontinuities may give 
rise to a price mechanism which displays several desirable 
properties. His approach is to hypothesise that over some 
range the production function of an economy may display 
increasing returns, giving a non-convex production set.
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Hiis implies that there exists a vector of relative prices 
at which the economy's goods supply correspondence is not 
single valued and the labour demand function is discontinuous.
i
His arguments are technically complex and may be most 
easily described diagramatically as in figures (5.2.3) and
(5.2.4) .
Figure (5.2.3)
Figure (5.2.4)
In figure (5.2.3) the production set is drawn with increasing 
returns over a range of inputs. Utilising a Scitovsky 
indifference curve it is demonstrated that the first best
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solution lies at point D, however a vector of relative prices
which decentralises this equilibrium cannot be found since
they would yield negative profits. At prices p* there are
three candidates for an equilibrium,A,B and C. Point B 
*defined by MRS = p lies outside the production set and is
not feasible, the equilibrium has to be established at A,
C or at a different vector of relative prices. Intuitively
it can be seen that equilibrium will be established at point
C, if relative prices are p*, since given no forced trading
A is dominated by B for consumers which is itself dominated
by C for producers. Figure (5.2.4) demonstrates how the
*relative price vector p is established. T he labour supply
curve of consumers passes through the discontinuity in the
labour demand curve (A=4, C=3). Since supply exceeds demand
*for a range of prices above p and is less than demand 
*below p a notional excess demand formulation (or indeed an 
effective excess demand formulation using Benassy-Clower 
demands) will cause prices to return to the level of the 
discontinuity. Heal demonstrates that this implies a Nash 
equilibrium will be established at point 3=C. This may be 
described as Keynesian since at the prevailing relative 
wage involuntary unemployment exists. It is also shown in 
the paper that the consumption demand of households will be 
consistent with firms output decisions and that the labour 
supply curve does in fact pass through the discontinuity.
The labour supply curve has been drawn with a backward bending 
section to demonstrate that^ since the economy must possess 
an odd number of equilibria, a stable Walrasian equilibrium 
occurs at 1 and an unstable one at 2.
This analysis was presented at the AUTE conference in March
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1982 and not all the work is in its final form. Taken in this 
light any comments or criticisms should be considered tent­
ative, and apologies are made to Heal if his ideas have «
been misconstrued.
Initial inspection of the analysis would suggest that its
reliance upon an excess demand function to generate price
adjustment is a weakness. However this may perhaps be
rationalised as follows. Consider the behaviour of an
individual unemployed worker who wishes to gain employment
with a particular firm, it may appear that he can gain
employment by offering to work at slightly below the going 
*wage p . The firm would be willing to employ him as this
represents an increase in its profits, he simply replaces
another worker. This argument will be true for all firms
and workers, so why is full employment not achieved at a wage
determined by the labour supply curve, point 5
on figure (5.2.4)? The answer is that in the aggregate this
is a false argument, if wages fall with no change in
unemployment (voluntary has replaced involuntary) aggregate
demand for output must fall and firms will choose to reduce*nominal prices. Relative prices p will not be disturbed 
and the equilibrium will be unaltered. If firms and workers 
perceive that such a process will occur no attempt will be 
made to shade prices.^ Neither individual firms nor workers 
will have any desire to change the relative price of labour.
Such an analysis would suggest that prices would tend to be 
fixed for goods whose production functions display increasing 
returns over some range and flexible for those goods whose 
production functions exhibit diminishing returns.*
187
The problem appears to be in explaining why prices should
ever change in such a situation. The adjustment mechanism
does not display our desirable property (e) indeed in a «
macroeconomic context it is difficult to see how this approach 
may be utilised especially if an examination of inflation 
is required.
(iii) Conjectural and Expectations Approaches 
Many analyses which fall (loosely) within this class have 
similarities to the work of Negishi discussed in section (ii), 
it is debatable whether a distinction between the two is 
valid. However in the Negishi kinked demand curve approach 
agents are required to perceive a kink at the level of their 
current realisations, here conjectures or expectations may 
include kinks but it is the self-fulfilling nature of 
perceptions which is important.
Some of the most advanced work within the area is due to 
Hahn (1977, 1978). The analysis describes what is called 
an infinitesimally rational conjectural equilibrium (IRCE), 
and provides a method of price endogenisation within a
Dreze type framework. It is assumed that agents perceive 
that they cannot trade in excess of a current constraint 
unless they adjust the prices at which they are prepared to 
trade. The argument goes as follows. Given a signal about 
current prices and quantity constraints
agent a calculates his potential trade revisions on any 
market b as (5.2.11)
s
(5.2.10)
x^ = max (0, Z® - Z^) 
= min (0, Z® + z£) (5.2.11)
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The first part of (5.2.11) describes potential increases in 
transactions and the second decreases. (Z^ e 1R+).
The prices at which the agent conjectures that these revisions 
«
may be achieved define his conjecture function (5.2.12).
_a, ~a a.C (P»x r? ) (5.2.12)
C is increasing in both its second and third arguments.
Agents then maximize utility by choosing both price and quantity 
offered subject to the conjecture function (5.2.12). An IRCE 
is then a vector of signals S = (p,z,z) such that Za trade
offers, ca price offers, have the properties that
(1) Z Za = 0 all markets clear
(2) ca = p Va price realisations confirm
conjectures
Hahn demonstrates that such an equilibrium exists, and that it 
may be consistent with both cases of one or neither side of a 
market being rationed, i.e. it admits the possibility of both 
Walrasian and non-Walrasian equilibria. A non-Walrasian equili­
brium may exist because the trading possibilities which agents 
perceive depend upon the rates of change of other agents con­
jectural utility or profit functions, these second order terms 
may be incorrect even though the first order (slope or elasticity) 
terms are correct. For example if each agent perceives a linear 
conjecture tangential to the 'actual* function at the equilibrium 
price quantity realisation conjectures will be proven correct 
but the true trading possibilities will not be revealed.
As an explanation of price adjustment and determination Hahn's 
approach has a great deal to recommend it. It clearly has our 
desirable properties (a) and (c) in that price and quantity 
adjustment decisions are made simultaneously as part of 
individual agents maximization problems, and can explain both 
cases of fixed and flexible prices depending upon the shape
of agents conjecture functions. Also the approach implicitly
recognises that there is an opportunity cost to revising a
trade in that the acquisition of an extra unit of 'stuff'
requires that a different price must be paid for all units.«
The introduction of transactions costs into the structure 
would not appear to be too difficult an exercise as these 
could easily be included as one component in the conjectured 
price adjustment required to break a constraint.
The approach is not explicitly sequential and does not 
have our desirable property (b). This is in the nature of 
a Dreze type formulation where all constraints are known 
prior to trading, consequently the conjectures of prices 
associated with different levels of trade upon market i are 
based upon information about other markets which it is not 
reasonable for apents to have and s = (p,Z,Z) contains all prices 
and constraints. Interestingly the approach accords well 
with our desirable property (c)^  price and quantity adjust­
ments are made upon the basis of verifiable information 
in that conjectures are correct in their first order terms 
and the information about the true shape of agents profit 
or utility functions is not verifiable since it is not 
transmitted.
Some problems do arise, firstly^hy do agents upon the 
short side of a market, when they observe that others are 
rationed, not exploit their position by raising prices.^ 
Secondly^what exactly determines an agents conjectural function 
to assume it is given is just replacing exogenous prices by 
exogenous conjectures. Clearly conjectures should be related 
to past trading experiences and any information that may be 
gleaned from others about their potential behaviour. This 
has not yet been investigated.
To my knowlodge there have been no successful macroeconomic 
analysis developed upon the basis of an IRCE,which is prob­
ably because the analysis, for all its nice properties, 
suffers’ from one crucial flaw. The fact that it does not 
explicitly model the sequential nature of trading. This 
would seem to be an essential feature of any microeconomic 
explanation of price and quantity adjustment that can 
adequately provide a basis for macroeconomics.
Expectations approaches,although embodying many of t-he proper­
ties of the conjectural approach, are an improvement in the 
vital respect that they assume trades are uncoupled over 
time. Drazen (1980) presents a model with endogenous flex­
ible prices which displays quantity constraints. The analysis 
has the interesting features that quantity constraints may 
arise even when sellers are aware of their trading possibilities, 
and that demand fluctuations may result largely in quantity 
rather than price responses. Trading is sequential and 
takes the following natural form. The labour market opens 
first - in the morning and labour is purchased by firms and 
production takes place, then - in the afternoon - the goods 
market opens and firms sell to workers some proportion of 
their stocks. If supplies and demands do not match either 
quantities must adjust or agents upon the long side of the 
market must change prices. It is assumed that individual 
firms and workers perceive finitely sloped demand curves 
for their output and labour respectively. The arguments 
behind these assumptions may be examined by giving a brief 
sketch of the model.
Firms perceive that the demand curve they will face for their 
output takes the following form (5.2.13)
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x(p) = y ( p ) n ( p )  (5.2.13)
where
n(p) is the market demand curve 
y(p) is an arrival function
Since n(p) has finite slope, x(p) will also have finite slope 
if y'(p) is not too large, so a firm cannot capture all of 
the market by a price cut or will not lose all its trade 
by a price increase. Drazen's discussion of y'(p) is not 
rigorous however the following arguments may be put forward. 
Suppose workers/consumers can obtain little or no informa­
tion about the prices of goods before visiting the market, 
all they know is the price that they paid upon the last 
visit, further let there be a utility cost to visiting a
Q
market. Workers will select at random the trading post 
that they visit to obtain their supply, and on discovering 
that the price now differs from their previous trade in 
that good they have to decide whether to engage in some 
form of search activity which is costly or accept the new 
price; some simple marginal condition will determine their 
behaviour. Alternatively it could be argued that price 
information discriminates slowly amongst purchasers, and 
they accept any price quoted which is consistent with the 
state of their information. Drazen hints at both these 
types of rationalization for the y(p) function but does not 
make the argument explicit.
Workers perceive that they face a finitely slooed labour 
demand curves of the form (5.2.14)
L (w) = k(w)A(w) (5.2.14)
where k(w) is the proportion of employed workers in the
total labour force
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A (w) is the market demand curve for labour.
k(w) is interpreted by (homogeneous) workers as the probability 
of being employed at w. L(w) is assumed to have finite slope
i
since a small reduction in w will not raise k(w) to one since 
workers know that a small wage cut will not induce firms to 
displace one worker by another since this may have a bad 
effect upon morale and the productivity of the remaining labour 
force. Alternatively there may be training costs associated 
with switching workers. Again the paper could be strengthened 
by making these arguments explicit.
Based upon their expected goods demand curves x(p) firms
announce a labour demand \ (w) which maximizes expected profit.
Workers conjecture a consumption function c(p) and maximize
* *their utility by choice of an optimum L which implies a w . 
Firms then produce according to a standard neoclassical 
production function (5.2.15)
y = f(L*) (5.2.15)
(the output y may be used for sales or inventory stock).
Workers receive income w*L*.
The goods market then opens, and given expected future 
variables, a demand determined equilibrium obtains if
n(p) = c(p, X(w*,n(p)), w*) + Z/p (5.2.16)
where Z/p is constant profit income.
I.e. an equilibrium obtains if firms expectations are correct.
If (5.2.16) does not obtain firms observe changes in their 
inventory stocks and revise their expected demand curves x(p) 
in the next round.
Drazen also argues that changes in demand tend to induce
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quantity rather than price responses, because the price deriv­
atives of both goods and labour demand curves increase (decrease) 
as the level of demand increases (decreases). Roughly this 
is for the following reasons. Consumers utility functions 
are assumed to display decreasing relative risk aversion.
A reduction in labour demand, a cut in income, implies that 
any increase in current consumption means that future con­
sumption streams become more risky, at lower levels of income 
a greater price cut - risk premium - is required to induce 
this change in consumer behaviour. The goods demand curve 
shifts in and becomes steeper. Firms facing a fall in 
product demand can respond with inventory accumulation and 
by reducing their labour demand. It is shown that if the 
value of inventory is concave in inventories, then a worsening 
of sales prospects will require a larger wage reduction to 
induce any given employment increase. The labour demand 
curve moves inwards and becomes steeper. Quantities will 
tend to adjust rather them prices due to these slope changes 
in the labour and goods demand curves.
As a price adjustment mechanism this approach has several of 
our desirable properties, most importantly, (b), that price 
and quantity adjustments are explicitly related to the 
non-synchronlzed nature of trading. The main feature of the 
non-Walrasian equilibrium is that it is based upon the 
fulfilment of product market expectations. Those are of 
course self fulfilling.. The mechanism admits as extreme 
cases the possibility of both fixed and perfectly flexible 
prices, in the sense that a Walrasian equilibrium may be 
achieved and would satisfy (5.2.16). How much prices respond 
to changes in demand depends upon inventory holding costs
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and households attitude to risk. For example if households
are highly risk averse at low levels of income price cuts
will have a negligible effect upon goods demand, firms will «
choose over the relevant parameter range to fix the price of 
output. At high income levels firms will choose to adjust 
prices due to the high elasticity of demand for goods.
As a price adjustment/determination mechanism Drazen's 
analysis stands or falls upon the question of why demand 
curves are perceived as having finite slope and why the 
slope should increase as demand curves contract. The 
arguments that explain why demand curves have finite slope 
seem reasonably persuasive, there are clearly costs-associated 
with obtaining information when the system is out of equil­
ibrium. It is not unreasonable to assume that workers 
engage in only a limited amount of search activity when look­
ing for employment. It is also reasonable to assume that in 
the face of training, hiring and firing costs that firms 
will not be prepared tg replace one worker by another unless 
a significant wage cut is offered. A non-Walrasian equil­
ibrium based upon these arguments seem credible.
The arguments about household risk aversion and firms 
inventory carrying costs are also persuasive; it would be 
interesting to know over what sort of parameter ranges the 
impact of demand shifts will fall mainly upon prices and 
when they fall mainly upon quantities. The importance of 
these factors would depend4.upon those circumstances in 
which the theory predicts mainly prices or quantities adjust.
The approach suffers from some of the same shortcomings as 
the conjectural approach. Agents upon the short side of a
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market do not make use of the observations that quantity
constraints exist to raise the prices for the goods they
supply. This seems a particularly pertinent problem in «
an extremely demand deficient equilibrium where the demand 
curves would by Drazen's arguments be very steep. Would it 
not be in the firms interests to cut wages? Strangely, we 
might ask why don't firms raise prices in a depression, because 
if demand curves are highly price inelastic profits will 
rise since the sales constraint a firm faces will only
qtighten by a negligible amount.
The macroeconomic implications of this analysis suggest 
that it may be a useful paradigm. The model has an 
unemployment equilibrium but also provides an explanation 
of price adjustment. In the simple form presented above this 
may not be regarded as an adequate explanation of inflation, 
however, if A(w) the labour demand curve, x(p) the expected 
goods demand curve and c(p) the planned consumption function 
are based upon a common expectation of a price change then 
a non-Walrasian equilibrium of the Drazen sort may be con­
sistent with inflation. Fiscal policy could be introduced 
in a meaningfully simple way, government expenditure would 
raise the price of output and reduce inventory stocks, 
causing firms to revise outwards their labour demand curves, 
with a subsequent increase in wages and employment. However 
it would be necessary to add asset markets to the model 
before any realistic policy conclusion could be drawn.
c;
Several models conceptually similar to Drazen's treatment
exist. Grandmont and Laroque (1976) examine a model based 
vupon Dreze effective demands, in which price setting firms 
base output decisions upon expected product demand curves.
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If firms have pessimistic expectation, unemployment arises
in a manner similar to that discussed above. Varian (1977),
in a paper discussed in chapter 2 section l,also presents «
a similar argument in which firms form point expectations about 
output demand, and an equilibrium occurs when nominal wages and 
prices are static and expectations validated. Varian assumes 
that labour market transactions and production precede the 
product market transactions. Nominal prices and wages 
adjust according to effective excess demand functions, based 
upon Benassy type demands. The model does not examine the 
inventory stocks which accrue to producers when disequilibrium 
occurs due to deficient product demand, yet it states that 
firms are price setters. The analysis also does not explain 
who sets wages and how. Crucially Varian's price adjustment 
mechanism does not possess our desirable property (a)as price 
adjustments do not appear as part of any agents choice 
calculus.
On the whole the expectations approach seems to be a poten­
tially fruitful line of research which may lead to a good 
microeconomic explanation of simultaneous price and quantity 
determination. It may not provide a complete microfoundation 
for macroeconomics analysis but it is perhaps part of the 
story. In non-contingent competitive markets this could be 
a good explanation of price adjustments, given that the 
question of how agents upon the short-side of markets affect 
prices is resolved.
(iv) Implicit Contracts
Deriving from the initial contributions of Baily (1974) and 
Azariades(1975) the implicit contract literature provides a 
rationale for endogenous price determination which has some
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desirable properties. The starting point for implicit 
contract models is the recognition that some form of 'locking- 
in' effect typically characterises the relationship betweeni
firms and workers. Workers are costly to train and learn 
firm specific skills.10 This locking-in is known to both 
parties, who take it into consideration by bargaining 
about both current and future wages and employment at the 
beginning of their relationship.
The earlier contributions in this literature assume that 
risk neutral firms offer insurance in the form of a fixed 
wage rate to risk averse workers. In return workers accept 
a level of the fixed wage below the expected value of a state 
contingent wage. Firms carry all the risk that arises from 
uncertain demand and charge workers a risk premium of the 
difference between the fixed and expected wage rates. A 
brief sketch of Azariades model illustrates the argument.11
Let S be the set of states of the world where $«S is an 
element and p(s) is tHe mapping of states into a given firms 
prices. By offering a uniform contract to workers 
6 = {w(s),L(s)} the firm maximizes expected profit tt ( 6 ) .
The firm is indifferent between contracts which yield the 
same expected profit.
Workers are assumed to supply one unit of labour inelastically. 
Their utility when employed and unemployed will be u|w(s)]] 
and K respectively. -The probability of a worker gaining 
employment if he enters a firms labour pool will depend upon 
L(s), the employment rule/and m,the number of other workers 
who enter the pool. We may define m as (5.2.17)
m = m(X,(w(s),L(s)) (5.2.17)
where X is the value of market alternatives to the workers.
Hence the probability of employment in any state s may be 
written* as (5.2.18)
Us) = min[l, L(s)/m ] (5.2.18)
The value to a worker of a given contract 6 may thus be as 
(5.2.19)
V(<Sj,m) = Eg [£u(w) + ( H ) k ]  (5 . 2 . 1 9 )
clearly a contract will only be feasible if V ^ m )  =X 
for some m>0 s.t L(s) < m Vs.
From this basic structure Azariades proves a very interesting 
result. Given any feasible variable wage contract 6^ there 
exists a fixed wage contract 62 which dominates it in the 
sense that V(6^,m) = V(62 ,m) and tt (6 )^ < tt(62) where 
6^ = (w(s), L(s)} 62 = {w,L(s)}r to is state invariant.
The proof is illustrative of the basic argument and goes as 
follows:
Let m satisfy V(6^,m) = \  (feasibility) and define 6^ = 
(i)-e,Lfe)} where to = E(wL)/EL. The contract 6^ produces the 
same expected labour income for workers and expected profits 
for firms as does 6^. Now
A = V(63,m) - V(51,m) = i EL [ u(0)- u(w)]
> EL(0-w)u'(to) by concavity of u(.) .
= u'{to)(«EL - EwL) = 0
Thus V(53,m)> V(6^,m) = X, Hence 3 e>0, s.t 62 =
satisfies V(62,m) = V(6^,m) and it(62) > n(6^) Q
{«-e ,L(s) }
Workers are prepared to pay the risk premium e  to obtain 
insurance in terms of a fixed wage contract from the firm.
The fact that the theory provides a rationale for fixed 
wage rates does not imply that this analysis can be simply 
integrated with#for example,Dixit*s (1976) model to provide 
an endogenous wage quantity constrained model. The implicit 
contract also specifies an employment rule L(s). If the 
approach is to provide an explanation of an involuntary 
unemployment equilibrium the optimal contract must be such 
that L(s) < m for some s. Azariades and Bailey both argued 
that the full employment contract would not be optimal, 
however Negishi (19 79) , Varian (19 76) and Akerlof and 
Miyazaki (1980) have argued that the full employment contract 
is in fact optimal and may imply that in some states employ­
ment is above that which would be achieved in a spot market 
model.
Clearly an approach which gives price rigidities but also 
implies full employment is not of great interest. However 
more recent work,especially Grossman and Hart (1981a, 1981b) 
appears promising. Three basic modifications are made to 
the Baily-Azariades approach. Firstly it is assumed that 
both workers and firms are risk averse, secondly that firms 
may also pay a wage to laid-off workers, finally and most 
importantly it is assumed that only firms can observe the 
true state of the world s. There is asymmetric information 
since only firms know the marginal revenue product of workers.
Once both firms and workers are risk averse the optimal 
contract must specify the optimal degree of risk sharing 
between a worker and a firm. If the state of the world s
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was public information then an optimal contract would state
that a worker should be employed in all states where his
reservation wage R is exceeded by his marginal revenue 
«
product/and the wage paid in employment states "We (s) 
will give the optimal degree of risk sharing. The model 
will not explain either unemployment when s>R (s is 
now taken to be the marginal revenue product of the worker), 
and cannot explain price rigidities since We (s) has to be 
variable for optimal division of risk. However such a con­
tract will be unenforcable if workers cannot observe the 
state s, since the firms will have an incentive to choose 
and announce that s^ rather than Sj has occurred/where 
We (s^ ) < Weisj^.given that both are employment states.
Moral hazard arising from asymmetric information means 
contracts cannot be made dependent upon s. Following some 
proposals by Hall and Lilien (1979), Grossman and Hart 
(1981a) consider the sort of contract that will be struck if 
the ex post level of employment is public knowledge. Hence 
the wage components of contracts may not be directly written 
to be contingent upon s , but they may be contingent upon 
employment. To understand how such an arrangement may yield 
fixed wages and unemployment in states in which the marginal 
revenue product of labour exceeds a given reservation wage R, 
consider the following argument due to Hart and Grossman.
The bargain that a firm can offer to an individual worker 
is that he will receive wage We if he works 
for the institutionally determined period, and W u if 
unemployed. Now let h=We~Wu. There is no problem in 
ensuring that the firm achieves an optimal level of employment 
ex post since it will always employ the worker if s>h [where
is the actual realisation] and whatever the hiring rule 
it will announce an s which yields employment. An optimal 
contract,when only the firm knows s,involves choosing h 
and to maximize (5.2.20)
r fhJh V(s-h-Wu)dG(s) + l V(-Wu)dG(s) (5.2.20) 
so
subject to (5.2.21)
fi fhu(h+Wu-R)dG (S) + I u(Wu)dG(s) > u (5.2.21)
so
where
G(s) is the probability distribution over states 
with sQ and s being the 'worst' and 'best' states, 
lower and upper bounds on G(s). u is the utility 
the worker can achieve if he does not make a contract 
with the firm.
Employment will occur if 5>h, hence if the optimal h>R 
unemployment will occur in states where full employment would 
obtain on a neoclassical spot market. The basic idea can 
be illustrated as follows; let h=R>s0 , net income is thus 
constant in employment and unemployment states. The worker 
is indifferent between working and not working and thus is 
locally risk neutral at h=R. Expected net income and profit, 
from (5.2.20) and (5.2.21), may be added together to yield
(5.2.22) .
E tt + El = ( (s-R) dG(s) (5.2.22)
Jh
(5.2.22) is maximized..at h=R. The firm is bearing all the 
risk and an appropriate increase in risk sharing will increase 
utility. Consider the following-let h increase slightly with 
an appropriate fall in Wu such that Eir does not change.
Since s-(u+Wy)> -Wu in employment states, the change represents
202
a transfer of the firms income from employment to unemployment
states decreasing the riskiness of the expected profit
stream. Since the firm is assumed risk averse it will 
1
accept a small cut in Eir in return for the reduction in risk.
The workers El rises and since he is locally risk neutral
at h=R he will also be made better off. Thus h>R is Pareto
superior to h=R. Because h>R at the optimal contract and
s>h is required for employment then s>h>R implies that
unemployment of the worker may occur when the realisation
of the workers marginal revenue product s exceeds his 
12reservation wage. Unemployment will be involuntary in this 
sense.
If it is to be argued that firms will face costs if they 
pay identical workers different wages, the theory implies 
that a uniform wage will be paid to all workers in employment 
states. If the unemployment/lay-off wage is zero the contract 
implies selecting a Wg =h to be paid in employment states.
As an explanation of wage rate determination between an 
individual firm and a group of homogeneous workers, implicit 
contracts struck under asymmetric information have several 
desirable features. Contracts are the consequence of 
maximizing behaviour by firms and workers. A contract which 
defines employment and wages as contingent upon the state 
of the world or employment as state contingent and remuner­
ation linked to employment, has the essential characteristic 
that rules about prices and quantities are determined
Ci
simultaneously.
The approach however suffers from several shortcomings. No 
explanation of what the wage rate will actually be is
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presented, neither is there any consideration of how the
optimal contract will change when the aggregate environment
changes. It is also assumed that a perfect auction market «
exists for the output of the firm, explanation of price 
setting behaviour is also required here. The question of 
why firms obtain labour pools of a given size is not 
explained yet the theory relies upon some underlying argu­
ment about labour immobility as a rationale for the implicit 
contract. If workers are tied in to a firm permanently 
or u is very low why do not firms shift all risk to workers 
by offering the following contract Wu=0, We-=R=H, L=1 if s>R, 
L=0 otherwise. This of course looks very familiar.
Further the way uncertainty is introduced into the Grossman 
and Hart analysis is doubtful. They assume that uncertainty 
is due to some random component in the production technology. 
The marginal physical product of workers varies over states. 
To suggest that only firms can observe changes in the MPP 
is somewhat peculiar. Workers on a production line know 
how fast the line is moving or how frequently it stops, they 
should be able to make a reasonable inference about the 
state of the world. Alternatively it could be argued that 
the demand curve firms face has some random component, which 
would seem to make it more reasonable to assume only firms 
observe the realisation s. An interesting question to ask 
might be how firms gain information upon the realisation s.
If a wage is paid to all employed workers and output precedes 
the revelation of the true state through product market 
transactions how is employment chosen ex ante? The most 
immediately obvious answer is that firms observe not randomness 
in prices, but variations in quantities at given prices,
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experienced through inventory stock changes. Employment 
will be a consequence of the firms inventory position. 
Introducing inventories explicitly into an implicit contract 
model would allow the firm two channels for handling the 
random component in demand, state contingent contracts and 
the inventory holding decisions. It is thus suggested that 
the possibility of absorbing random demand shocks by 
inventory holding policies may make a risk averse firm, risk 
neutral in its attitude to the contracts it offers it? 
workers. This may be an interesting line of investigation.**
It would perhaps be premature to judge the importance of 
implicit contracts as a wage adjustment and determination 
mechanism. Since the micro-models cannot be generalised by 
treating a worker and producer as representative agents, as 
is often done when considering potential microfoundations, 
few comments about the sort of macroeconomic analysis that 
will result can be made.
(v) Explicit Contracts: Union Employer Bargaining 
Standard IS/LM macroeconomic models can explain the existence 
of an unemployment equilibrium which has the usual Keynesian 
features when the wage rate is rigid. Dixit (1976) has also 
shown that a 'Keynesian Temporary Equilibrium' arises under 
wage rigidity. The most straightforward way of explaining 
why prices do not adjust to clear the labour market is to 
use the observation that trade unions exist and play a role 
in the determination of wages. Fixed or imperfectly adjust­
ing wage rates may then be explained either ns a consequence 
of the institutional organisation of the labour market or 
as a result of optimising behaviour on the part of the union.
A
I.e. Wage and employment bargains may be struck periodically
and must be adhered to for some institutionally given time
period or they are continuously revised but do not give 
1
sufficient price adjustment for the labour market to clear.
The questions of why unions exist^what motivates their 
leaders ,and under what conditions particular workers choose 
to join the union will not be examined. It will simply be 
assumed that unions are interested in maximizing some form 
of utility function the arguments in which are the wage rate 
and level of employment.
The problems of wage rate and employment determination on a 
unionised labour, market is essentially a problem of bilateral 
monopoly. A monopolistic union facing a monopsonistic 
firm. Two basic approaches exist, demand determined solutions, 
and efficient solutions.
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Demand determined solutions seek to select a point upon the 
firms labour demand curve. The easiest and one of the 
simplest solutions is due to Dunlop (1944) he assumes that 
the union maximizes the total wage bill (5.2.23)
(5.2.23)Max Uu = wL(w) 
w
hence du
dw
u
= L(w) + wL'(w) = 0 (5.2.24)
which may be written
L(w) (1-ELw) (5.2.25)
where L(w) is the firms labour demand curve, E, = -wL'(w)/L(w)
Ij W
is the elasticity of demand for labour with respect to the 
wage rate.
The problem with such an approach is that it involves fixing
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employment at a level where marginal revenue is zero, with 
a result that the wage rate that would be achieved in the 
absence of the union is greater than the unionised wage if 
ELw >1. Figure (5.2.5) demonstrates this.
Figure (5.2.5)
In figure (5.2.5) WuLu > wN but wN > wu : The wage 
bill is maximized at wuLy the unions choice point on the 
firms labour demand curve, but the actual wage rate 
chosen lies below the non-unionised wage w^.
Dunlop/aware of this problem/constrains the unions maximiz­
ation problem by introducing a union membership function 
M(w) where M'(w)>0. This membership function is assumed to 
lie above the non-unionised labour supply curve for all 
wage rates. This then admits two possibilities as described 
by figure (5.2.6)(a) and (b).
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Figure (5.2.6)
In (a) the wage bill maximizing pair (wu,Lu) on the labour demand curve 
selects a lower level of employment than the supply of 
labour, M(wu) given by the unions membership function. 
Unemployment M(wu)-Lu occurs.
In (b) there is insufficient labour supply at the wage bill 
maximization point max wyLu on L(w), and the wage is bid 
up to the intersection between the membership function of 
the union and the firms labour demand curve. Dunlop's 
approach is based upon the assumption that each worker has 
an identical opportunity of employment and that each has 
identical weight in the formulation of union policy. This 
simple representation of the bargaining problem suffers 
from a number of serious problems. Most importantly it does 
not explain how the membership function arises, which aspects 
of individual agents choice calculus cause them to join. It 
also does not explain why the particular maximand wL(w), 
wage bill maximization,is adopted. To generate this result 
from individual workers decisions requires: (i) That they are 
income maximizers (ii) that they are risk neutral. These 
are strong assumptions to make in general.
Using a more general form of the unions utility function 
Cartter (1959) argues that shifts in the labour demand 
curve/brought about by changes in the effective demand for 
the firms output, will cause both wages and employment to 
rise when demand rises, but only employment to fall when 
demand is reduced. The unions indifference map is such 
that it resists wage reductions. This is illustrated in 
figure (5.2.7) :
Figure (5.2.7)
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Cartter argues that given the initial wage employment 
bargain (w,L) increases in demand^represented by outward 
shifts in the firms labour demand curve in figure (5.2.7), 
give rise to increases in both the wage rate and the level 
of employment, but for demand decreases only the level of 
employment changes. This implies that the indifference map 
of the union changes shape for all utility levels 
below the one associated with (L,w). This explanation of 
what is supposed to be a stylised fact, unions resist wage 
reductions despite the employment consequences of such 
behaviour, is self-evidently inadequate. Suppose demand
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rises as in figure (5.2.7) wages and employment rise, what 
then happens when demand falls back to its initial levels. 
Unless preferences have changed,wages and employment both 
also return to their initial levels. Cartters argument 
only holds for the first initial movement away from w,L.
Walters and Negishi (1980) propose a much more reasonable 
explanation of why unions resist wage reductions.16 Unions 
are assumed to maximize the utility function (5.2.26).
UU = wV(L(w)) V(•)>0,V'(•)>0,V"(•)<0 - (5.2.26)
The introduction of the V(L(w)) function into the simple wage 
bill specification implies that those workers who are employed 
first, senior workers, have the most influence upon union 
policy. The condition for maximizing (5.2.26) is (5.2.27)
where p(f(D) the demand curve is perceived to have a kink
function.
Profit maximization involves the conditions (5.2.29) and (5.2.30)
V(L(w))+wV' (L(w))L'(w) = [ïwL'(w)V(L(w)) _ L(w) '] <5-2-27»
'Lw
1
thefirm maximizes profit as (5.2.28)
Max it = p(f (L ) ) f (L) -wL (5.2.28)
such that p'(f(L))+ < p'(f(L) ) , f(L) is the production
p'(f (L) )+(l-Ep~) f  (L) > w (5.2.29)
p ( f (L) ) (1-E t ) f  (L) < w (5.2.30)
where Ep  ^and Ep  ^ are the left and right hand price 
elasticities with respect to output.
In the light of (5.2.29) and (5.2.30) the labour demand curve
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rises as in figure (5.2.7) wages and employment rise, what 
then happens when demand falls back to its initial levels. 
Unless preferences have changed, wages and employment both 
also return to their initial levels. Cartters argument 
only holds for the first initial movement away from w,L.
Walters and Negishi (1980) propose a much more reasonable 
explanation of why unions resist wage reductions.^-® Unions 
are assumed to maximize the utility function (5.2.26).
UU = wV(L(w)) V(-)>0,V' (•)>0,V"(.)<0 * (5.2.26)
The introduction of the V(L(w)) function into the simple wage 
bill specification implies that those workers who are employed 
first, senior workers, have the most influence upon union 
policy. The condition for maximizing (5.2.26) is (5.2.27)
where p(f(L)) the demand curve is perceived to have a kink
function.
Profit maximization involves the conditions (5.2.29) and (5.2.30)
V(L(w)) +wV wL'(w)V(L(w)) _ L(w) ]|> V L -EwJ  (5-2 -27>
Lw
1
thefirm maximizes profit as (5.2.28)
Max tt = p ( f (L ) ) f ( L) -wL (5.2.28)
such that p'(f(L)) < p'(f(L)) , f(L) is the production
p'( f (L) )+ (l“Epf) f1 (L)> w (5.2.29)
p ( f (L) ) (1-Ep^ ) f  (L) < w (5.2.30)
where Ep  ^and Ep  ^are the left and right hand price 
elasticities with respect to output.
In the light of (5.2.29) and (5.2.30) the labour demand curve
perceived by the union will probably have a vertical section 
at the current level of employment. The wage rate that max­
imizes wV(L(w)) will be the maximum value of w on the 
vertical section of the demand curve. A small cut in wages 
cannot improve the unions utility since it will have no 
employment effect. Since L(w) is clearly zero at that w 
which maximizes wV(L(w)) the L.H.S. maximization condition 
is satisfied. To evaluate the R.H.S. condition we may 
simply rewrite (5.2.27) as (5.2.31)
[wV(Ljwn L*(w)+J [EVL-(1/ELJ ]  < 0 (5.2.31)
where L'(w)+ is the right-hand derivative 
El* the right-hand elasticity
Consider now what happens when there is an increase in demand 
for the firms output. Two scenarios are possible depending 
upon the unions perceptions. (i) If the union perceives 
E^w is constant then for f"(L)<0 and if Ep^ is perceived 
by employers as constant. The increased product demand will 
cause firms to raise employment L at a given w. Consequently 
the term (EyL - (1/e£w )) in (5.2.31) is initially positive 
and then becomes zero, hence beyond this point all increases 
in demand are absorbed by changes in the wage rate. (5.2.29) 
implies that p must eventually rise once the change in L 
causes the condition to become satisfied by an equality. 
Initially the effect will be felt on employment but will then 
switch to changes in prices and wages. (ii) If the union 
perceives a constant right-hand slope L'(w)+ rather than a 
constant elasticity E.+ increases in both the wage rate and 
the level of employment must occur once (5.2.31) has achieved 
an equality through w changes.
For a reduction in product demand the argument is considerably 
simpler. A fall in demand will reduce employment with an 
unchanged product price and given wage rate as long as the 
R.H.S. profit maximization condition (5.2.30) holds.16 The 
union will not of course react by reducing wages since this 
will gain no increase in employment. The full effect of 
the fall in product demand is felt on the level of employment.
Despite the improvements suggested by Walters and Negishi 
demand determined solutions to the bargaining problem do not 
seem to provide an acceptable explanation of wage rate 
determination. The arguments essentially rely upon the 
following process occurring, firms announce a labour demand 
curve which defines the profit maximizing level of employment 
at each wage rate. The union then selects a given wage 
employment combination on the labour demand,curve which 
maximizes utility. There are several problems with such a 
process. If the firm learns about union preferences it will 
manipulate the outcome by announcing a labour demand curve 
the wage bill maximization point of which yields a greater 
profit than may be obtained on the true labour demand curve. 
The analysis also does not consider the possibility that the 
firm may be able to influence the point chosen by the union 
by threatening a lock-out. Finally it should be noted that 
demand determined solutions to the problem are always pareto 
inefficient if the level of employment enters the unions 
utility function.1^
As Hall and Lilien (1979) point out an efficient bargain 
'must specify the level of employment as well as the total 
compensation or average wage'. This can be easily illustrated 
by a simple diagram due to MacDonald and Solow (1981).
Fig.
(5.2.8
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In figure (5.2.8) if we imagine that the unions indifference 
curves are the rectangular hyperbola as in Dunlop's 
analysis we see that the demand determined solution appears 
at A. Notice immediately that all wage employment pairs 
within the shaded lens are Pareto superior to A. The 
contract curve represents efficient combinations of w and L. 
In the context of an efficient bargaining solution the way 
in which wages and employment are determined and adjust 
will depend upon the shape and position of the contract 
curve, and the actual bargaining process adopted to pick the 
solution point upon the curve.
Given any particular product market structure the shape of 
the contract curve will depend upon the associated revenue 
function and unicns preferences. Unions preferences should 
in some sense represent the preferences of its members. 
MacDonald and Solow suggest the following ;
UU=N_1{L(U(w)-R)+(N-L)U(wu)} (5.2.32)
where N is the total number of workers
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R is the marginal disutility of labour 
wu unemployment or the opportunity cost wage 
U(w) and U(wu) represent the preferences of a 
representative worker.
The specification assumes the union is risk neutral and that 
senior workers have no extra say in union decision making. 
However this does seem a reasonable reoresentation 
of union preferences and variants of this form will be 
adopted frequently in the next two chapters.
Actual bargaining solutions come in three basic forms .
Game Theoretic as for example Nash (1950), which treat the
problem as a fixed threat two persons non-zero sum bargaining 
18game. Arguments based upon the costs and benefits 
associated with strike duration deriving from Hicks (1932)/ 
and arguments about the propensity to fight -based upon the 
early work of Zeuthen (1936). A good review of the various 
approaches may be found in de Menil (1971). The actual 
properties of bargaining solutions will be discussed in 
chapter 6.
The introduction of unions with monopoly power would seem 
to be an important explanation of wage rate determination. 
Solutions which yield efficient bargains are more desirable 
since they are consistant with the simultaneous determination 
of both wages and employment, as firms and unions maximize 
via the bargain. However, if the process is sufficiently 
costly then such agreements will only be struck periodically 
and it may then be argued that they provide a rationale for 
short-term wage rigidity.
The impact of disequilibrium upon bargaining and the macro- 
economic implications of unionization within the context of 
a disequilibrium model will be the subject matter of 
chapters 6 and 7.
In terms of explaining the behaviour of prices and wages 
in the macro economy it should perhaps be argued that each 
of the mechanisms discussed, with perhaps some reservations 
about the effective excess demand hypothesis as it stands, 
has some relevance. Combination of the expectation approach 
to output price determination and explicit contracts deter­
mining wages and employment might provide some interesting 
insights. As a consistent choice theoretic basis for price 
and quantity determination which may provide a rigorous 
microfoundation to macroeconomics the expectations approach 
currently looks most promising. The somewhat vague arguments 
associated with why price changes do not yield large 
quantity responses need to be examined in more detail, 
however arguments about the cost of search, speed or cost 
of information dissemination have at least the attraction 
of heuristic plausability.
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FOOTNOTES
1. The work of Hahn and Negishi straddles several categories.
2. For a discussion of the Effective Excess Demand Hypothesis 
and references see Chapter 4.
3. Benassy (1980) notes that certain patterns of expectations 
formation may jeopardise the existence of am equilibrium 
of this type.
4. The specification assumes workers are risk neutral.
5. The absence of real balance effects may well be critical 
here as in Varian (1977).
6. Other sectors may not soak up the unemployment since 
the wage required may be below the shadow price of 
leisure.
7. Eric Maskin is acredited with having made this point first.
8. See Chapter. 3.
9. This might suggest an explanation of stagflation.
10. See W.Oi (1962)
11. Bailey (1974) provides a very similar result in an 
inter-temporal context.
12. Grossman and Hart (1981) prove this result rigorously 
for the case of many workers.
13. Since the literature is still in its infancy one should 
not be too dismissive.
14. Thi3 is a problem to which the author hopes soon to 
give further attention.
15. Hart (1980) Considers a model of General Equilibrium 
with frrms and unions monopolistically setting prices 
and wages respectively. However Hart does not manage
to analyse the general case or explain the arbitrary division 
of laoour and product markets adopted.
16. Negishi notes that this will always be the case if
E+,>1.Pf
17. This was
18. See Luce
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6- WAGE and e m p l o y m e n t  b a r g a i n i n g in d is e q u i l i b r i u m
6.1 Solutions to the Bargaining Problem
The idea that unionization by causing price rigidities may 
generate unemployment equilibria has been a recurring conten­
tion in conventional macroeconomics. The argument is usually 
that during periods when excess supply exists upon the labour 
market unions resist the wage cuts that would remove 
involuntary unemployment. This is because unions it is 
claimed represent their members who are typically drawn 
mainly from the employed members of the total labour force, and 
these workers place greater emphasis upon wages since 
seniority gives them a certain safety from redundancy. The 
unemployed have less voice in influencing union behaviour.
This is the.essence of the Walters-Negishi (1980) specific­
ation of the unions preferences discussed in the previous 
chapter. The utility which the union places upon the two 
objectives, wages and employment, at the margin will depend 
upon their marginal valuation by its actual members.
A well founded exposition of bargaining behaviour should not
arbitrarily assign the control of different variables to
different agents. Often it is assumed that the wage rate
is determined by the union and employment by the firm.*
Rational bargainers should detect and realise all possible
pareto improvements by determining both wages and employment
2simultaneously as part of the bargain. Given that the 
correct information is available the bargain should be 
efficient. Hall and Lilien (1979) and Malcomson (1982) 
discuss the ways in which efficient or approximately 
efficient bargains may be struck under uncertain supply and
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demand conditions.
The informational requirements and enforcability of fully 
contingent efficient contracts or bargains will not be 
examined here. It will be assumed that any bargain struck 
will be efficient at least at the moment it is determined. 
This chapter is concerned with the impact of disequilibrium 
upon the wage employment bargains. Chapter 7 will examine 
the macroeconomic implications of introducing bargaining 
into disequilibrium models.
To examine how changes in the disequilibrium situation 
effect the outcome of an efficient bargaining process we 
shall initially follow the path taken by Cartter (1959) and 
Fellner (1960). The bargaining problem consists of defining 
the locus of pareto efficient bargains and then selecting 
a particular wage employment pair on that locus.
A Simple Bargaining Model
The agents in this model are one firm and one union. The 
union operates a closed shop and labour is the only variable 
factor of production.
The firms demand curve and production function are jointly 
summarised by a revenue function as (6.1.1)
R = R(L) (6.1.1)
where (i) R' (L)< 0 as L > L*
(il) R" (L) < 0 as L > L**
(iii)( iv ) R'"(L)<0 constant VL R' (L) =R(L)/L defines L***
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Diagramatically the revenue function is as figure (6.1.1).
Using (6.1.1) the profit function of the firm may now be 
written as (6.1.2)
it = R(L) - wL (6.1.2)
For any given isoprofit curve ir = tt the slope and curvature 
are derived from (6.1.2) as (6.1.3) and (6.1.4)
Slope of the isoprofit curve
dw _ R' (L) L - R(L) - ir _ R' (L) -w ,, ,dL = ~2 “ ---L--- (6.1.3)i-i
Curvature
~R" (L) L + £ [R(L) + 7T - R' (L)
Hence 0 V L>L* * * "“0 and d w 3— ~  < 0 V L>L*>0
dL
(6.1.4)
Thus the firms isoprofit curves are as in figure (6.1.2)
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Fig. (6.1.2)
w
R'(L)=w [Traditional labour demand curve]
TT=0X TT>0 LL** L*** L*
In the bargaining process the firms objective is to get onto 
the highest isoprofit curve it can.
The union will be assumed to maximize a utility function over 
wages and employment as (6.1.5).
This is assumed quasi-concave and increasing in both arguments. 
The slope of any indifference curve will be
The unions indifference map is convex.
Using (6.1.3) and (6.1.5) the locus of pareto efficient
bargaining points may be written as (6.1.6)
u = u(w,L) (6.1.5)
[w-R' (L)] ( 6 . 1 . 6 )
differentiating (6.1.6) gives (6.1.7)
Inspection of (6.1.7) reveals that in general the slope of
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the contract curve cannot be signed. McDonald and Solow (1981) 
claim that there is a strong presumption that the contract 
curve will have positive slope. However their analysis is 
based upon a less general specification of union preferences, 
implicitly they assume each worker has an equal say in 
union policy and each is equally effected by union behaviour. 
The expression (6.1.5) is completely general and allows for 
the possibility;suggested by Walters and Negishi (1980), of 
senior workers having a higher marginal evaluation on wage 
increments and lower evaluation on employment changes than 
junior workers, and also a proportionately larger say in 
union policy. In such a case a negatively sloped contract 
curve is more likely. For example if the unions utility 
function were specified as u = w'*'-L//NLL//N then a sufficiently 
large initial labour pool N or small employment level L 
will ensure a negatively sloped contract curve. This speci­
fication has the property that senior workers place a higher
4marginal valuation upon wage increments.
In the completely general case of bargaining, progress is 
limited to stating that the solution will lie in a particular 
region in the bargaining space. If it is assumed that
(i) the firm will not accept a negative profit solution,
(ii) the union will never accept a wage rate below that which 
will ensure its members employment elsewhere, (iii) employment 
will never be set such that R'(L)>w. These three assumptions 
allow the bargaining space to be divided up as figure (6.1.3). 
Clearly bargains will not be struck outside the region A.
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Fig. (6.1.3)
w
R'(L)=w
l
=0
w Min wage
L
L*** L*
To make further progress with the analysis so that it will 
be possible to examine the specific implications of disequil­
ibrium for the bargain, it is necessary to give the model
Differentiating (6.1.8) and (6.1.10) totally and holding u 
and n constant defines the pareto efficient bargaining locus 
as (6.1.11)
the locus has slope
and curvature
further structure.^ Thus/ let the unions utility function 
be Cobb-Douglas^ and the firms revenue function be quadratic
as (6.1.8) and (6.1.9)
a+B=l (6 . 1. 8)
R(L)=bL+cL2 c<0 (6.1.9)
The firms profit function may now be written
tt = bL + cL2 wL ( 6 . 1 . 1 0 )
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Hence the efficiency loci are clearly rays originating from 
w=0, L= -b/2c as in figure (6.1.4)
Fig. (6.1.4)
This specification has some very useful properties. Recalling 
that the coefficients a and 6 are elasticities and using the 
facing that the a=3 efficiency locus is vertical, a simple 
interpretation of bargaining loci is possible. If the 
unions utility is more responsive to the level of employment 
then the locus of pareto efficient bargaining points has 
positive slope and is located to the right of the a=3 vertical, 
which may be interpreted as the wage bill maximization 
specification of the unions utility function. If however 
the unions utility is more responsive to the wage rate then 
the contract curves have negative slope and lie between the 
a=3 wage bill maximization locus and the 3=0 wage rate maxi­
mization locus. This specification allows a simple categor­
ization of loci and does not make the presumption that they 
have a positive slope.
It is now fruitful to examine some actual bargaining solutions.
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The Union as a Monopolist 
The union maximizes its utility subject 
its opportunity cost level of profit A. 
Max u = waL^
S.T. R(L)-wL = A
Maximizing (6.1.12) subject to (6.1.13) 
a solution equation in L as (6.1.14)^ 
(1-0) R'(L)L+ (23-1)(R(L)-A) = 0  
Solving (6.1.14) for L and substituting 
give the solution value of w.
to the firm achieving
(6 .1.1 2)
(6.1.13)
and rearranging yields
(6.1.14)
into (6.1.13) would
The comparative static properties of the solution may be 
obtained by totally differentiating (6.1.14) and rearranging 
to give (6.1.15)
dL = (23-1) . ...Ha 8 R* (L) + (1-3)R"(L)L (b.1.15)
Using the quadratic form of the revenue function and (6.1.11) 
it can be shown that the comparative static effects of a 
change in the firms opportunity cost - fixed threat point - 
are as described in table (6.1.1)
Table (6.1.1)
a>8 8>a a=8
dL/dA + - 0
dw/dA - - -
Hence an increase (decrease) in the firms opportunity cost 
raises (lowers) employment if the unions utility elasticity 
with respect to wages is greater than that with respect to 
employment, has the opposite effect if the employment 
elasticity is the greater and has no effect upon employment
i
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if the two are equal. In each case the wage rate will fall.
The firms opportunity cost profit level A, is that which the 
owners could earn by using the given capital in its next 
best employment. If demand in the market for the firms next 
best output is rationed, then the comparative static results 
presented in table (6.1.1) may be interpreted in the follow­
ing light. A tightening of the ration in the alternative 
market will reduce A, a relaxation of the ration will raise 
A, with the effects as reported in the table (6.1.1).
Another interpretation might be that the firms opportunity 
cost is defined as the output that could be obtained from 
employing another group of workers with different specific 
skills who can thus obtain a different product from the 
capital. A change in the firms opportunity cost could then 
be associated with a change in the availability of that 
particular type of specifically skilled labour, i.e. a change
Oin the labour supply constraint on a particular labour market. 
The Firm as a Monopsonist
The firm maximizes profit subject to the union achieving 
its opportunity cost level of utility. The problem becomes 
Max 7i = R(L)-wL (6.1.16)
S.T waL6 = B (6.1.17)
where B = w™N^, i.e. w is the wage at which the total 
labour pool N may gain employment elsewhere.
Maximizing (6.1.16) subject to (6.1.17) and rearranging will 
yield a solution equation in L as (6.1.18).
B'(L) - B1/a(l-B/a)L~0/a = 0 (6.1.18)
which may be solved for L, and the result would allow (6.1.17) 
to solve for w.
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The comparative static properties of this solution are 
obtained by totally differentiating (6.1.18) and rearranging 
to give (6.1.19)
dL = (1/g)B1/ot ~1 [l-3/alL"g//ot (6.1.19)
R" (L) +(B/a)B1//a (l-8/a)L"(6/a+1)
Using the quadratic form of the revenue function and (6.1.11) 
it can be shown that the comparative static effects of a 
change in the unions opportunity cost are as in table (6.1.2). 
Table (6.1.2)
\ a>8 £J>a
dL/dB - + 0
dw/dB + + +
Thus an increase (decrease) in the union opportunity cost 
raises (lowers) employment if its utility elasticity of 
employment is larger than that with respect to wages, has 
the converse effect if the wage elasticity is larger/and no 
employment effect if the two are equal. The effect upon 
the wage rate is positive whatever the elasticities.
An increase in the unions opportunity cost may be associated 
with either a rise in fixed wage rates in other sectors 
in which its members could gain employment, or an increase 
in unemployment benefit levels, or perhaps a relaxation of 
a labour demand constraint on an alternative labour market 
which raises the probabalistic value of the associated wage
ra te.
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The Nash Solution
Since the Nash solution is used here and extensively in later 
chapters, its properties will be discussed in a little detail.
The technique proposed by Nash [1950] uses the von Neumann- 
Morgenstern concept of cardinal utility to provide a determinate 
solution to the classical 2 player simple bargaining game. The 
classical approach to this game assumes that the two players 
can achieve any payoff vector v = (ü,") within the compact 
payoff space P of the game G. If the two bargainers cannot 
agree, then each receives a fixed conflict payoff c = (B,A). 
However, if an agreement is reached, then the solution must 
satisfy the two classical rationality postulates, R1 and R2.
(Rl) Individual Rationality: Any agreement must yield each 
player a payoff at least as good as the conflict situation.
Hence u B and * >, A
which implies the outcome must lie within the area cde in 
f i gure (6.1.5).
(R2) Joint Rationality: The agreement cannot be improved
upon further for both players.
* * * * _ *Hence ^ v = (ü,»)eP s.t. ü > u and » > *
so the outcome must lie in the negotiation set of the game 
(see Luce and Raiffa [1957]). In figure (6.1.5) the negotia­
tion set H of the game G is the boundary of P between 
points a and b .
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Figure
Hence, R1 and R2 together imply v must lie on the arc between 
d and e , termed the concession limits for the two players. 
However, the exact location of v on de is indeterminate.
To make v determinate, Nash proposed the following. The 
game is played in normal form, the players each make only one 
move independently and simultaneously. The move is to choose 
a real valued payoff demand. If the two demands are mutually 
compatible; v = (u,n)r.P , then these are the solution to the 
game. If the demands are mutually incompatible; v = (u,»)/P , 
then each player receives only his conflict payoff; v = (B,A) . 
Nash agrues that the game will be resolved by the two players 
agreeing to equal payoffs, because neither player can rationally 
expect that a rational opponent will grant him better terms 
than he is willing to concede himself.
Formally the Nash solution satisfies four postulates, P1-P4. 
(PI) Joint Efficiency: v = (u,i)cH
(P2) Symmetry: The solution of a symmetric game lies on the 
line vi = « in the positive orthant.
(P3) Linear Invariance: If v is the solution to G and G* 
is the game obtained when one player's utility
231
function is subjected to an order preserving 
linear transformation T . Then the solution
■Ar ■)kv to G will be the image of v under the
*transformation T . v = Tv .
(P4) Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives: For the game 
G in payoff space P and solution v , if 
the payoff space is restricted to P*C P 
and c = (B,A)eP* and v = (u,i)eP* then 
v is also the solution to G* .
The solution to G , v = (u,^) is the point satisfying 
(u-B)("-A) = max [(u-B) (n-A)] . Nash shows this to be a solu­
tion to both symmetric and asymmetric games in normal form.
In our simple model, the Nash maximand may be written as (6.1.20)
Max' Prod = [waLB-B] [R(L)-wL-A] (6 .1 .2 0 )
differentiating 
d [Prod.
dw = aw0* ^LBR(L) - (a + l)waL0 + ^ - aAw0-  ^+ BL = 0
( 6 . 1 . 2 1 )
dfProd] = 6waL6 1r (L) + w 0L6R'(L) - (e+l)wa+1L6"dr
- 6AwaL6-1 - BR'(L) + Bw = 0 ( 6 . 1 . 2 2 )
Evaluating (6.1.21) and (6.1.22) at A=B=0 and using the 
quadratic form of the revenue function gives (6.1.23) and 
(6.1.24)
.  b [‘*‘ *
[ * 42 - (6.1.23)
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w
[a+l - (l-82)
L
p+2 -
(6.1.23) and (6.1.24) define the Nash solution.
( 2 . 1 . 24 )
Some messy algebra allows the comparative statics of the solution, 
when A^B^O to be signed as table (6.1.3)^.
Table (6.1.3)
a> ß 6>a a=B
dL/dA + - 0
'dL/dB - + 0
dw/dA - - -
dw/dB + + 1* 1
The interpretations that may be placed upon changes in the union 
and firms opportunity cost (conflict payoffs), B and A 
respectively, are the same as in the previous two cases.
The Nash solution in this simple model gives relatively 
straightforward results. However, two questions should perhaps 
be asked. Firstly is the problem of bilateral monopoly addressed 
here adequately described by the simple 2 player bargaining 
game? This form of game assumes that the threats points are 
exogenously given and the two players make independent simul­
taneous moves. In a real world bargaining situation an agent 
may be able to threaten a number of different penalties if his 
offer is rejected. A union may choose between a work to rule,
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a strike, or various forms of disruptive action. A firm may 
threaten variable period lockouts or closure. This may result 
in a variable threat game. The credibility of the threats 
will be important, if a bargainer can make a demand and at the 
same time make it impossible for himself to compromise, then 
providing the demand yields his opponent something better than 
the conflict payoff he will gain his demand. For example, the 
union leadership may promise its members it will settle for 
no less than a 10% pay rise, even though 57» may be acceptable, 
it may not be able to back down on 107. and will consequently 
win. In circumstances where both bargainers can reduce their 
own ability to compromise the timing of demands becomes crucial. 
Whoever demands first will be successful (Schelling [1960] dis­
cusses these possibilities at some length).
These arguments seem to place doubt upon the validity of the 
simple"fixed threat" bargaining game as a representation of 
bargaining situations. However, Harsanyi [1967, p. 187] 
states, "most empirical bargaining situations seem to have the 
nature of simple bargaining games rather than ultimatum games". 
This could well be because bargainers seem particularly inventive 
in sLightly redefining the game to get around a commitment an 
opponent has managed to lock himself into. For example, a 
firm may concede a 10% pay demand but will then attempt to 
introduce productivity clauses into the agreement.
If we accept llarsanyi's statement, the second question 
arises. Are the Nash postulates P1-P4 reasonable characteriza­
tions of the features a solution should display? Postulate 1} 
joint efficiency, just states that the two bargainers exhaust all
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possible Pareto improving moves. This does not seem particularly 
contentious providing that there are no institutional constraints 
which prevent both the wage and the level of employment to be 
freely chosen. The symmetry postulate P2 is essentially ano­
ther rationality postulate. Neither player believes the other 
will adopt a strategy less rational than his own. This postu­
late suggests neither player has an advantage in terms of 
bargaining power or skill. However, if two rational bargainers 
are playing the simple game in normal form, then there seems 
no role for bargaining skill, and bargaining power is captured 
in the specification of the conflict payoffs. Postulate 3 
makes the solution independent of interpersonal comparisons of 
utility between the two players.
Interpersonal comparisons may
be important for ethical reasons if the game is resolved by 
arbitration. Ethical judgment, however, involves imposing some 
measure of comparison on the two bargainers utilities, clearly 
neither rational bargainer would accept a measure which lowers 
his payoff.
The final postulate, independence of irrelevant alternatives, 
may be interpreted as that the solution should not be effected 
by excluding from the payoff space some potential agreement 
points that would not have been chosen. This postulate has 
been heaviliy criticized. Critics argue that the bargaining 
solution should reflect "bargaining power" or "fairness". For 
example, if the payoff to the firm was of a large order of 
magnitude in the monopsony solution, then because the firm could 
"win big" if a monopsony solution arose, then this should be 
reflected in higher payoffs for the firm in all other solutions.
Basically critics of the postulate claim unchosen solutions 
cannot be regarded as irrelevant. Taking this line of thinking 
to its logical conclusion Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975) 
abandon the use of the conflict payoff point, and divide the 
payoffs to the two bargainers in the same ratio as they would 
achieve in the monopsony and monopoly solutions. However, 
there does not seem any simple case for adopting this solution 
rather than the Nash.
Market Power Solution
One possible non-co-operative alternative to the Nash solution, 
the market power solution is obtained by taking a weighted 
average of the monopolist and monopsonist solutions.
Let 0 represent the unions and (1-0) the firms bargaining 
p o w e r . C o n s i d e r  first the determination of the level of 
employment L from (6.1.14) and (6.1.18) we obtain (6.1.25)
0[R* (L)-B1/a(l-B/a)L~6/a] + (l-0) [(l-B)R' (L)L+(2B-1) (R/L)-A)]=0
(6.1.25)
Solving (6.1.24) for L and using the definition of efficiency
(6.1.11) gives w.11
The comparative static effects of changes in the union and
finis opportunity costs follow in the same manner as in the 
monopolist and monopsonist cases. Changes in the bargaining 
power parameter 0 move the solution along the appropriate 
efficiency ray as summarised in table (6.1.4).
Table (6.1.4)
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a>6 V>a a=B
dL/dA + - 0
dL/dB - + 0
dL/d0 - + 0
dw/dA ’ - - -
dw/dB + + +
dw/d0 + + +
Increases in 0 represent an increase in the unions bargaining 
power, as table (6.1.4) indicates changes in 0 effect the 
bargaining solution in the same manner as changes in the 
unions opportunity cost B. If for example an employment 
constraint in another sector where the union members may 
work is removed, this both varies the unions opportunity 
cost and its bargaining power.
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6.2 The Impact of Disequilibrium Upon Bargains
Section 6.1 examined some solutions to the problem of bargain­
ing upon the labour market. Attention was mainly focused 
upon the comparative static properties of the various 
solutions. Changes in the union or firms fixed threat 
points were interpreted as a consequence of changes in con­
straints in other sectors of the economy. This section 
considers how such changes^by effecting the firms inverse 
demand curvefmay cause the position of the contract curve 
in bargaining space to change. This leads to several plaus­
ible scenarios in which the nominal wage varies little when 
product demand changes, but the employment level changes 
considerably. One of these explanations of a sticky 
nominal union wage has been replicated independently by 
McDonald aad Solow (1981).
As previously the firm will be assumed to be a simple profit 
maximizer faced by a standard neoclassical production function 
x=x(L) x'(L)>0 ,x"(L)<0 (6.2.1)
x 1 (0 ) =°° x 1 (<») =0
The product market structure of the firm is described by 
the inverse demand function (6.2.2).
p=p(x(L),H) P1 (-)<0, p2 (*)>0 (6.2.2)
where H represents the level of economic activity in other 
relevant markets. McDonald and Solow (M.S.) introduce II directly 
into a revenue function and interpret it as representing 
the trade cycle - this interpretation is not adopted here 
and it is shown that M.S.'s results do not necessarily follow 
in this analysis.
The firms profits may be written as (6.2.3)
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and hence we have the isoprofit curve (6.2.4) for = 
w = ¿[ p(x(L),H) x(L) - tt] (6.2.4)
The isoprofit curve will thus have slope as (6.2.5)
ti = p(x(L) ,H) x(L) - wL (6.2.3)
dw _ 1, [ip ax, x(L)+3x d (x (L) 
dì, I, ]Tx '3l '5f' 2 [p(x(L) ,H) x(L) -irj•• L
- ì [lE JLi x(L) +p(x(L) ,H) 3x - w~j 
L [3x 3L * 3L j (6.2.5)
and curvature as (6.2.6)
w 1 f32x ( 3p x 
2 " L
d2
dL
2 3x
?
(L)+p(x(L) ,H) ) + 2 3p f 3X ' 
/ 9x ULy
^ ix I _3g x(L) +p (x (L) 'H) ] + Tf [p(x(L) ,H)x(L)-ir] (6.2.6)
Examination of (6.2.5) and (6.2.6) allows us to state that 
the isoprofit curves will be concave except for a convex 
tail as in figure (6.2.1)
Union behaviour may be described by a concave utility 
function as in section 6.1
(6.2.7)
where uww,uLL<0
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dw
dL
uL
u (6 . 2 . 8)u=u w
An efficient contract must now lie upon the contract curve 
obtained from (6.2.5) and (6.2.8)
The contract curve (6.2.9) may possibly have negative slope
Our interest lies in examining how changes in other sectors 
of the economy, dH, which may be interpreted as rationing 
level or regime changes, effect the level of employment and 
wages. Most particular^ are there any scenarios in which 
there will be little tendency for wages to change? To 
consider the possibilities it is necessary to understand 
how both the position of the contract curve in bargaining 
space and the location of the solution upon the curve respond 
to potential changes in H.
Differentiating (6.2.9) holding L constant and assuming 
Pl2=0 gives (6.2.10) and describes the movement of the 
contract curve.
Hence as with the slope of the contract curve the crucial 
argument is the unions marginal evaluation of wages, uw .
For small values of uw the curve has positive slope and moves 
downwards when the firms product demand curve moves out. For 
large values of uw the contract curve has negative slope and 
moves upwards with product demand increases. The possibilities 
are described in figure (6.2.2)(a) and (b).
(6.2.9)
if the union places a high marginal evaluation upon wages.^
3w
Jn =
•Sii *
3p 8x
-*77 • T T (6.2.10)
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(a)
F i g .  ( 6 . 2 . 2 )
(b)
In figure (6.2.2)(a) uw is assumed very large, the contract
curve has negative slope and moves from c/cq to c/c^ as the
firms product market demand conditions improve, dH>ri. In
(b), the more likely case and the one analysed by McDonald
and Solow the contract curve moves from c/c to c/c, down-o 1
wards.
To describe how wages and employment may change under diff­
erent bargaining solutions consider figures (6.2.3) and
(6.2.4) .
Figure (6.2.3) describes the effect of a rise in the firms
product demand upon various bargaining solutions. Point A
in the initial bargaining solution that has been in force
prior to the change upon the product market. A lies on the
contract curve c/cQ which derives from the tangency points
between the unions indifference map and a set of isoprofit
curves associated with ft. An improvement in the product
market generates a new set of isoprofit curves denoted ft,
our previous analysis implies that these will appear as
13depicted in the figure.
If the levels of utility and profit obtained at the initial
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point A are taken to be the union and firms opportunity 
costs then C may be interpreted as the new monopolistic 
solution and D the new monopsonistic solution. If the 
original opportunity cost/fixed threat points upon which A 
was struck are maintained then C is the new monopolistic 
solution if A was a monopolistic solution and D is the new 
monopsonistic solution if A was a monopsonistic solution. 
The point B is also of some interest here as the firm may be 
Fig. (6.2.3)
described as obtaining all the extra reward associated with 
a product price rise at A whilst the union captures the 
total rewards from new pareto improvements. The same inter­
pretation may be placed upon figure (6.2.4).
Figure (6.2.4)
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c/co c/cl
Notice that' if the contract curve has positive slope the 
monopolistic solution C is associated with a higher level 
of employment than the monopsonistic solutiontand a higher 
wage rate. If the contract curve has negative slope the 
monopoly solution actually entails lower employment and 
higher wages than the monopsony case. Clearly the same 
statements can be made with reference to the market power 
solution since this is a linear combination of the two extremes.
Any change which effects the firms inverse demand curve may 
also effect the firm and unions opportunity costs and their 
relative bargaining power. There are several possibilities 
which could be examined here. As was found in examining 
bargaining solutions in section 6.1 clear statements about 
how wages and employment adjust cannot be made without giving 
the problem functional form. The choice of the correct 
functional specification is an interesting empirical question
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but not one that will be tackled here. Attention will be 
focused upon the various potential scenarios which the 
structure developed above generates when disequilibrium 
changes upon other markets are postulated. To simplify the 
arguments it will be assumed that the opportunity costs of 
the union and firm are not significantly inter-related.
The argument that the firm achieves its opportunity cost 
activity by applying a different type of labour to its 
capital^ and the union by having its members work in another 
sector with different capital, might support such an assump­
tion .
Scenario 1: The sector in which the unions members have 
their alternative employment possibilities is characterised 
by a Repressed Inflation type situation: i.e. a shortage 
of both appropriate labour and goods.
If the supply constraints in the unions alternative sector 
tighten this will have three effects. The resultant 
spillovers on the product markets will cause the demand 
curve to shift out and consequently the contract curve to 
behave as in figure (6.2.3) or (6.2.4). The unions opportunity 
cost will rise since the probabilistic value of alternative 
employment will increase with effective excess labour demand.
The unions bargaining power relative to that of the firm 
14may also increase. For the case where the contract curve 
has positive slope figure (6.2.5) demonstrates that for 
monopsonistic and market power solutions the three effects 
work together in raising employment but tend to offset each 
other in their effect upon wages.
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Figure (6.2.5)
The initial bargaining solution lies at point a in the bargain­
ing space upon the contract curve c/cQ the change in constraint 
levels in the unions alternative employment sector, generates 
product demand spillovers and a new contract curve c/c^. The 
movement to the new contract curve a-b lowers wages and 
raises employment. The rise in the unions opportunity cost 
pushes the monopsonistic solution up the contract curve b-c 
reinforcing the effect upon employment but offsetting the 
effect upon wages. If rather than a monopsonistic solution a 
market power solution arises then the increase in the unions 
bargaining power moves the solution further out along the 
contract curve, as for example c-d, further compounding the 
rise in employment but offsetting the fall in the wage rate.
Scenario 2s The sector in which the firm may employ its 
capital for an alternative productive use is characterised 
by a Keynesian unemployment type situation. Both the 
product and labour markets are demand determined. Relaxation
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of the constraints in this sector will increase income and 
hence demand for the good produced in the bargaining sector.^ 
The firms opportunity cost and bargaining power will also 
rise. The case where the contract curve has positive slope 
and behaves as in figure (6.2.3) is again considered. Here 
there may be offsetting effects upon both wage and employment 
i.e. the monopolistic and bargaining power outcomes.
Consider figure (6.2.6)
Figure (6.2,6)
a is the initial bargaining solution, located upon the 
contract curve c/cQ . The change in the firms inverse demand 
curve moves the contract curve to the right and the 
monopolistic solution to b, raising both employment and wages. 
The change in the firms opportunity costs means that its 
minimum profit level rises/causing the monopolistic solution 
to move back along the contract curve c/c^ as indicated b-c, 
which has an offsetting effect upon both wages and employment. 
If a bargaining power solution arises the increased
bargaining power of the firm pushes the solution from c-d, 
further reducing wages and employment and offsetting the 
changes originating from the demand function movement.
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The two scenarios examined were chosen since they suggest 
possible explanations of sticky wages. The analytical 
structure can generate many other possibilities, and since 
there appear to be no overriding theoretical arguments which 
limit these possibilities empirical analysis may be required 
to decide which are the important and interesting cases.
One case that may be of potential interest occurs when a 
simple arbitration rule is applied to the bargaining problem. 
Let the rule be that the union receives a given proportion 
of total revenue as defined by (6.2.11)
where 0<X<1 constant
This may be termed an equity locus. It has slope as (6.2.12).
When demand for the firms output rises the whole equity locus 
moves upwards as indicated by (6.2.13)
wL = Xp (x (L) ,H) x (L) (6 . 2 . 11)
x(L) + p(x(L),H) + w < 0 (6.2.12
L
9w a 3p x(L) > 0
15TT = ’ D'H •
(6.2.13)
Combining this analysis of the behaviour of the equity locus 
with the contract curve demonstrates that the solution 
becomes as described in figure (6.2.7)(a) or (b)
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(a) (b)
Figure (6.2.7)
In both (a) and.(b) in figure (6.2.7) as demand for the 
firms product rises the contract curve moves from c/co~c/c^ 
and the equity locus from E/LQ to E/L^.
In case (a) where the contract curve has positive slope the 
movement of the two curves produces offsetting effects upon 
the wage rate and complementary effects upon employment. In 
case (b) the effects upon wages and employment depend upon 
the relative magnitudes of the contract curve and equity 
locus shifts. Clearly wages or employment will rise^but 
not necessarily both.
Finally a brief remark about the bargaining behaviour of a 
sales constrained firm may be in order. Firstly it should 
be noted that a sales constraint only makes sense if the 
firm is a price taker. This implies that any workers 
employed in excess of those required to produce the given 
sales will yield the firm no further revenue, however it 
does not imply that these workers will not be employed. The 
analysis here diverges from that of McDonald and Solow who 
assume employment will not exceed that required to produce
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the given sales.
Let x be the given sales constraint, and define L to bemax
the level of employment such that x = x(L). Care must now 
be taken in deriving the firms isoprofit curves.
(1) For L<Lmax the firms problem is defined by (6.2.14)
Max tt = px(L)-wL (6.2.14)
L
An isoprofit curve valued at ir=n has slope on (6.2.15)
dw
dL
p 9x L + if - px(L) 
3L (6.2.15)
(2) For L>Lmax the firms problem is defined by (6.2.16)
Max it = px (L ) - wL
* max (6.2.16)
here the isoprofit curve of value it=fr has slope as (6.2.17) 
dw _ P * (Lmx> * 1 < 0TTT 5 (6.2.17)
and curvature
2 px (L ) - ir . r max > (6.2.18)
Hence the firms isoprofit map is as figure (6.2.8)
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There seems a strong possibility here that the bargain will
be struck at the employment level L associated with them3 x
isoprofit curve kink. However if the curvature of the 
unions indifference curves exceeds that of the isoprofit 
curve to the right of L , it is quite feasible for labour 
whose value marginal product is zero to be employed.
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FOOTNOTES
1 See Addison and Siebert for a good basic review.
2. It may be argued that such bargains are not directly 
observed, however demarkation and manning agreements, 
featherbedding', will have employment effects which 
taken together with periodic wage negotiations may give 
approximately efficient bargains.
3 Since djw
dL3 = R"' (L) +R" (L) ~2^“^ £~) _6 £r (L) +tt-R' (L) L^
and .2d w = 0 evaluated at L=L*— 2dL
4 Under this specification it may be shown that
dw
dL
0V+ i
jslz
1iiiu=u
,2d w = - (N+w)(N-L)2 U
dL -
The contract curve becomes:
R' (L) -w = (w+L)
L = N-L
which represents points of interior maximum for the union
"(R=?)2 > jj [ R" (L) L+ l [R(L)+5-R'(L)L] ] •
The slope of the contract curve is:
dw _ N R"(L)-L R"(L) - R'(L) + 2w + 2L , „
dL ' N-2L < °
for N sufficiently large or L sufficiently small.
5 De Menil (1971) in an interesting analysis considers 
wage bill maximization using the Nash bargaining solution.
6 Dertouzos and Pencavel (1981) adopt a Stone-Geary form 
of the unions utility function, they do not consider 
efficient bargains but rather allow the union to select 
a point upon the firms labour demand curve.
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7. Derivation is as follows:
substituting (6.1.13) into (6.1.12) gives: 
u = [jffi-A jq lb
differentiating
i a-1
I liii
L'
- a [R(L[~A j “"1 [*' (L)L-R(L)+A j L 6+g|R(L)-Aj “ L^-1= 0
dividing by i a-1 ®_1and L yields
•I*
(L)L-R(L)+A 
t2 ] L + 6 0
Using l-a=8 and rearranging gives:
(1-8)R'(L)L + (20-1)(R(L)-A) = 0  as required
8 The interpretations given are of course not exhaustive.
9. The most intuitively straight forward way of verifying 
the comparative static results is to evaluate the polar 
cases u=0, a=6 and 6=0 and then use the linearity of 
the efficiency loci to make the generalization.
10. This solution will only be approximately efficient when 
the efficiency loci are non-linear.
11. Generally we have (w*,L*)=(0(w1)+(1-0)(w2),0(Lj_)+(1-0)(L2))
where subscripts 1 and 2 refer to monopsonistic and 
monopolistic levels of wages and employment respectively.
12. To obtain the slope of the contract curve totally 
differentiate (6.2.9) to give:
dw w + u._ LLwIjUW + U.ww V
dL f2 ap /3x\2 .2a x f ap x (I.) +p(x(L) ,H)11
TTx N + — 7aii L 3x J
«w
which can be negative if uw is sufficiently large.
13. The diagram is as drawn since by (6.2.10) the contract 
curve must move downwards if u is small, hence the 
tangency point with each indifference curve must lie 
to the right implying that the isoprofit map must be 
flatter as drawn.
14. This suggests that the solution is sensitive to both 
the distance between the two opportunity cost curves _;L
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and also their location in bargaining space.
15. Presuming the good is normal.
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7. m ac r o e c o n o m i c implications of b a r g a i n i n g
7.1 Simple Single Sector Analysis
In this section labour market bargaining is introduced into 
a simple Malinvaud (1977) , Barro and Grossman (1971) type 
macroeconomic model. The purpose of this analysis is to 
examine how wage rate endogenization by bargaining effects 
the properties of a macroeconomic model, particularly the 
comparative static effects of fiscal policy. The model will 
also provide clarification of some conjectures made by 
McDonald and Solow (1981) that bargaining may explain sluggish 
real wage adjustment.
A very simple specification of the economy will be adopted.
It will be assumed that a representative firm employs some 
proportion of N identical workers to produce a homogeneous 
output. This output is purchased by the government and both 
employed and unemployed workers. Unemployed workers consume 
by spending an unemployment benefit wage paid by the govern­
ment. Workers each supply one unit of labour inelastically 
and are represented in the bargaining process by a single 
representative union. The bargaining process is continuous 
and an efficient outcome is always achieved. All members 
of the labour force belong to the union.
Two cases are studied, in model 1 the price of output is 
fixed. In model 2
price adjustment ensures that the product market always 
clears.
(1) Fixed Product Price
The Firm: The firm is assumed a strict profit maximizer whose
maximand may be written as (7.1.1).
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Max tt = px-wL = F (L) -wL 
w, L
(7.1.1)
S. t L<L<N
F(L) is the production function, p=l is the normalized output 
price. L number of workers on the payroll L number of 
workers actually used in production. N total working 
population. (7.1.1) implies that the firm may hoard labour 
L 11 as (7.1.2)
The Union: The union seeks to maximize the sum of the
w,L
where V(w) is the indirect utility function of an employed
benefit w from the government. There is no specific utility 
or disutility attached to employment per se.
Workers; The N identical workers each supply one unit of 
labour and demand output as (7.1.4)
Government; The government purchases output g, it has its 
demand satisfied before workers are supplied, pays unemploy­
ment benefit w and levies a 100% profits tax. In the short- 
run it finances any deficits by printing money.
As in the standard fix-price literature reviewed earlier, 
there are several feasible regimes which may be identified 
as arising in this structure. Each equilibrium will be 
characterised by the level of employment and labour hoarding 
on the labour market and whether the goods market is supply
L H L-L (7.1.2)
utilities of its members as (7.1.3)^
Max V LV(w) + (N-L)V(w) (7.1.3)
worker and V(w) that of an unemployed worker receiving
( x(w) if employed
i
) x(w), otherwise
(7.1.4)
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or demand determined, which possibility actually arises depends 
upon the levels of the exogenous variables w, g, p,and the 
particular bargaining solution adopted. There are eight 
possible outcomes as characterised by figure (7.1.1).
Figure (7.1,1)
* This is clearly a borderline case between 
regimes 2 and A.
ESG and EDG indicate excess supply and demand for goods.
LH and NLH indicate labour hoarding and no labour hoarding. 
Combinations of excess goods demand and labour hoarding are 
not feasible under any efficient bargaining solution. Hence, 
'irdine borderline cases, there are five regimes of 
1UU.I.-. . g.li (»lug, l 1*0*: .... i v.di ‘..it t.l 1-5
on figure (7.1.1). To examine these the Nash bargaining 
solution is adopted.
Keynesian Unemployment and Labour Hoarding 
Here the levels of the exogenous variables are such that the 
goods market is demand determined and unemployment together 
with labour hoarding occurs upon the labour market.
The Nash solution requires the two bargainers to maximize the 
product of their utility surpluses over their opportunity 
costs. In the case of the firm the opportunity cost is tv=0 
and for the union V=NV(w). Hence the joint maximand of 
the bargainers may be written as (7.1.5)
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Max Prod - [x-wlj L [y(w)-V(w)|] (7.1.5)
w,L
differentiating
3 prod 
3L
3 prod
ïïw
= x-2wL = 0
= x-wL _r fv(w) -V(w)~|L'^iw) J -
where x is demand on the product market (7.1.8) 
x - Lx(w) + (N-L)x(w) + g
(7.1.6)
(7.1.7)
(7.1.8)
Thus the three equations (7.1.6) (7.1.7) and (7.1.8) define 
an equilibrium triple {w,L,x} for a given w,N,p and g.
Expression (7.1.6) indicates that the solution requires 
revenue to be split equally between the two bargainers, the 
Nash is equivalent to a fair-shares solution or an equity 
locus as discussed in McDonald and Solow.
Using (7.1.6) to remove x from (7.1.7) and rearranging gives 
a surprising result
V (w) -V(w) 
Vw (w) = w (7.1.9)
The real wage upon this regime depends only upon the unemploy­
ment benefit rate, if this is constant then the real wage does 
not respond to changes in demand, so in sane sense, it is invariant 
over part of the cycle. McDonald and Solow working in a 
partial equilibrium structure conjecture this result, here 
it lias been demonstrated rigorously as occurrinq upon this 
regime, and as we shall see does not appear elsewhere. The 
intuition behind the fixed wage is interesting, it arises in 
all specifications of the unions utility function which 
assume the unions marginal utility of employment to be a 
constant. This is because maximization here requires that
the wage be chosen such that its marginal utility is just 
equal to that of employment, and then the level of employment 
is chosen to achieve the best distribution of revenue 
between the union and firm. The product of the two bargainers 
utility surpluses will thus be maximized.
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Given (7.1.9) the comparative static properties of the 
equilibria follow easily. Eliminating x from (7.1.8) using 
(7.1.6) gives (7.1.10)
(7.1.10)t - g + Nx(w)2w-x(w) + x«JFT
differentiating W.R.T. g
dL
Hi = 2w - x(w) + x(w) > 0 (7.1.11)
Since the x functions refer to demands by individual workers 
and 2w is ty/ice an individual workers income the standard 
assumption MPC<1 ensures dL/dg>0. An increase in govern­
ment expenditure raises employment, and since w is invariant 
with respect to g wdL/dg may be interpreted as the national 
income multiplier on this regime.
Since output is demand determined the effect of the increase 
in government expenditure may be obtained from (7.1.6) and
(7.1.11) to give
dx _ 2w
dg = 2w-x (w) +x ($] > 0 (7.1.12)
output upon this regime Increases with qovernment expenditure.
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a rise in unemployment benefit raises wages.
From (7.1.6) and (7.1.8)
S  = L[xw (W)~2]S  + (N-L)x^(w ) (7.1.14)
2w - x(w) + x(w)
the effect of an increase in unemployment benefit upon employ­
ment is ambiguous, since the first term in the numerator of
(7.1.14) is negative and the second positive, however, the 
second term is small when there is close to full employment 
and dL/dw will then be negative.
(7.1.14) and (7.1.6) give
= 2L[x(w)-x(w)+wx^(w)]^- + (N-L)x^(w) 
2w - x(w) + x(w) (7.1.15)
a sufficient condition for (7.1.15) to be positive is
- * 2 x(w) + wx-(w) > x(w) w
Thus a rise in unemployment benefit rate raises wages, pro­
bably raises output, but may reduce total employment. This 
is because the benefit increase has a direct effect upon 
product demand and an indirect effect through raising the 
unions opportunity cost and, hence, its allocation of revenue 
in the bargaining process.
The effect of a change in either government policy variable
upon labour hoarding will be ambiguous in siqn. Labour 
»1hoarding L may be defined as (7.1.16)
LH = L - L(x) (7.1.16)
where L(x) is the inverse production function. Hence the 
effects upon labour hoarding of changes in unemployment 
benefit and government expenditure are ambiguous,as (7.1.17) 
and (7.1.18) demonstrate.
*3L _ dL 3L 3x
dw~ dv5 " 35 (7.1.17)
= dL - 3L 3x
dg 3? "5g (7.1.18)
These expressions cannot be signed without further specific­
ation of the inverse production function.
If government expenditure and unemployment benefit rise with 
the result that the bargaining process yields full employ­
ment with labour hoarding then a second Keynesian regime 
is possible.
Keynesian Full-Employment with Labour Hoarding
If the product market remains demand determined at high 
levels of activity then the bargain may specify that all 
workers are employed even though not all are required to 
produce the output demanded. Here revenue is sufficiently 
high that the bargain requires full employment to distri­
bute it between the union and the firm in the way that will 
maximize the product of their utilities.
Since full employment is assumed the firms maximand must 
be rewritten as (7.1.19)
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Max TT = x - wN (7.1.19)
w
The unions maximand becomes (7.1.20)
Max V = V(w)-V(w) (7.1.20)
w
and output demand will be of the simple form (7.1.21)
x = N x(w) + g (7.1.21)
In this case the bargain has only to determine the employment 
wage. From (7.1.19) and (7.1.20) the Nash objective function 
depends only upon the wage rate and may be expressed as
Equations (7.1.21) and (7.1.23) define an equilibrium pair
(x,w)
Full employment has two immediate implications.Firstly, revenue 
redistribution between the two bargainers can only be achieved 
through wage rate adjustments. Secondly, changes in the 
unemployment benefit level cannot have direct demand effects.
From (7.1.21) and (7.1.23) a little manipulation yields a 
solution equation in w, (7.1.24)
(7.1.22)
Max Prod = [x-wn][v(w)-V(w)] (7.1.22)
w
differentiating
3 f^°d = [x-wN]vw (w)-N[v(w)-V(w)] = 0 (7.1.23)
Nx(w) + g-wN (7.1.24)
C3
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Differentiating with respect to 0, and g gives the compar­
ative static effects of changes in the governments two policy 
variables.
Thus both increases in government expenditure and the 
unemployment benefit rate raise the wage rate. Increased 
government expenditure raises revenue, some of which accrues 
to the union through the only possible channel,wage increases.
A rise in unemployment benefit lowers the unions utility 
surplus and requires a redistribution of revenue away from 
the firm to restore optimality to the bargain.
The effect of an increase in government expenditure on output 
is obtained from (7.1.21) and (7.1.25)
and the effect of a rise in unemployment benefit upon output 
follows from (7.1.21) and (7.1.26)
Output clearly rises with both policy variables since both 
imply an income increase, and output is demand determined.
On this regime the effects of government policies upon 
labour hoarding are clear as (7.1.29) and (7.1.30) demonstrate.
dw
dg [■(
V w) -Vww (w) [v(w)-v(w)] 
v „  (w) 2 >0 (7.1.25)
dw
dw (7.1.26)
(7.1.28)
GV25?
< 0 (7.1.29)
dL,
dg
H
< 0 (7.1.30)
With full employment and labour hoarding increased demand 
will reduce hoarding as shown.
There are two interesting implications of the analysis of this 
regime. Firstly^full employment can occur when there is a 
shortfall in effective demand. Secondly, by comparing this 
analysis with the other Keynesian regime it can be seen that 
wage variability, depends crucially upon whether or not the 
system is at a full-employment equilibrium. Unemployment 
is required for wage rigidity.
If, starting in a Keynesian unemployment labour hoarding 
situation,demand increases had eradicated labour hoarding 
before full employment was reached, then what might be 
described as a semi-neoclassical regime would obtain.
Semi-Neoclassical
On this regime the production function determines the 
level of employment such that product demand may be satisfied, 
bargaining simply requires that w is chosen to maximize (7.1.31)
Max Prod = (F(L)-wL)L[V(w)-V(w)] (7.1.31)
w
The first order condition is (7.1.32)
V(w)-V(w) = F(L)-wL
V (w) w L
(7.1.32)
2 «
and upon this regime output equals demand as (7.1.33)
F(L) = Lx(w) + (N-L)x(w) + g (7.1.33)
(7.1.32) and (7.1.33) define an equilibrium pair (w,L) upon 
this regime.
To examine the comparative statics of this regime,(7.1.32) 
and (7.1.33) are totally differentiated and rearranged in 
matrix form to give (7.1.34)
-
all a12 dw b^dw
a21 a22 • dL b2dw + dgL. -
(7.1.34)
where
V (w)[V(w)-V(w)]
- ."S'--------- .----  > 0
V w>
[F. (L) -w]L - F(L) + wL~l------ 7 ------J > 0
a21 = -Lxw (w) < 0 
a22 = *V (L) - x(w) + x(w) 0
b1
v w (w)
Vw (w) > 0
b2 = (N-L)x^(w) > 0
The sign of the determinant of the system (7.1.34) depends upon 
the sign of the element a22> Upon this regime it is easy to 
see that a22 > 0. Consider a small change in w, dw, which
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just increases employment by one worker, the extra output he 
produces will be F^(L) , and the extra demand he expresses will be 
x(w)-x(w). However, all other unemployed workers will now 
demand more output [x(w+dw) - x(w)][N-L]. Then 
Fl (L) = x(w)-x(w) + (x(w+dw) - x(w)][N-L] so FL<L) > x(w)-x(w) 
and 822 * 0. Then det[a] > 0.
The comparative static effects of changes in government 
expenditure and unemployment benefit follow by Cramers rule. 
Consider first changes in government expenditure.
Provided 822 > 0 increases in government expenditure raise 
wages output and employment. The effects of changes in 
unemployment benefit follow in the same manner.
(7.1.35)
(7.1.36)
(7.1.37)
< 0 if b^22 < ^2a12 (7.1.38)
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(7.1.39)
(7.1.AO)
Hence, increases in unemployment benefit unambiguously raise 
employment and output due to the demand effects, the effect 
upon the wage rate is ambiguous, however, when N = L then 
b2 = 0 i.e., when the system is close to full employment, then 
dw/dw > 0, or when there is a lot of unemployment dw/dw < 0.
Further expansion of demand would cause supply to 
constrain the product market at full employment output,giving 
a Repressed Inflation regime.
Repressed Inflation
With no labour hoarding and full employment the product market 
will be supply determined and workers will be rationed for 
their goods demand.
Hence the firms maximand must be rewritten as (7.1.A1)
Max tt = F(N)-wN (7.1.41)
w
and the unions maximand must also be rewritten to describe 
the goods market rationing faced by its members.
Max V = N[v(w,x/N)-V(w)] (7.1.42)
since workers are identical the assumption of a simple 
proportional rationing scheme seems appropriate.3
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Total output supply to consumers will be full employment out­
put less government purchases as (7.1.43)
(7.1.43) has the immediate implication that dx = -dgjany 
increase in government purchases reduces output available 
for consumers.
The joint maximand of the two bargainers may now be written 
as (7.1.44)
Given that the regime obtains the equilibrium is defined 
by any value of w which satisfies (7.1.46).
Changes in government expenditure effect the goods ration 
faced by individual workers and hence the marginal value 
of the employment wage. Using the fact that dx = -dg we 
may differentiate (7.1.46) to obtain the comparative static
4effect of a government expenditure change (7.1.47)
x = F(N) - g (7.1.43)
Max Prod = [f (N) -wN]n [V(w ,x /N) - V(G)} (7.1.44)
w
maximizing (7.1.44)
= [F(N)-wN]N Vw (w,x/N)-N2 [y(w,x/N)-V(w)] = 0  (7.1.45)
hence
fF(N)-wN]vw (w,x/N)-N[V(w,x/N)-V(ig')] = 0 (7.1.46)
dw _ _ dw --1 /Vx 
3g dx n \ W
As the marginal utility of the wage falls with a tightening 
of the goods ration the bargain raises the wage rate to 
compensate the union for some of the utility loss.
2 6 9
Changes in the unemployment benefit level effect the unions 
utility surplus and effect the wage rate via the bargain 
as (7.1.A 8) .
-NV. (v>)(3w y j
as? = (N) -wNj Vw w  (w ,x/N) -2NVw (w ,x/N) 51 0 (7.1. A8)
The wage rate rises to achieve the necessary revenue 
redistribution between the two bargaining agents.
I
On this regime any increase in government expenditure or 
unemployment benefit will only give rise to wage inflation.
A further regime-is possible,when government expenditure is
relatively high,the product market supply determined, and the 
marginal product of labour low, then the bargain may yield 
unemployment and goods rationing. This may be termed a 
Neoclassical regime.
Neoclassical Regime
With no labour hoarding,unemployment and rationing of consumers 
upon the goods market the Neoclassical regime may seem an 
unlikely possibility. Its existence is a consequence of the 
bargaining solution. The failure of the system to employ 
more workers when there is excess demand for their output, is 
possible because although increases in employment raise the 
unions utility they will cut the firms profit significantly 
if wages are high and the marginal product of labour is low. 
Maximization of the product of the two bargainers utility 
surpluses may prevent increases in employment. There will 
of course be no labour hoarding.
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On such a regime the firms maximand is as (7.1.49)
Max tt = F(L)-wL (7.1.49)
w,L
and the unions maximand becomes (7.1.50)
Max V = LV(w,n) + (N-L) V(ft) (7.1.50)
w,L
where n is defined as output available for consumption by 
an individual worker, the goods ration of an employed 
worker. It is assumed that unemployed workers have a low 
output demand and experience no rationing upon the product 
market. Hence n'may be defined as (7.1.51).
n - F(L) - 8 £ (7.1.51)
The Nash bargaining maximand may now be defined as (7.1.52)
Max Prod = [F(L)-wL]L[V(w,n) - V(w)] (7.1.52)
w,L
The first order conditions for maximization are:
— - [F(L)-wL]LVw (w,n) - L2[V(w,n)-V(w)]=0 (7.1.53)
■8- = [F(L)-2wL + FL (L)L] [V(w,n)-V(w)]=0 (7.1.54)
Equations (7.1.51), (7.1.53) and (7.1.54) define a Neoclassical 
equilibrium triple (w,L,n).
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The comparative statics of this regime are somewhat more 
complex than the previous four, however the system may be 
simplified by noting that (7.1.54) implies w and L must be 
chosen such that F(L)-2wL+FL (L)L = 0 '’»replacing (7.1.54) by 
this expression,and rearranging the other two conditions 
the regime oan be described by (7.1.55-57).
(7.1.55)
F(L)-2wL+FL (L)L = 0 (7.1.56)
Ln = F(L)-g-(N-L)x(w) (7.1.57)
To examine the comparative statics of the regime the system 
(7.1.5 5-5 7) .is totally differentiated and rewritten in 
matrix form to give (7.1.58)
n — r i
all a12 a13 dw
Vw (w)L .
- [ij— ;--=-. ] dW
a21 a22 a23 dL =
Vw (w,n)
a31 a32 a33 dn
0
-(N-L)x^(w)dw-dg
L J L J
(7.1.58)
where
‘11 - T + L— ) ~vww^w,n)(V(w,n)-V(w))“Vw (w,n)2 ] ] < 0
'12 = F. (L) - w - *- V (w,n) -I
a13 ” L
w
vn (w,n) vw (w,n)-Vw-(w,n) [v(w,ii)-V(v))]
Vw (w,i;)2 < 0
a21 -2L < 0
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a22 = 2fL<L> “ 2w + Fl l (L)L < 0
0
a31 " O
a32 = n ' Fl (L> - x(w) 0
Assuming a^ .j<0 and det[a]>0 ® the comparative static
effects of changes in government expenditure and unemploy­
ment benefit follow by Cramers rule. Consider changes in 
government expenditure.
An increase in government expenditure reduces output available 
to workers, the goods ration tightens. The marginal value of 
the wage for employed workers and hence the union falls, which 
suggests as indicated by (7.1.59) and (7.1.60) that wages 
and employment must rise to achieve the correct sharing of
dw
dg
a12 a13
a 22 a 23 > 0 (7.1.59)
all a13
dL
dg a21 a23
> 0 (7.1.60)
all a12
dn
dg a21 a22 (7.1.61)
the utility loss between the union and firm. Although (7.1.61) 
cannot be signed it would seem reasonable to argue that the 
direct effect of the increase in government expenditure 
tightening the consumers goods ration offsets any increase 
in output arising from the employment increase required to 
obtain the optimal sharing of utility loss between the two 
bargainers.
The comparative static effects of a change in the unemploy­
ment benefit rate are obtained in the same manner, writing 
b^ and b2 for the coefficients of dw gives
dw
dv5
dL
d*5
dn
dft
bl a12 a13
= o a22 a2 3 > 0 (7.1.62)
b2 a32 a33
|a|
all bl a13
— a21 o a23 < 0 (7.1. 63)
a31 b2 a33
|a|
all a12 bl
= a21 a22 o < 0 if | an a22b2+a21a32bl 1 > 1 a21a12b 2^
a31 a32 b2
lai
( 7.1. 64 )
The effect of a rise in the unemployment benefit rate reduces 
the unions utility surplus. A wage rate rise and an employ­
ment level fall as (7.1.6 2) and (7.1.63) are required to
2 7 4
achieve the correct redistribution of the loss between the 
two bargainers. The ambiguity of the effect of the benefit 
increase upon the goods ration arises because only employed 
workers are assumed to have sufficient income to encounter 
rationing, thus although there is clearly less output availa 
ble for employed workers to consume, there are also fewer 
employed workers and their share of available goods will 
rise.
These are summarized in table (7.1.1).
Table (7.1.1)
REGIME
1 V-(w,n)Vw (w ,n) - Vw-(w,n)[V(w,n) - V(w)) < 0 and
n - F. (L) - x(w) > 0 are necessary for these results.
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Using the comparative static properties of the model and 
the regime definitions, the regimes may be represented 
diagramatically in w,g space as figure (7.1.2).
Figure (7.1.2)
The model displays several interesting properties.
Increases in government expenditure raise both employment 
and output upon the Keynesian regime without giving wage 
inflation. Upon the Keynesian full employment regime 
demand increases generated by either an increase in government 
expenditure or unemployment benefit give rise to wage 
inflation together with an output increase obtained by a 
reduction in labour hoarding. On the repressed inflation 
regime no output effects are possible since there is full 
employment, both government expenditure and unemployment 
benefit increases, yield wage inflation. On the
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semi-Heoclassical regime, government expenditure increases 
raise output and employment but wages actually fall as a 
consequence of the bargaining solution. Unemployment bene­
fit increases raise both output and employment, but have 
an ambiguous effect upon wages. On the Neoclassical regime 
government expenditure increases raise output, employment 
and wages, however an upward revision of unemployment 
benefit reduces output and employment but causes wage inflation
(2) Flexible Product Price
If price adjustment clears the product market as in Dixit 
(1976) and Bliss (1974), then the unions utility function 
must be rewritten as (7.1.65)
Max V = LV(w,p) + (N-L) V(G,p) (7.1.65)
w , Li
and the firms maximand as (7.1.66)
Max tt = pF(L)-wL (7.1.66)
w,L
it will be assumed that the firm is a price taker and that 
price is determined by the product market equilibrium 
condition (7.1.67).
x = L x(w,p) + (N-L) x(i),p) + g = F(L) (7.1.67)
Since the firm cannot be demand constrained and is a price 
taker all labour employed will be used in production of 
output. No labour hoarding can occur. An equilibrium may 
be defined by (7.1.67) and the solution to the bargaining 
problem. Again adopting the Nash bargaining solution, the 
joint maximand may be written as (7.1.68)
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Max Prod = [px-wLjLfvfWjpJ-ViQfp)]] 
w,L
maximizing (7.1.68)
9 prod 
Dw = px-wL-L
V(w,p)-V(ft,p) 
_ Vw (w,p) = 0
(7.1.68)
(7.1.69)
= px-2wL = 0
rearranging (7.1.69) and (7.1.70)
p F(l ,-w l . l [v « ^ , - ^ - p »;
pF(L) = 2WL
(7.1.70)
(7.1.71)
(7.1.72)
Thus (7.1.67) (7.1.71) and (7.1.72) define an equilibrium 
n-tuple {w,p,L,x}. To obtain the comparative static prop­
erties of the model we totally differentiate the equilibrium 
conditions to give (7.1.73).
(7.1.73)
all a12 a13 ~ dL “ b^dO
a21 a22 a23 dw = 0
- a31 a32 a33- - dp b^dO - dg
where
U  ■ *!«■' - “ - [y^ ^ ? ,P>] ‘ °
= -L - ri-^MW.(W-«P) CV(w,p)-V(ft,p)j L  0
1 L Vw (w,p)2 J
= F (L) - [ W^,P } ~vp(w >P)J (w, P)-VWJ3(w>p),[v (w,p)-V«»,p)|
13 L V w(w,p)r * 0
a21 = pFL^L  ^ “ 2w < 0
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a22 
a2 3 
a31
a32
a33
= -2L < 0 
= F (L) > O
= x(w,p)-x(G,p)-FL (L) < 0 
= xw (w,p)L > O
= L x (w,p) + (N-L)x (G,p) >P P
= V 0)
Vw <w,p) < 0
O
fc>3 = - (N-L) x^(&,p) < 0
Assuming a13, a31 < 0 then det [a] > 0  if I an.a22a33 ^ <
a12a23a31+a21a32a13“a31a22a13_a21a12a33-a32a23all;inspection 
suggests that this will not be a strong assumption to make.
Using Cramer's rule the comparative statics of the model 
follow.
dL a12 a13 > 0 (7.1.74)dg a22 a2 3
1 a
dg ? l (l )
dL
dg > 0 (7.1.75)
dw 311 a13
dg a31 a33
> 0 (7.1.76)
l a
= _dg
all
a21
a12
a22
> 0 iff< alla22-a21a12 (7,1
|a|
Thus an increase in government expenditure raises employment 
and output and gives rise to wage inflation. The ambiguity 
of the effect of an increase in government expenditure upon
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the price level arises since employment and hence output supply 
increase for two reasons,firstly in response to the demand 
increase/and secondly to redistribute utility between the 
two bargainers. The large output increase may give rise to 
an eventual fall in price upon the product market, the 
possibility that fiscal expansions will be deflationary is 
an interesting consequence of introducing wage/employment 
bargaining. This may be highlighted by totally differentiating 
(7.1. 72) and dividing by dg to give:
^2 = 2L dw + f2w-PFL (L)-) dL ,n , 7ox
dg FTL) dg [l HIT' J  dg (7.1.78)
which suggests that fiscal expansion will have a price 
deflationary effect when the initial equilibrium is 
characterised by a low level of employment, wages and output. 
The comparative static effects of a change in unemployment 
benefit follow by the same method.
bl a12 a13
II o a22 a2 3
> 0 (7.1. 79)
b3 a32 a33
|a|
dx
dff " V L>
dL
dv5 > 0 (7.1. 80)
dw
all bl a13
a21 0 a2 3 > 0 iff Ia21b3a13“b3a23alll
a31 b3 a33 < bla23a31+a21bla33
(7.1.81)
1 a 1
all a12 bl
i - a21 a2 2 0 > 0 iff 1alla22b31 (7.1. 82)
a31 a32 b3 < a21a22bl"a21a22bl_a21a12b 3
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The increase in unemployment benefit raises employment and 
output unambiguously, its impact on wages and prices depends 
essentially upon the bargain. If the rise in employment 
implied in (7.1.79) is large, because of both the demand 
effect of a change in Q and a requirement for a redistribution 
of the extra revenue between the two bargainers, then a fall 
in the employed wage may be required for this optimal revenue 
distribution. Large output increases may reduce the price 
of output because employment rises due to both demand and 
'bargaining' effects.
7.2 A Two Sector Flex-Price Bargaining Model 
The preceding section examined the introduction of bargaining 
into simple Malinvaud (1977) and Dixit (1976) type disequil­
ibrium models. In this section the flexible price model 
will be extended to include a second production sector. The 
important characteristic of the second sector will be that 
it hires labour upon a competitive non-unionised labour 
market.
In this more complex world the informational requirements 
and costs of bargaining are higher, consequently it may be 
argued that the process occurs at discrete intervals rather 
than continuously. This assumption which has the additional 
advantage of improving the tractability of the analysis,
Qwill be made. Bargains are struck upon the basis of 
expectations and revised periodically in the light of experience 
Interest will thus be focused upon the impact of government 
policy under a given wage employment bargain, and the way in 
which bargains will be revised when expectations are proven
Incorrect.
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Initially two further simplifying assumptions will be made.
Both labour and capital will be assumed inter-sectorally
9immobile in the short run.
(1) The Unionised Production Sector
In this sector a given labour pool of workers, who 
inelastically supply one unit of labour each, are repre­
sented by a typical union in wage employment bargaining with 
a representative firm. Since the price of output is assumed 
sufficiently flexible to always clear the output market and 
since individual firms are price takers all labour that the 
bargain specifies should be employed will actually be 
productive. There will be no labour hoarding.
The Firm: Is a strict profit maximizer whose miximand 
may be written as (7.2.1)
Max = p^F(L^)-w^L^ (7.2.1)
W 1'L1
S.t Lx < N
where N is the total labour pool of the unionised sector.
The Union: The union seeks to maximize the sum of its 
members utilities as (7.2.2)
Max V = Lx V(wlfPl,p2) + (N-L1) V(0,p1 ,p2) (7.2.2)
W 1'L1
Since labour is immobile in the short-run workers may be 
either employed in the sector, receiving the wage w^ or 
unemployed receiving unemployment benefit 0. The unions 
maximand is independent of the wage rate of the competative
sector.
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Workers: Each of the N workers supply one unit of labour 
inelastically at all wage rates which yield higher utility 
than the unemployment benefit level. They purchase output 
from both production sectors as (7.2.3) and (7.2.4).
Government: Purchases output from both production sectors, 
g-^ and g2,and has first claim on output. It pays unemployed 
workers benefit w and levies a 100% profits tax. If its 
budget is in deficit it finances its excess expenditure by 
printing money.
The determination of the level of employment and the wage 
rate in the unionised sector is achieved through bargaining. 
Again adopting the Nash solution, the maximand is as (7.2.5)
Max Prod = [v(w,plfp2)-V(w,p1#p2)] LjjjjFd^) -WjL^] (7.2.5)
With a little simplification, the first order conditions of
(7.2.5) may be written as (7.2.6) and (7.2.7).
(7.2.6) and (7.2.7) determine w^ and for given values of 
w2, p^ and p2; since it is assumed that the bargain is struck 
periodically it will be efficient while the values of w2,p^ 
and p2 upon which it was based persist. Two interpretations 
are possible here/either the firm and union are myopic in
if employed 
otherwise
(7.2.3)
if employed 
otherwise (7.2.4)
3 Prod
3w = PiFtLj^-WjI^ - v(wi'Pi*P2)"V(d'Pl'P2) L = 0 (7.2.6)
3 Prod
L vW](w1,p1,p2) J 
- p 1[f (l 1)+fl 1(l1)] -w 1(1+l1) = 0 (7.2.7)
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which case w2,p^, and p2 are the current values of prices, 
or the bargainers predict these prices and base the bargain 
upon expectations. For simplicity it will be assumed both 
bargainers share the same expectations.
(2) The Non-Unionised Production Sector
In this sector there is no bargaining. A representative 
competative firm treats both wages and prices as parametric 
and employs some or all of the R workers in the labour pool 
so as to maximize its profit.
The Firm: Maximizes its profit subject to a labour supply 
constraint as (7.2.8)
Max 7T2 = p2G(L2) - w 2L2 (7.2.8)L 2
S.t L2 < R
From which we obtain a labour demand function (7.2.9)
Workers! Maximize the utility gained from the consumption of
The analysis of the two production sectors may now be combined
1^2 ^2 (w2 »P2) (7.2.9)
and a goods supply function given by the production function.^-0
x2 = G(L2) (7.2.10)
output from the two production sectors. Giving 
rise to demands (7.2.11) and (7.2.12)
if employed
otherwise (7.2.11)
x2 = <x2 (w2'pl'p2) if employed 
othe rwise
(7.2.12)
(x2 (G,Pl,p2)
to examine the behavioural properties of the model. Two 
equilibrium concepts may perhaps be identified in this context
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A short-run equilibrium in which Wj^  and L, are fixed by the 
bargain and other variables adjust to establish an equilibrium 
which will persist only as long as the period between bargains 
being struck if the bargain is based upon incorrect expectations. 
A medium-run equilibrium arises if expectations upon which 
the bargain is based prove correct.
The scenario which will be studied below is as follows. It 
will be assumed that the economy is initially in a medium-run 
equilibrium, the government may thus use its policy instru­
ments to attempt to achieve policy objectives. The bargain 
may not adjust until it is next due for renegotiation, 
consequently the short-run impact of government policy 
effects only variables outside the bargain. Once the 
bargain is again restruck the change in the economic environ­
ment gives rise to an adjustment of wages and employment in 
the unionised sector and the medium-run effects of government 
policy measures are felt.
A medium-run equilibrium in the model may be described by 
equations (7.2.13-17).
F (L^ ) (w^p^pj) + 1 * 2 * 1  (W2 'Pi'P2) + (N+r-l1-l2) (01p1,p2) +g1
(7.2.13)
G (Li 2 ) “^^2  ^ w l'Pl'P2^ +^2 X2 ^ ^2 f P^ * P2 ^ ^  l""^ ’2^  ^ 2 ^ # Pi # P2) *^ 2^
(7.2.14)
1*2 (w2 • P2 ^ 1 ^
Pl[F(Li)+FL i (Li)] - w 1(l+L1) = 0 (7.2.16)
(7.2.15)
PlF(Li) - w^L^ - v(w1 , p 1, p 2 ) - v ( a >p 1, p 2)1 L _  0
vw 1(w i»P1»P2)
(7.2.17)
Expression (7.2.13) and (7.2.14) are the product market 
equilibrium conditions for the two sectors outputs, (7.2.16) 
and (7.2.17) are the distribution and efficiency conditions 
from the Nash bargaining solution. Condition (7.2.15) 
states that the labour market in the non-unionised sector 
will either be demand determined or will achieve full 
employment R. This suggests there are four medium-run 
equilibrium configurations characterised by the level of 
employment in each of the two sectors. The possibilities 
are :
(1) L1 = N , L2=R Full employment in both sectors
(2) L1 = N , L2<R Unemployment in sector
the non-unionised
(3) L1 = N ,L2 = R Unemployment in sector
the unionised
(4) L1 < N , L2 < R Unemployment in both sectors.
There is no role for government policy in (1) since in this 
case all resources are fully utilised.^ In the short-run 
there are thus two possibilities L2=R, L^<N and L2<R 
combined with either L^=N or L^<N since both w^ and are 
fixed in the short-run.
If full employment obtains upon the competitive labour 
market, then both sectors of the economy are capacity 
constrained. If the government raises either its purchases of 
the good or unemployment benefit this will simply 
bid up the prices of the two goods and raise the competative 
wage as indicated in figure (7.2.1)
Figure (7.2.1)
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P 2 > P 2
A more interesting case arises when there is unemployment 
upon the competative labour market, which represents a case 
of market failure since there does not exist an equilibrium 
competative wage. Define the minimum wage which will 
induce workers to supply labour as (7.2.18)
W2 = w (7.2.18)
The competitive labour market may thus be described by 
figure (7.2.2) .
Figure (7.2.2)
The intuition behind this possibility is that the wage 
employment bargain of the unionised sector provides very low 
levels of both wages and employment. The level of effective 
demand in the economy may fail to bid up the price of the 
good produced in the non-unionised sector, which may 
subsequently lead to a failure of the competitive labour 
market. The necessary government policy to remove this 
unemployment must give rise to an increase in the price pj 
to move the labour demand curve rightwards. An increase in 
government purchases the most obvious measure, however
an increase in g^ may also be very effective if the two 
goods are close substitutes. Determination of the correct 
expenditure policy to remove unemployment R-L^ will depend 
upon the shapes of the demand and Engel curves of the three 
groups of consuming workers. Adjustment of the level
of unemployment benefit may also be used to remove 
unemployment. In the scenario suggested by figure (7.2.2) 
no cut in ft can remove all the unemployment and indeed may 
increase it if the demand effects cause a large leftwards 
shift in the labour demand curve. A rise in unemployment 
benefit will increase demand for the good, bidding up its 
price,and may produce a sufficiently large rightward shift 
in the labour demand curve to remove the unemployment. This 
is particularly likely if there is unemployment in the union­
ised sector,since the increase in the unemployment benefit 
rate will increase income by dw(N-L^) which will have purely 
expansionary effects upon ?2 and hence L-.
The medium run effects of government policy will occur when
the bargain is restruck to incorporate the changes that
have occurred in P^»P2 and w. Totally differentiating (7.2.16)
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and (7.2.12) and rearranging in matrix form yields (7.2.18).
(7.2.10)
1
(
N
r
H
r
Or
H
r
H
<TJ
1
d w ^
b l d p l
a 2 1  a 2 2
d L l
—  —
b 2 1 d P l  +  b 2 2 d p 2  +  b 2 3  d w
where
*11
*12
*21
22
21
22
-(1+Ll) < 0
p£V Li> + > 0
-L- [ \ (W1,P1,P2)2 " Vw1w1(wl'pl'p2 )CV(wl'Dl'P2)
vWi (wlfplfp2)'
" V(v^ ,Pl,p2)]J < 0
V(w1>p1/p2)-V(w,p1/p2)'
Vw1 (wl ' P l ' P 2 ) < 0
-F(L1) +
- V
[f (lx) + fl^(l 1)] < 0
[VPi(Wi,Pi,p2)-V?1(a,Pi,p2)] VW i (w x,Pl,p2) 
\
w1p1(wl'Pl'P2)[V(wl'Pl'P2) ' v^'Pi-P2)]
Ww 1 (wl*Pl»P2)2
V^p2 (wl  * P i ' P2} -Vp2 (<* l pl '  P21 ] VW;L (wl ' P i  * P2 ] 
Vw1 (wl ' P 1 ' P 2 ) 2
-  Vw1p2 (wl ' P l ' P 2 ) CV(wl ' P l ' P 2)-v(<;)' P i ' P 2 )]  > 0
b23 = "L
V " ' P1'P2>
VW 1 (W1'P 1' P 2 )
Vw 1 (wl'Pl'P2).
< O
Hence the determinant of the system |a|>0.
If we assume b21<0 and that the government has pursued an 
expansionary policy raising both expenditure and unemployment
2b9
benefit since the last bargain was struck, such that dp1 
and dp2 are positive, then the influences upon the bargain 
and hence the medium run characteristics of the model are 
as follows:
dw^
dp^
bl a12 
b21 a22
> O
|a|
a, i b.
dLx
dp^
± X j. 
a21 b21 0 1 « “llb21 
> la h 1
|a| 1a21°11
dw^ -b22 “12 < Q 
|a|
dLi
dp^ b22 311 < o
1 a |
dw^
dw
“b23 a12 > 0 
1 a |
dL.1 =
w
b23 all > 0 
1 a 1
(7.2.19)
(7.2.20)
(7.2.21)
(7.2.22)
(7.2.23)
(7.2.24)
Although they do not tell a clear story the comparative 
static results do provide some interesting insights into 
the medium run effects of government policy in this type 
of economy. The comparative static effects upon wages 
and employment in the unionised sector of a rise in the price, 
P2, may appear somewhat strange. The rationale behind this 
result is that an increase in p2 actually increases the unions 
utility surplus, because it reduces the value of V(w,pj,p2)
more than viw^p^jpj), thus and fall to redistribute 
some of this gain to the firm. The effect of a rise in the 
unemployment benefit rate is most interesting in the short- 
run, the analysis suggests that if unemployment exists in 
the non-unionised sector a rise in benefit reduces unemploy­
ment due to its demand effects. In the medium run the rise 
in unemployment benefit reduces the unions utility surplus 
and thus a rise in the level of employment and wage rate 
are required to share the loss correctly between the union 
and firm, thus unemployment falls in the unionised sector.
In the case where there is unemployment in the unionised 
sector,but the non-unionised sector is employing all R members 
of its labour pool, there is a role for government policy.
The short-run effects of government expenditure and unemploy­
ment benefit increases will be purely inflationary, however 
their medium run effect upon the bargain may lead to a rise 
in both output and employment; a little inflation, particularly 
a rise in p^, is a good thing in this circumstance.
The basic implication of this analysis is that the existence 
of a unionised sector within a simple macroeconomic model 
does introduce rigidities in the form of a fixed level of 
wages and employment in the short-run. However in the medium 
run the bargain struck in the unionised sector adjusts in 
response to changes in the environment. Government expenditure 
and unemployment benefit levels should be chosen in the light 
of both their short and medium run consequences. The 
distributional effects of fiscal expansions upon the prices 
of the goods produced in the two sectors should perhaps be 
given close scrutiny as (7.2.19-22) suggest.
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7.3 A Two Sector Disequilibrium Model with Bilateral 
Monopoly In One Sector
In this section a model similar to that examined in 7.2 is 
analysed/the major difference being that here the fix-price 
method is adopted. All prices will be assumed exogenously 
fixed in the short-run>except the price of labour in the 
unionised sector, which will be determined by bilateral 
bargaining. The main purpose of this analysis is to examine 
how the existence of a  w a g e  employment bargain will modify 
the characteristics of the models rationing regimes, and to 
examine the comparative static effects of changes in such 
a bargain.
There are three types of decision makers in the economy firms, 
workers and unions, again there are two production sectors 
one of which draws its labour from a unionised labour pool, 
the other obtains workers on a competative labour market.
A representative firm and unicn formulation will be adopted. 
Workers will not be described by a representative individual 
since it is assumed each supplies one unit of labour 
inelastically as it is desired that the analysis considers 
unemployment rather than underemployment.
(1) The Unionised Production Sector
In the unionised sector it will be assumed that the firms
output price is exogenously fixed and that there is a given
12labour pool of N identical workers.
The Firm; Maximizes profit through periodic wage employment
bargains agreed with the union its maximand may thus be 
written as (7.3.1).
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(7.3.1)
S.t
F(L^) is the concave production function, L. the number 
of workers used in productive activity. the number of
workers on the payrole. N is the total labour pool, p^  ^
is normalised to unity.
Workers: The N workers belonging to the labour pool each 
maximize an indirect utility function as described by (7.3.2)
where 0 is again the unemployment benefit rate.
Hence the total demands for the two consumption goods by 
workers in this labour pool are as (7.3.3) and (7.3.4)
The Union: Bargains with the firm to attempt to raise employ­
ment and the sector wage, so as to maximize the sum of its 
members utilities.
The bargain struck between the union and firm must be 
efficient and satisfy some distribution rule. The Nash 
solution may be taken as illustrative/although other distri­
bution rules such as the fair shares solution suggested in 
McDonald and Solow (1981) could equally well be adopted with 
similar results. The Nash maximand is written us (7.3.6)
M a x  V
= (V(w1 |p1,p2) when employed 
otherwise (7.3.2)
*1 = L1x1 (w1) + (N-L^x^O) (7.3.3)
x2 = L1x 2 (w 1) + (N-L1)x2 (0) (7.3.4)
V  =  L j V t w ^  +  ( N - L l )  V ( G ) (7.3.5)
Max Prod I>(L1) -WjLj Li [V(wt) -V(0)] (7.3.6)
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The first order conditions for maximization are (7.3.7) and
(7.3.8)
. FILi) - 2WL ♦ - 0 (7.3, 7)
' F(ii’ -"iLi-Li
Vfw^-V«» 
- V w ^ w ^
= O (7.3.8)
Condition (7.3.7) is the distribution rule and (7.3.8) the 
efficiency condition the term 3Li/3L^ takes a value of unity 
when the bargain specifies no labour hoarding and zero otherwise,
(2) The Non-Unionised Sector
In this sector the prices of both output and labour are 
exogenously determined. There is a given labour pool of R 
identical workers.
The Firm: Is a price taker on both labour and output markets 
and hires workers to maximize profit in the standard neo­
classical manner.
Max tt2 = P2X2~W2L2 = G(L2)-w2L2
L~
(7.3.9)
S.t L2 < R
where G(L2) is the concave production function,the output 
price p2 is normalised to unity.
Thus since the only constraints the firm faces are given by 
the production function and the size of the competative 
labour pool, the firms notional supplies and demands may be 
written as (7.3.10) and (7.3.11).
L2=L2 *w2'p 2^
( x2 (w p ) 
min (
( G ( R)
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Workers: The workers in this sector maximize utility as
described by the indirect utility function (7.3.12).
( V(w2) if employed
V = ( (7.3.12)
( V(i>) otherwise
associated with these indirect utilities are the aggregate
product demand functions (7.3.13) and (7.3.14).
ilt—tX L2 x 1 (w 2) + (r-l 2) (0) (7.3.13)
X2 L2 x2*w 2* + (r-l2) x2 (0) (7.3.14)
Government: Purchases output from both production sectors,
g^ and g2, and has its demand satisfied before workers are
supplied. It pays the unemployment benefit rate Q to all
13unemployed workers and levies a 100% profits tax. It 
finances any deficit by printing money.
(3) Constraint Combinations, Aggregate Effective Supplies 
and Demands
The preceding sections examine how the various agents in the 
economy solve their notional maximization problems when faced 
by a vector of fixed prices. The notional supplies and 
demands will only be mutually consistent if the fix-price 
vector is at its market clearing constellation, typically 
supplies and demands will not match and the usual fix-price 
picture will emerge, here however the bargain in the unionised 
sector will produce some new possibilities. Figure (7.3.1) 
describes the possible constraint combinations.
Figure (7.3.1)
□
L,<R ___*x?<xf ___ L^. <N --- , x? < xf
" V "  V -  1 V x -  1 1
>L2>R ' , xf > xf — — t L1=N — -X xf > xf E
As figure (7.3.1) demonstrates there are 16 'routes' from 
A to B and thus 16 possible constraint combinations or 
disequilibrium regimes, superscripts D and S indicate demand 
and supply respectively.
Aggregate effective demands and supplies will thus depend 
upon both prices and constraints. On each regime a different 
combination of constraints impinges upon economic agents 
maximization problems, yielding different forms of the supply 
and demand functions. The responses of agents to quantity 
constraints depends upon the structure of the sector in which 
they are operating.
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Aggregate effective supplies and demands may now be defined 
as follows.
The representative firm in the non-unionised sector will 
always be upon its production function and will:
Demand Labour L„ = min |g * (x!^  )
r
(^2(w2 (7.3.15)
x® = min |x2 (w2 ,p2) (7.3.16)Supply Output
(G (R)
The representative firm in the unionised sector has its level 
of employment and wage rate predetermined by the bargain. The 
firm is thus either constrained in its output by the amount 
of labour the bargain specifies or hoards labour if demand 
falls short of that which its employee^ could produce.^ The 
amount of labour it hoards is described by (7.3.17).
H -a* ( V F'1(’I1>( o
(7.3.17)
The total effective demands for the outputs of the two sectors 
are obtained by summing the demands expressed by the workers 
employed in the two sectors, the demands by the unemployed
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and the government as (7.3.18) and (7.3.19).15
- li^ xj^ ' x2 ^ "^ *^2 X1 ^ 2  1 x2^  ^l” ^2 ^ ^ 1 ^  ^ "^"^1 (7.3.18)
x2 = Llx2 *wl'xl*+L2X2 ^ ^ l * + *K~Ll“L2* x2 +g2 (7.3.19)
s sThe inclusion of the terms and x2 recognises that agents 
demand for one good will be effected by a spillover effect 
if they are rationed in their purchases of the other. It 
is assumed that unemployed workers receive insufficient income 
to encounter a constraint and that the government is never 
rationed.^ K is the total working population, K=R+N.
The potential regimes of the economy may now be described 
by a set of minimum conditions as utilised by Muellbauer and 
Portes (1978).
Unionised Sector
x“ = F (L^ ) given by the bargain (7.3.20)
xj = ^lxl(w^/x2)+^2X^(w2 ,x2)+ (K-L^-I^)x^(ft)+g^ (7.3.21)
( x?x, = min (
(
(7.3.22)
L1 = L1 given by the bargain (7.3.23)
Non-Unionised Sector
xf = min ( x2 (w2 ,P2) 
1 ( G(R)
(x!:
x2= min (
(x£
LS2 = R
(7.3.24)
x2 = l ix2 (w1,x®)+L2x2 (w 2 ,x®) + (K-Lj-L2)x2 (0)+g2 (7.3.25)
S
(7.3.26)
(7.3.27)
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otherwise (7.3.28)
L.'2 (7.3.29)
Thus any short run equilibrium in this economy may be character­
ised by the wage employment bargain and the short-side market 
clearing rules as described by (7.3.20)-(7.3.29).
(4) Constraint Regimes and Their Comparative Static Properties
In the economy studied here there are 16 different constraint 
regimes but an exhaustive exposition of each is not provided. 
Attention is focused upon five examples which demonstrate 
the most interesting effects which the introduction of 
bargaining has upon the models comparative static properties. 
Keynesian Unemployment; A shortfall in effective demand for 
the output of both sectors combined with unemployment of 
workers in both labour pools.
The following inequalities hold: L^<N, I^R, x^<x^ x2<x2
Hence the effective demands of the regime may be written as 
(7.3.30)-(7.3.32)
and labour hoarding arises in the unionised sector as (7.3.33)
Thus the representative firm in the unionised sector faces
because of the wage/employment bargain. Any employees over 
the number the firm requires to produce the output demanded
(7.3.32)
(7.3.33)
a shortfall in demand for output, x^, but cannot sack workers
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‘
Hare simply hoarded, L . The bargain prevents the short-run
effects of a demand shortfall upon employment occurring.
The firm in the non-unionised sector also faces a demand 
shortfall, and thus reduces its workforce accordingly.
Since the novel component of this model is the addition of 
a unionised production sector attention will be focused upon 
how this changes the comparative static effects of changes 
in government policy, and how changes in the bargain effect 
the other variables.
For a given bargain the effect of an increase in government
purchases of output from the unionised sector raise output
and reduce labour hoarding as described by (7.3.34) and (7.3.35).
Since the only effect of an increase in government purchases 
in this sector is to induce the firm to use hoarded labour
workers demands for goods do not change, there are no 
multiplier effects. An increase in government purchases 
from the non-unionised sector has multiplier effects, 
increasing output and employment in the non-unionised sector, 
and raising output and reducing labour hoarding in the unionised 
sector as (7.3.36)-(7.3.39)
1 (7.3.34)
(7.3.35)
productively,17 no extra wage income is generated and
1
(7.3.36)
3-g~
(7.3.37)
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. D 
dXl
dg^ = Qci (w2)-x1 (i))]G'1,(xJ) dx°
dg2
(7.3.38)
dLH
dg2 « “F-1* (x ?) â*Dl dg2 (7.3.39)
(7.3.36) is the non-unionised sector demand multiplier. If
the government raises the unemployment benefit rate this 
increases output in both sectors and also raises employment 
in the non-unionised sector whilst reducing labour hoarding 
in the unionised production sector as (7.3.40)-(7.3.43)
. D 
dX2 = [k-l 1-g"1(x d2 Q x j  (G) (7.3.40)
)dô 1 - [x2 (w2 ) - x2 ((i)J G_1 (xD2
dL“
dw
= G-1' (x°2) dx°2 
dw
(7.3.41)
. D dx ^
dft
'= [k-Lj-G-1 (x^ ] x ’ (i))+[x1 (w2)-xx (0)] G-1,(x^)dx dw
(7.3.42)
dLH
dw = -F-1'(x?) dxl 1 “diT (7.3.43)
A change in the wage employment bargain, holding government 
expenditure and unemployment benefit constant,will effect 
output employment and labour hoarding as described by (7.3.44)- 
(7.3.47)
dx2 = [x2(w 1)-x2 (0)] dLj_ + (w1)dw 1 (7.3.44)
1 - [x2 (w2)-x2 «))] G-1 (Xj )
dLD2 = G-1' (x2)dxD2 (7.3.45)
dx°i = [x1 (w1)-x1 (ft)]dL1+ L1x|(w1)dw1+G_1 (x°2 ) [x1 (w2)-xx (0)]]dx£
dLH = dL1 - p"1'(x® )dxj
(7.3.46)
(7.3.47)
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Thus if both goods are normal and the change in the bargain 
involves the wage rate and level of employment in the 
unionized sector moving in the same direction, then an 
improvement in the unions position will raise employment 
and output in both sectors, the effect upon labour hoarding 
is unclear.
Keynesian Unemployment in the Non-Unlonised
Sector,______ Unemployment in the Unionised Sector: A
shortfall in effective demand for the good produced in the 
non-unionised sector and a shortfall in supply of the good 
produced in the unionised sector.
The following inequalities holds L1<N, L2<R, x^>x^, x2<x^,
Hence the effective demands and supplies of the regime may 
be written as (7.3.48)-(7.3.50)
(7.3.51) describes a rationing scheme where the demands of 
the unemployed and government are satisfied and the remaining 
output is divided equally between employed workers.
To obtain the comparative static properties of government 
expenditure increases differentiate (7.3.49)-(7.3.51) holding 
w^,L^, and Q constant to give (7.3.52)-(7.3.54)
x^ = Fd^) (7.3.48)
(7.3.50)
where = FO^) - gx - [k -L1-g'1(x2)]x 1 (G) (7.3.51)
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^Jlx2,x1 (wl'xl)+L2x2 ,Xj (w2 ,x1)]dx1+dg2 ( 7 .3 .5 2 )
(7.3.53)
dx
dgx - G (x° J'fx^iW-xJ dx1D2 (7.3.54)1
an increase in government expenditure upon either good will 
increase output and employment in the non-unionised sector. 
An increase in government purchases of the good produced 
in the unionised sector tightens the ration on that good 
faced by employed workers making them switch expenditure to 
the other good,hence raising demand and thus output and 
employment. A rise in unemployment benefit has similar 
effects as described by (7.3.55)-(7.3.57)
Clearly output and employment in the non-unionised sector 
rise when unemployment benefit rises, due to the increase 
in demand for the sectors output arising from the increased 
income of the unemployed and from the demand 'switching' 
effect due to the tightening of the goods ration faced by 
employed workers.
A change in the wage employment bargain involving a rise in 
both employment and wages in the unionised sector has the
dxD (w)dv> + ]L
1 + G 1 (x°) [x2 (ft) -
Lmmm1
(7.3.56)
(7.3.57)
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effects as (7.3.58)-(7.3.60)
[x2 (w2,x,)-x2 (Gfjdl^+j]:
1 + G 1 (x^ ) [x2(0)-x2(w2,x1)J
(7.3.58)
(7.3.59)
dx U ,(Ll)-Xi + x1(0)]dL1 + G-1' (x °) ^  (0)-xjdx°1
The effect of an increase in the wage rate and level of 
employment in the unionised sector upon the level of output 
and employment in the non-unionised sector, and hence 
overall employment, depends crucially upon the change in 
the ration dx^. Increased employment gives greater output 
as described by the production function, which may raise 
the level of the ration leading to a switching of demand 
away from the non-unionised sector good. If the direct demand 
effects upon x2 raising the level of demand for this good 
outweigh the switching of demand arising from the change in 
the ration level then output and total employment will rise.
If the demand switching effect dominates then the effect upon 
total employment of an increase in both components of the 
bargain is ambiguous. However if the ration actually 
tightens, due to the goods being distributed between a greater 
number of employed workers/then total output and employment 
unambiguously increase.
Full Employment in the Unionised Sector, Keynesian Unemployment 
in the Non-Unionised Sector: Here there is a shortfall in
demand for the output of both production sectors. There is 
unemployment in the non-unionised labour pool, but in the 
unionised sector a full employment contract is in force and
I mÊÊÊL
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i
the demand shortfall gives rise to labour hoarding.
The rationing regime is characterised by the following
Hence the effective demands of the regime may be written
Clearly the comparative static effects of changes in govern­
ment expenditure and unemployment benefit rates will be the 
same upon this regime as on the Keynesian unemployment 
regime. Increases in g2 and to raise output and employment 
in the non-unionised sector and lower labour hoarding. An 
increase in g.^ simply reduces labour hoarding.
The effect of a change in the bargain here differs from 
that on the Keynesian regime since any improvement in the 
unions utility must be achieved by an increase in the wage 
rate w^. The comparative static effects of such a change
inequalities. L1=N, L2<R, X° <x® , x2<x2
xj = N x1 (w 1)+G_1(xD2 )x 1 (w 2) + [r-G-1(x° )]x1 (0)+g1 (7.3.61)
x2 = N x2 (w ^)+G  ^(xR, ) x2 (w2) + £r-G  ^(x1^  )]x2 (w)+g2 (7.3.62)
(7.3.63)
and there is labour hoarding as defined by (7.3.64)
(7.3.64)
are described by (7.3.65)-(7.3.68)
(7.3.66)
(7.3.65)
1 + G-1 (xD2 ) [x2 (ft) - x2 (w2) 3
(7.3.67)
dLH -F"1'(xf)dxj (7.3.68)
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An increase in the union wage in this case raises output 
and employment in the non-unionised sector and reduces 
labour hoarding in the unionised sector.
C lassical Unemployment in the Non-Unlonised Sector,
Keynesian Unemployment in the Unionised Sector
In this constraint regime the fixed prices are such that the 
firm in the non-unionised sector desires to neither meet all 
demand nor employ its total labour pool. In the unionised 
sector there is a goods demand shortfall and the bargain 
specifies a level of employment less than the total available 
labour.
The regime is characterised by the following inequalities, 
LX<N, L2<R, x^<x® x° >xS2 .
Where the effective supplies and demands are given by (7.3.69)- 
(7.3.71)
The ration of the good x2 faced by employed workers is defined 
by (7.3.72)
There will be labour hoarding in the unionised sector as 
(7.3.73)
(7.3.70)
(7.3.69)
(7.3.71)
(7.3.73)
Only changes in relative prices effect output and employment 
in the non-unionised sector,the level of employment in the
unionised sector is given by the bargain. Thus the only 
effects that changes in government expenditure and unemploy­
ment benefit may have will be upon output and labour hoarding 
in the unionised sector as described by (7.3.74)-(7.3.79).
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, D dx^ CL1 xi,x 2 w^ 1'x2) + L 2 X1,x2(w2'x2)3 dx2+dg (7.3.74)
dx2 = -dg2 (7.3.75)
L1 + L 2
dLH = -F 1 (x1^  ) dx1^ (7.3.76)
Thus an increase in government purchases raises demand for 
the good produced in the unionised sector and reduces labour 
hoarding. In the case of g^ the effect is direct, in the 
case of g2 this occurs because the ration on the employed 
workers x2 tightens/ switching demand to the unionised sectors 
good.
d x  1  ^ l  X 1 , x 2 ( w 1 , X 2 ) + L 2 Xl,x2(w2'x2)J dx2
+ [k-I^-L1^ ] x  ^ (G)dv) (7.3.77)
dx2 = - Q c-Lj- L j ^ X j (G)di> 
L1 + L 2
(7.3.78)
dLH = -F 1 (x° Jdx1^ (7.3.79)
An increase in unemployment benefit only effects 
labour hoarding in the unionised sector.
output and
A revision of the bargain involving an increase in wages 
and employment will again only have repercussions in the 
unionised sector as (7.3.80)-(7.3.82)
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dxD = [ x ^ w ^ x ^ - x ^ G ) ]  dLx + L1
(7.3.80)
(7.3.81)
,TH -1' , D . . DdL = dL^ - F (x ^  ) dx ^ (7.3.82)
Employment rises as defined by the bargain, labour hoarding 
will fall if the demand effects of increasing w1 and 
raise the amount of labour used productively by more than 
the bargain specifies total employment must rise.
Full Employment in the Unionised Sector, Repressed Inflation 
in the Non-Unionised Sector; Producers in the non-unionised 
sector are constrained by the size of the labour pool and 
cannot meet- the demand for their output. The bargain 
specifies full employment in the unionised sector despite 
a shortfall in demand for its output.
The regime is characterised by the following inequalities: 
L1=N, L2=R, x1^  <x® , x2 > x|
The effective supplies and demands in this case are (7.3.83)- 
(7.3.84)
where the rationing on the good x2 is defined by (7.3.85)
(7.3.83)
x| = G(R) (7.3.84)
x2 = G(R)-g2 (7.3.85)
K
labour hoarding may be defined by (7.3.86)
(7.3.86)
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The only role for government policy upon this regime is to 
reduce labour hoarding as described by (7.3.87)-(7.3.89)
dx2 = (7.3.87)K
dxi° = x1/x2(w 1'x2)+R x2,x2(w2'x2)] dx2+d9l (7.3.88)
dbH = -F*1 (x£)dx° (7.3.89)
An increase in government expenditure on either good will 
reduce labour hoarding. Any change in the bargain will 
entail only a change in the wage rate( a rise in which will 
reduce labour hoarding as (7.3.90) and (7.3.91)
dx° = N w (w^x^dwj^ (7.3.90) •
dLH = -F-1'(xj)dxj (7.3.91)
A listing and brief characterisation of the constraint 
regimes not discussed in this section may be found in the 
appendix to this chapter.
The regimes examined demonstrate how the wage employment 
bargain will modify the comparative static properties of a 
two sector fix-price model. In the short- run the bargain 
places an upper limit upon the amount of output that may 
be produced in the unionised sector, and also it makes 
the level of wage income in the sector insensitive to 
changes in other sectors. The bargain provides a rationale 
for labour hoarding and consequently may throw some light 
on how the average productivity of labour varies.
In the analysis presented in this section a simple two sector 
general equilibrium model has been examined when four basic 
market inperfections are introduced.
Firstly, prices do not adjust sufficiently rapidly to equil­
ibriate supplies and demands. This creates the usual conse­
quences of rationing and spillover effects. In the face of 
such an imperfection, government expenditure policies have 
been shown by Muellbauer and Portes (1978) for example, to be 
able to raise output and employment as required. Here there 
are further imperfections.
Secondly/there is the problem of labour immobility. In the 
short-run workers belong to the labour pool of a particular 
production sector. If unemployment exists in a particular 
labour pool but not in others then policies designed to 
alleviate the problem need to have the correct distributional 
characteristics or the problem may be exacerbated.
Thirdly the. labour supply of an individual worker is inelastic 
or institutionally fixed implying,together with labour 
immobility/that if excess demand exists for the sectors 
output policies such as payroll subsidies cannot induce an 
increase in labour supply and output.
Finally, fourthly and most importantly, trade unions are 
active in one sector of the model, with the consequence that 
the wage rate and level of employment in the unionised sector 
are determined by a bargaining solution to the problem of 
bilateral monopoly. Employment in this sector is not 
immediately responsive to changes in government expenditure, 
which must work through the bargaining process changing 
either the efficiency or distributive conditions of the bargain
These, arguably realistic, market imperfections produce many 
new fix-price regimes which suggest that government demand 
management policies should be designed on a sector specific
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basis rather than in aggregate.
In conclusion it is suggested that unionisation of some 
labour pools and the introduction of bargaining is an 
acceptable method of endogenizing some wage rates. 
Unionisation cannot simply be 'tacked on’ to a fixed-price 
model but has several behavioural consequences some of 
which have been investigated in preceding sections.
FOOTNOTES
1. By adopting this form of the unions utility function it 
is being implicitly assumed that hiring is random.
2. The necessary condition is
3. As has been pointed out a proportional rationing scheme 
is manipulable and may lead to overbidding of demands 
by agents. See Drazen (1980) for a discussion.
4. The necessary condition is 
Vx (w,x/N) > [FW- w N J V ^ w . x / N )
5. The other possibility here is V(w,n) = V(w) however 
substitution of this condition into the equilibrium 
conditions demonstrates that this cannot occur.
6. The condition for det[a]>0 is an a22>a21a12
7. The ai3 term is important here, if V^tw.n) is large 
then the unions utility loss when the ration tightens 
is also large and the wage and level of employment 
must rise as argued.
8. It might be argued that there are lags and costs involved 
in obtaining the information to 'check' the bargain,
and it is for these reasons that it is only renegotiated 
periodically.
9. We may introduce labour mobility by rewriting the unions 
objective function as:
where a is that proportion of the working population who 
are mobile in any period.
10. The added complication of inventories is not introduced 
here despite its potential interest.
11. Unless government policy is designed to have distributional 
effects.
12. The union operates a closed shop.
13. This assumption is made for convenience, alternatively we 
could assume either that the MPC out of profit Income is 
less than that out of wage income, or that profits are 
distributed at the end of the period. Neither would 
qualitatively effect the results.
2L[x(w) - x(w) + wx^(w)]^ + (N-L)x^(w) > 0
N+a(R-L2) R+a(N-I^) V(wjP!iP2)
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14. If overtime were worked the firm would have a little 
more flexibility.
15. It will be assumed that the effective demand functions 
are continuous, this seems reasonable given K is large.
16. It is assumed that the government, being a large 
purchaser, is given priority by firms and is never 
rationed.
17. This will effect the level of the firms profit, 
however this will have no demand effect in the short- 
run. The role of profit in such models is discussed 
by Malinvaud (1981).
18. See Neary and Roberts (1980) or Comes (1979).
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where x
F (N) - [r-f_1(x°)] x2 (ô)-gi
1 N + L2
Classical Unemployment in the Non-Unlonised Sector, Full 
Employment in the Unionised Sector The firm in the non- 
unionised sector is on the short-side of both markets. In 
the unionised sector the bargain specifies full employment, 
but there is some labour hoarding due to a demand shortfall. 
Constraints: 1^ = N, L°<R, x°<x®, x° > x®
Effective Supplies and Demands
x° = N x^w^Xj) + L°(w2,p2)x1 (w2,x2) + [R-L2 (w2 ,p2)]x1 (€»+g1
S S , ,x2 = x2 (w2 ,p2)
L2 = L2 *w 2'p 2*
Classical Unemployment in the Non-Unionised Sector,
Repressed Inflation in the Unionised Sector. Workers are 
constrained on both output markets. Full employment obtains 
on the unionised labour market, the firm is on the short-side
of the non-unionised labour market.
D D S D SConstaints: = N, L2 < R, x^ > x^, x2 > x2
Effective Supplies and Demands
where
x.
xf = F(N)
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Underconsumption in the Non-Unionised Sector: Keynesian 
Unemployment in the Unionised Sector; Available labour just 
produces the output demanded in the non-unionised sector, 
clearly a boundary case. A demand shortfall gives labour 
hoarding and unemployment on the unionised sector.
Constraints: N, L2 = R,
Effective supplies and demands
u
X1 = L1X1(W1) + Rx^(w2
X2 = L1x2(w 1) + Rx2 (w 2
4° = G_1(x2) = R
_ H „ -1 , D.L = L! “ F (Xj^)
(N-L1) x1 (GJ+gj^ 
(N-L1) x2 ( f t )+g2 = G (R)
Underconsumption in the Non-Unionised Sector: Unemployment in 
the unionised sector and an excess of demand for output 
from the unionised sector. Again a boundary case in the 
non-unionised sector. Workers are rationed for the output 
of the unionised sector, since the bargain provides 
insufficient labour to achieve the required level of production.
D S D SConstraints: < N, = R# > x^, x2 - x2
Effective Supplies and Demands
S
X1 = F(L1)
D
X2 = L1‘x2 (w j .Xj ) + R XjiWj,^) + (N-LjiXjid) + g2 ■ G(R)
. D
L2 = G (x ) 2 = R
X1
* F(LX)- gx - (N-Lj) Xjii»
R+L,
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ZHjiA Underconsumption The firm in the non-unionised sector 
is on its production function. There is full employment 
in the unionised sector together with labour hoarding arising 
from a demand shortfall.
Constraints: 1^ = N, L2 = R, xj < x®, x° - x| 
Effective Supplies and Demands
X 1 = N Xj^W^ + R xi(w2) + gx
X2 = N X2 (w^ ) + R x2 (w2) + g2 = G (R)
T D ■1 , d .
L 2 = g" (xx) = R
L» = N - F_1(x°)
Underconsumption in the Non-Unionised Sector, Repressed 
Inflation in the Unionised Sector. The firm in the non- 
unionised sector is on its production function, demand 
exceeds full employment output in the unionised sector.
D S D SConstraints: = N, L2 = R, x^ > x^ , x2 = x2
Effective Supplies and Demands
x2 = N x2 (w1,x1) + R x2 (w2 ,x1) + g2 = G(R)
L2 = G_1(x2) = R
x® = F (N)
F(N) -
where x, = --------
1 K
Repressed Inflation in the Non-Unionised Sector: Keynesian 
Unemployment in the Unionised Sector. The firm in the
non-unionised sector cannot meet demand despite employing 
the whole of its labour pool. The firm in the unionised 
sector faces a shortfall in demand for output.
Constraints:  ^N, L2 = R, x^ < x^ , x2  ^ x2
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Effective Supplies and Demands
X1 = L1 xl^wl,x2^  + R xi^w2'x2^  + x^(0) +
xS2 « G ( R)
tH _ t „-1, D .L = L1 - F (x x )
where x2 = G(R) ~ 92 ~ (N-L1> x2 (<>)
Lx + R
Repressed Inflation in the Non-Unlonised Sector, Unemployment 
and excess product demand in the unionised sector The level 
of employment agreed in the bargain constrains unionised 
sector output.
Constraints: < N , L2 = R, X2>xl' x2 > xS2
Effective Demands and Supplies 
xG = F(LX)
x2 = G ( R)
No labour hoarding.
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». CONCLUSIONS
8.1 Summary and Results
The main aim of this thesis has been to review and make 
some contributions to disequilibrium macroeconomic theory.
Two themes have dominated this work, the role of expectations 
in disequilibrium models and the implications of introducing 
bargaining into a disequilibrium framework.
In chapters 2.3 and 4 the roles of expectations in Neo- 
Keynesian macroeconomic models were investigated. It was ar­
gued that the literature can be divided into two sections, 
non-Walrasian models such as Varian [1977] or Heller and 
Starr [1978] where equilibria are based upon self-fulfilling 
expectations, and models such as Malinvaud [1977], Muellbauer 
and Portes [1978] or Barro and Grossman [1971] which rely upon 
price rigidities to give the (temporary) equilibria. The 
three chapters concentrate mainly upon fixed price models 
since these appear to have the more immediate macroeconomic 
policy implications. The original contributions in each of 
these chapters arise from a simple objection to the way fix- 
price models such as Malinvaud are conceptually formulated.
Fix-price analysts argue that there is no agent within 
an economy whose role is to organize perfect price adjustments 
(the Walrasian auctioneer) and as a consequence any equilibria 
must be established through the adjustment of quantities.
This seems a reasonable proposition. There is no tâtonne­
ment upon prices. Therefore, not all desired transactions 
can be completed and quantity adjustment consequently occurs. 
However it is then argued that at given prices a tâtonnement 
process on quantities operating according to some given
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rationing scheme establishes an equilibrium as defined either 
by Benassy [1975] or Dreze [1975]. The assumption of a per­
fect, frictionless quantity tatonnement process in this con­
text seems particularly unpalatable and chapters 2 and 3 of 
this thesis modify this assumption^whilst chapter 4 investi­
gates the consequences of replacing it with sequential 
trading at fixed-prices. Once the assumption of a perfect 
frictionless quantity tatonnement is abandoned or modified 
then quantity constraint expectations within the current 
period become important. This seems to have been recognized 
at least partially by Benassy [1975,appendix] and Honkapohja 
and Ito [1980].
In chapter 2 two significant modifications are made to 
the simple basic fix-price model. First it is assumed that 
at the start of each market period agents hold subjectively 
certain expectations of the levels of trades they may carry 
out on the various markets. If these expectations are less 
than their desired trades these are regarded as rations and 
are used to calculate desired transactions upon unrationed 
markets, i.e. there is a notional spillover effect. Further 
it is then assumed that once made market offers may only be 
revised downwards either due to productive adjustment costs 
or an inability to find another agent willing to recalculate 
all his trades so as to complete the other side of the 
desired transaction. With this mechanism a treatment with 
several interesting properties is obtained. What is 
termed the Keynesian expectational regime is investigated 
in depth, with results upon the expectational repressed in­
flation and classical regime following in a similar manner.
The regime is termed expectational Keynesian since it is
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the worker/consumers expectation of a shortfall of demand 
for his labor which causes him to reduce his goods purchases. 
The effects of change in government policy instruments, 
goods purchases, lump sum transfers/taxeson firms or consumers, 
have been shown to have different effects in one period and 
over a succession of periods and also to have placebo effects 
if "announced" at the start of the current period. Perhaps 
the most interesting is the impact of government expenditure 
policy in the short-run on the expectational Keynesian regime. 
If an expenditure increase is carried out unannounced it 
raises employment and output but does not raise consumption 
until the next period when expectations adjust. If however 
an expenditure increase is announced/in the form of the 
government giving an undertaking to purchase sufficient out­
put to maintain full-employment/then workers will not an­
ticipate any rationing upon the labor market and their goods 
demand alone will be sufficient to establish a full employ­
ment equilibria. The government then has no need to pur­
chase any output. Similar results obtain with the govern­
ment reducing expenditure upon the repressed inflation regime. 
Also interesting is the way the equilibria adjust over a 
succession of periods in response to expectations and money 
balance adjustments. If government policies are held con­
stant and the system is initially in an expectational 
Keynesian unemployment equilibrium, then expectations and 
money balances adjustments will push the system out along 
the production function with increasing levels of output, 
employment and consumption in successive periods until an 
orthodox Keynesian type unemployment equilibrium is 
established. The economy in an expectational regime does
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display a self-adjustment mechanism, but towards a standard 
fix-price equilibria^not towards full Walrasian equilibrium.
On first inspection the assumptions made in this section 
may seem strong, however the analysis is intended to demon­
strate the implications of imperfect quantity adjustment and 
the effect of current constraint expectations upon current 
market transactions offers. These ideas were carried one 
stage further in chapter 3 where adjustment costs were intro­
duced explicitly into the quantity adjustment process. In 
section 3.2 adjustment costs take the form of resources con­
sumed in the adjustment process, firms and consumers are 
aware of these adjustment costs but have to state initial 
transactions demands before the true state of the world, as 
characterized by the quantity constraints they face, is 
known. Consequently initial transaction demands are cal­
culated upon the basis of maximizing Von Neumann-Morgenstern 
objective functions. These offers maximize expected utility 
from trade net of expected adjustment costs. On learning 
the true state of the world^s characterized by their sets 
of feasible trades/agents then adjust optimally away from 
their initial transactions demands. Again only "Keynesian" 
cases were examined in detail, however analysis of the re­
pressed inflation cases follows immediately. Several in­
teresting features were shown to arise. The calculation of 
an agents initial transaction offer is complex since it is 
chosen simultaneously with the level of transactions that the 
agent wishes to complete once the state of the model has been 
revealed, the planned adjustment away from the initial trans­
action offers. The initial transactions offer could be
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generated by three different demand functions and could switch 
between them with changes in the models parameters. An 
interesting point which arises is that when the worker is opti­
mistic about his labour sales, he places a high probability 
upon being unconstrained, then further increases in optimism 
will cause his choice labour supply and goods demand to fall.
He chooses more leisure. The comparative static properties of 
this treatment are also of some interest, and it was shown, as 
perhaps might have been anticipated, tiiat several comparative static 
effects are similar to those in the model developed in 
chapter 2. However it is again noticeable that the system 
is generally less responsive in terms of output and employ­
ment to changes in government expenditure, for example, than 
standard treatments such as Malinvaud [1977].
In the fourth chapter of this thesis the role of 
expectations in tatonnement and non-tatonnement models was 
discussed, and it was suggested that the correct method of 
describing how a fix-price equilibrium is established 
should be by some sequential trading process. In section 4.2 
a simple model of a sequential adjustment process was de­
veloped. It was argued that in such a treatment expectations 
are of crucial importance since workers and firms, unable to 
trade upon both markets simultaneously,must base transactions 
upon one market on their expectations of trade possibilities 
on the other. Keynesian and Repressed inflation trading 
sequences are modeled,each of which was able to take one of 
two forms depending upon the decision making process in the 
sequence. If trade effectively takes place first upon the 
goods market then firms sell inventory to consumers who
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purchase from their current money stocks in anticipation of the 
income they may realize from labour sales at the next stage of 
the sequence. Firms, being on the short side of the labour 
market, will have no problems in purchasing sufficient labour 
to rebuild stocks. This describes one possible Keynesian 
trading sequence, the dynamics of which arise from workers 
not knowing the firms production function and consequently 
not correctly anticipating the level of employment which results 
when they transact upon that market in the next instance. If 
anticipations are incorrect involuntary money stock decumula­
tion and expectations adjustment provide the dynamics of the 
system. Alternatively, if the decision making process is such 
that the labour market effectively meets first, then firms 
must decide how much labour to purchase in anticipation of the 
goods they will be able to sell when that market opens. Since 
firms do not know workers preferences these anticipations may 
be incorrect, and firms expectations and inventory stock adjust­
ment give rise to the system's dynamics.
Similar analysis was carried out for the repressed in­
flation regions under the two alternative decision making 
processes; upon this regime it was the firms expectations 
of labour availability and households exectations of goods 
availability which were crucial in defining the dyanmics.
The stability properties of these dynamic systems were 
examined and it was found that on both regimes either 
stable, cyclical or saddle point type behavior was possible.
These results are more complex
than the conclusion drawn by Bohm [1978] and Honkapohja
and Ito [1980]. Hence it was argued that in the stable cases 
the comparative statics exercises of calculating the Keynesian
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demand and repressed inflation supply multipliers were valid. 
In the cyclical and saddle point cases it was shown that 
government expenditures and money supply (repeated lump sum 
transfer) rules could be derived which would stabilize the 
system. An interesting result arose in the Keynesian 
cyclical cases. It was found that the simple reduction of 
government expenditure would stabilize the system, this gave 
a trade off in this regime between the expansionary 
effects of increases in government spending and the possible 
instability it might cause.
The stability properties of the quantity adjustment 
process are also important when considering subsequent price 
adjustment. A unstable quantity adjustment process would 
invalidate the use of the effective excess demand hypothesis 
to define price adjustments.
In chapters 5, 6 and 7 the second theme of the thesis, 
the determination of prices, was considered. In chapter 5 
the various approaches that have been proposed in the litera­
ture for endogenizing prices in disequilibrium (or non- 
Walrasian equilibrium) type models were examined. Each 
approach examined appeared to suffer from a number of 
conceptual weakneses, however, with the exception of the 
effective excess demand hypothesis, each clearly gave sign­
ificant insights into the problem. Particular processes of 
price adjustment seemed more plausable as means of describing 
the behaviour of some markets than others. Reality is 
clearly a combination of the processes.
In chapter; 6 and 7 rather than address the general 
question, why do prices adjust and how?, attention was focused 
on the mechanisms by which the price of labour, the wage
rate, might be determined. The argument that wages are 
determined by bargaining between a union and the employer 
was adopted and investigated in some detail. Section 6.1 
developed a simple bargaining model of wage and employment 
determination and examined the comparative static properties 
of monopolist, monopsonist, Nash and Market Power solutions. 
Utilizing the approach developed in 6.1, in section 6.2 
partial equilibrium analysis of the impact of disequilibrium 
regimes upon bargaining was carried out. Two scenario's 
which had the characteristic that the wage rate varied 
little but the level of employment considerably, were studied. 
The important element in these scenarios was the fix-price 
regime operating in the sector where unions members or 
the firms capital found alternative employment. In scenario 
1 it was assumed that the sector in which the union members 
had their alternative employment possibilities was 
characterized by a repressed inf lation type situation. Then 
a tightening of the constraints operating in that sector 
will produce offsetting effects upon wages and complementary 
effects upon employment. In scenario 2 it was assumed that 
the sector in which the firms capital could find alternative 
employment was characterized by Keynesian unemployment. 
Relaxation of the constraints in that sector was shown to 
produce offsetting effects both on employment and wages.
This analysis was somewhat exploratory In nature and 
reproduced independently, through somewhat more extensively 
some results obtained by McDonald and Solow [1981], In 
chapter 6 the effect of disequilibrium upon wage employment 
bargaining was examined. In chapter 7 the task of incorpora­
ting bargaining into a complete disequilibrium macroeconomic
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model was undertaken. In section 7.1 a simple single sector 
model was constructed and examined first under the hypothesis 
that the price of output is rigid and second that it adjusts 
to clear the product market. In both analysis the wage rate 
was determined by the Nash bargaining solution. When the out­
put price was assumed rigid some very interesting results 
arose. It was found that five fix-price regimes could arise 
depending upon whether supply or demand was on the short side 
of the goods market, whether full employment or unemployment 
was contracted for in the bargain and whether or not labour 
hoarding resulted. I.e., was the agreed employment level 
higher or lower than that required to satisfy demand for 
output. The model had two exogenous parameters, government 
goods demand and the level of unemployment benefit, paid by 
the government. The magnitude of the exogenous parameters 
determined which rationing regime obtained. Two regimes 
with Keynesian features, two with neoclassical features and 
one repressed inflation type regime arose. The comparative 
static effects of changes in government expenditure and un­
employment benefit upon the models endogenous parameters 
in each regime were investigated, and some interesting results 
were found to hold. On the Keynesian unemployment regime, 
(where the bargain gave unemployment and labour hoarding 
together with a shortfall in effective goods demand), an 
increase in government expenditure had no effect upon the 
wage rate. The price of labour, although endogenous, was 
found to be rigid. Upon the semi-neoclassical regime (where 
the bargain determined the wage rate and employment was 
determined by product demand via the production function) 
increases in government expenditure reduced the wage rate.
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On the repressed inflation regime (full employment and a 
shortfall of goods supply) increases in unemployment benefit 
raised the wage rate despite the absence of unemployment.
A full listing of comparative static results may be found 
in table (7.1.1).
Under the hypothesis that the product price always 
adjusts to clear the output market the simple single sector 
model produced less clear cut results, however it did appear 
probable that increases in government expenditure would 
raise output employment and wages but would have an ambiguous 
effect upon prices. An increase in unemployment benefit would 
probably raise output and employment, due to the extra demand 
generated/ but had’ an ambiguous effect upon both prices and 
wages.
The simple single sector model developed in section 7.1 
assumed that the wage employment bargain adjusted continuously. 
In section 7.2 a two sector model was developed with wage 
employment bargaining only in one sector. It was argued 
that in such a complex world continuous bargaining would be 
more costly and that bargains would be struck at discrete 
intervals and would remain in force for a specific period.
It was assumed that both labour and capital was immobile 
between sectors in the short run and that all prices other 
than the wage detemined in the bargain were perfectly flexible.
It was argued that the wage employment bargain would be 
struck on the basis of the firm and unions expectations 
about the prices that would obtain over the period it was in 
force. This suggested two possible equilibrium concepts.
A short-run equilibrium,established, given the bargain, by 
price adjustments upon other markets. The prices arising
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on other markets would differ from the price expectations upon 
which the bargain was struck. Consequently the bargain and 
equilibrium would change when the bargain was renegotiated.
A medium-run equilibrium would arise when the expectations 
upon which it was based proved to be accurate and subsequent 
renegotiation would yield the same outcome.
One of the most interesting consequences of adopting this 
structure was that involuntary unemployment can arise in 
either production sector both in the short and medium run. 
Unemployment can arise in the unionized sector as a con­
sequence of the bargaining process, where the union may be 
prepared to accept some unemployment in return for a higher 
wage. In the non-unionized sector unemployment may arise 
as a consequence of market failure, low levels of government 
expenditure together with a low wage employment bargain and 
a low level of unemployment benefit, may result in the price 
of the non-unionized sector output and hence its labour 
demand at each nominal wage being very low. The non-unionized 
sectors wage cannot go to zero as wages must exceed unemploy­
ment benefit to attract any labour.
It was found that in the short-run the government could 
cure the market failure problem by increasing expenditure 
on the output of either sector or by increasing unemploy­
ment benefit (given certain elasticity and substitution 
assumptions). The medium-run effects of government policy 
occurred when the bargain was restruck to incorporate the 
changes that occurred in prices. It was argued that if the 
government had pursued expansionary policies, raising 
expenditure and unemployment benefit such that output prices
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had risen, then the bargain could be effected in the 
following manner. A rise in the price of the good produced 
in the unionized sector and a rise in the unemployment 
benefit rate would tend to push the wage rate and level of 
employment in the unionized sector upwards. However, and 
perhaps somewhat counter intuitively, a rise in the price 
of the good produced in the non-unionized sector tends to 
reduce the wage and level of employment in the bargain. It 
was argued that this effect arose because an increase in 
this price reduced the value of unemployment benefit by more 
than that of the wage rate, consequently increasing the unions 
utility surplus. A reduction in wages and employment was 
then required to redistribute some of this utility gain to 
the firm.
The case where there was unemployment in the unionized 
sector, but full employment in the non-unionized sector was 
interesting. In the short-run expansionary government policy 
simply gave rise to inflation, with no real effects. In the 
medium run the effect upon the bargain was to probabily raise 
both output and employment in the unionized sector, particularly 
if the price of that sectors output had risen sharply. A 
little inflation, was a good thing.
It was argued that the existence of a unionized sector 
within a simple macroeconomic model introduced short-run 
rigidities, but in the medium run renegotiation of the wage 
employment aggreement took place in response to changes in 
the environment. Therefore government policy should be 
devised in the light of both its short and medium run con­
sequences .
In section 7.3a model very similar to the one examined
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in 7.2 was analyzed, however the major difference was that the 
fix-price method was adopted. This generated a large number 
of regime combinations depending upon whether demand or 
supply was on the short side of the two output and non- 
unionized labour markets, and whether full or unemployment 
with or without labour hoarding arose as a consequence of 
the bargaining solution. Sixteen possible constraint 
regimes could be generated, these were not all investigated 
thoroughly and attention was focused upon five examples which 
seemed the most interesting and plausable. Since the novel 
component of the model was the introduction of a unionized 
production sector analysis centered on how the existence of 
a wage employment bargain effected the comparative statics 
of government policy, and on how changes in this bargain 
affected the models other endogenous variables. The bargain 
effected the models comparative static properties in a number 
of ways. The fixed level of employment in the unionized 
sector implied that labour hoarding could exist, and if it 
did, then government purchases of that sectors output would 
have no multiplier effects. If the employment component of 
the bargain constrained output, then government purchases of 
the sectors output could be used to raise employment in the 
non-unionized sector. This was due to a tightening of the 
goods supply constraint for the unionized sectors output, 
causing consumers to switch expenditure to the non-unionized 
sectors output, giving a rise in employment.
The effects of changes in the wage employment bargain 
were typically dependent upon the regimes obtaining on the 
output markets. If the unionized sectors output market was
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supply constrained, an increase in employment and wages in 
that sector would have two offsetting effects upon employment 
in the non-unionized sector. Increased income would tend 
to raise output and employment, by raising demand. Increased 
availability of unionized sector output would cause consumers 
to switch expenditure away from the non-unionized sectors 
good, with a tendency to reduce output and employment. If 
however the unionized sectors output market was supply con­
strained at full employment output, any rise in the wage rate 
would increase demand employment and output in the non- 
unionized sector, provided that the market was demand con­
strained. However, if a situation of classical unemployment 
obtained in the non-unionized sector, then changes in the 
wage employment bargain would have no effect since the firm 
in the non-unionized sector would be on the short-side of 
both its input and output markets and would be unwilling to 
change its behaviour.
Further to its implications for the comparative static 
properties of the model, it was also argued that the wage 
employment bargain explained labour hoarding and consequently 
threw some light onto how the average productivity of labour 
varies.
In chapters 6 and 7 several of the implications of
wage employment bargaining in disequilibrium were examined. 
Firstly the actual mechanics of various bargaining solutions 
were examined. Secondly, the way bargaining inonesector might 
be affected by constraint changes in others was analysed, and 
then in chapter 7 some simple single sector models with con­
tinuous efficient bargaining incorporated were developed and 
analysed. Finally in sections 7.2 and 7.3 a pair of two
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sector models were introduced in which a bargain was struck on 
the basis of current parameter values. The bargain was assumed 
to be renegotiated at discrete intervals generating an iterative 
process. A bargain is struck, then prices and quantities 
adjust. After the institutionally defined time period, the 
bargain is renegotiated on the basis of the new information.
The general approach of this thesis has been to explore 
a number of areas within the main themes of expectations and 
bargaining. The aim was not to construct a single consistant 
macroeconomic model incorporating all the thesis ideas, but 
rather to make a series of suggestive contributions upon 
various aspects of both problems. Further developments along 
some of the lines examined are possible,and in the next section, 
a few tentative suggestions are made.
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8,2 Potential Further Developments
Neither of the problems addressed in this thesis has 
been exhaustively investigated either here or in the liter­
ature. There are many potential further developments. Dis­
equilibrium or Neo-keynesian economics attempts to build 
viable macroeconomic models with an acceptable choice- 
theoretic microeconomic base. Two lines for further develop­
ment immediately suggest themselves, improvements to the micro- 
economic basis and extensions of the macroeconomic models. 
There are two fundamental problems with disequilibrium eco­
nomics, firstly we do not have a good microeconomic explan­
ation of price adjustment (or lack of adjustment). Secondly, 
the macroeconomic models are too simplistic, and require at 
least the incorporation of investment and asset markets 
before they can be used to make useful policy prescriptions.
With specific reference to the contributions made in 
this thesis a number of possible refinements and extensions 
could be made. Most of the analysis could have been carried 
out in an open rather than closed economy context. However, 
reference to the survey of open Neo-keynesian models pre­
sented in the appendix suggests there are a number of alter­
native specifications which could be adopted. These would 
complicate the analysis considerably but would possible pro­
vide some interesting conclusions. The introduction of wage 
employment bargaining into an open economy framework might 
be very interesting. Chapters 2 and 3 examined expectations 
together with restrictions upon quantity adjustments in fix- 
price models. Extensions could be made to the models by in­
vestigating different forms of expectations adjustment, 
Bayesian learning may be easy to incorporate into Chapter 3's
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analysis. The behaviour of agents using the fix-price model 
to formulate their expectations might produce some interesting 
results. The work of Neary and Stiglitz (1981) suggests this.
In chapter 4 some very simple assumptions are made about 
firms inventory holding decisions, these could be modified 
to include a complete story of inventory holding costs and 
optimal inventories. The impact of constraint expectations 
upon target inventory stocks could provide some interesting 
extensions.
The introduction of a government issued bond as an al­
ternative form of deficit financing, could be made in the 
models presented in the first three chapters, this would in­
volve the specification of an asset market and bond demand 
functions. Further the assumptions made about profit through­
out the thesis were deliberately simplistic,the 100% pro­
fits tax could be replaced by the assumption that firms re­
tain some profits or issue equity. Profit retention or 
equity issue might be the way firms respond to constraint 
expectations.
In the two sector bargaining models, the specification 
of one sector as producing an intermediate or capital good 
for use in the other sector could lead to some interesting 
conclusions. A high wage low employment contract in the 
capital goods producing sector might create capacity con­
straints in the consumption goods sector producing a very 
undesirable equilibrium, with low employment and goods 
availability.
Further developments of the bargaining models might 
entail investigation of different forms of the unions utility
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function and different solutions to the bargaining problem 
(the Nash solution has been the mainstay in this thesis). 
Dynamization of the fix-price bargaining models is another 
potential development. If output prices at the end of each 
period adjusted according to some specified rule the 
evolution of the model over time might provide an interesting 
area for study. In the two sector models relaxation of the 
labour immobility assumption may allow the study of inter­
sectoral labour mobility and the union non-union wage diff­
erential, we might anticipate an equalization of expected 
wage income across the two sectors.
Clearly then the work of formulating a well articulated 
comprehensive disequilibrium macroeconomic model has yet to 
be completed. It is hoped that this thesis has made some 
helpful contributions and suggestions towards that end.
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APPENDIX
A Survey of Open Neo-Keynesian Models
In the main body of this thesis attention has been focused 
upon the role of expectations and the introduction of wage 
bargaining in disequilibrium macroeconomics. The analyses 
were carried out in a closed economy context for reasons of 
tractability. Several of the analyses would be interesting 
in an open economy setting, most particularly wage bargaining 
in an open model. This however is beyond the scope of this 
thesis.
There have been a large number of recent contributions to the 
literature on open Neo-Keynesian Macroeconomics, here only a 
brief review of the ideas and results of the main papers will 
be presented. A very extensive bibliography of the area may 
be found in Owen (1981).
The starting points for this literature are the simple fix- 
price models of a closed economy developed by Malinvaud 
[1977] and Barro and Grossman [1976], and the analysis of 
Dixit [1976] which assumes some prices are fixed whilst 
others clear markets. The literature may be regarded as 
divided into two strands, those treatments following 
Malinvaud, Barro and Grossman who treat all prices as 
exogenous parameters and those that follow the Dixit line. 
Open models with all prices Exogenously fixed will be 
examined first.
Dixit s [1978] contribution considers an economy in which 
there are three goods: money, labour and a tradable 
commodity. The prices of money and labour are domestically 
fixed, the price of the tradable commodity is determined upon 
the world market. The country may buy or sell all of the 
tradable it wishes at the going world price which is simply 
the foreign price multiplied by the fixed exchange rate. 
Agents cannot encounter rationing upon the goods market, 
excess demand or supply manifests itself in a balance of 
trade deficit or surplus. Rationing can however arise on the 
labour market since labour is assumed internationally 
immobile. Utilising Clowers dual decision technique Dixit 
divides wage price space up into regions of unemployment and 
excess demand for labour, and superimposes upon this a trade 
balance line as reproduced in figure Al.
Figure Al
where FE is the full employment locus, and BT is the trade 
balance locus. The four regions are (UD) unemployment and a 
trade deficit,(US) unemployment and a trade surplus, (ED) 
full employment and a trade deficit, and (ES) full employment 
and a trade surplus. W is Walrasian equilibrium a position
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of both internal and external balance.
Dixit notes that the BT locus must change slope as it cuts 
the FE locus since the form of the domestic demand functions 
changes.
With this apparatus it is shown that if the economy is 
initially in a position of Walrasian equilibrium then an 
increase in the money supply will give ¿is*: to a trade 
deficit and excess demand for labour. With completely rigid 
prices and exchange rate the trade deficit will persist until 
all the money supply increase has been used in the purchase 
of tradables when the economy will return to its original 
position. If the wage rate responds to the excess demand for 
labour the system will display convergent cycles between the 
UD and ED regions until the deficit disappears and 
equilibrium is re-established at w with the original money 
supply. If the exchange rate can adjust instantaneously then 
the money supply will remain at its new value, and a new 
Walrasian equilibrium will be established with relative 
prices unchanged but nominal prices higher.
If the government attempts a fiscal expansion, this has no 
effect upon employment but reduces the amount of the domestically 
produced tradable good that is available for consumption at home 
or abroad and causes a ound for ound deterioration in the 
trade surplus. This is of course a result made famous by the 
New Cambridge school, the government simply spends reserves 
to buy goods from abroad.
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Dixit also examines the effect of a rise in productivity, 
resulting from an increased marginal product of labour. This 
gives rise to an excess of tradables and hence a trade 
surplus together with excess demand for labour. This is very 
different from the effect a rise in productivity has in a 
closed economy, Malinvaud demonstrates that Keynesian 
unemployment will result.
These results ate auyyestive but as the author remarks the 
analysis is only a first approach to examining the balance of 
trade in an open Neo-Keynesian model. To obtain a more 
realistic treatment the analysis should recognise that not 
all goods are internationally traded, and that a country may 
be a large transactor on the markets for some tradables but 
small on others. It is thus necessary to introduce the 
distinction between traded and non-traded goods and to 
examine more closely the small country assumption.
Neary [1980] introduces a non-traded good into an analysis 
very similar to Dixit's. The small country assumption is 
made about the tradable, hence rationing may only arise on 
the non-tradable good and labour markets. Given that there 
are two production sectors the rationing scheme which 
distributes labour during periods of excess demand becomes 
important. Two scenarios are examined, one,where the traded 
goods sector gets priority upon the labour market, and is 
assumed to be never rationed, and two, the non-traded goods 
sector gets priority and cannot be rationed. Under these two 
scenarios the wage rate, non-traded good price space may be 
divided up as figure A2(a) and (b).
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Figure A2
(a) (b)
w w
R(a)
K
■ > D“ 1
Traded goods sector gets 
priority on the labour
Non-Traded goods sector gets 
priority upon the labour
market market
The interpretation of figure A2 is as follows: the region 
indicated C in both panels displays excess supply of labour 
and excess demand for the non-traded good. The regions 
indicated K in both panels display an excess supply of the 
non-traded good and general excess supply of labour. The 
region R(a) is an area of excess demand for labour in the 
non-traded goods sector and excess demand for the non-traded 
good. R(b) is a region of excess demand for labour in the 
traded goods sector. The region U is an underconsumption 
region, its appearance is interesting since the model uses an 
atemporal production function. The underconsumption case 
arises when the traded goods sector is rationed for labour, 
households are unconstrained and the non-traded goods sector 
is rationed upon the goods market.
Having established the division of ( w ^ )  space into the 
familiar regimes, Neary examines how changes in the money
342
stock, government expenditure, the exchange rate and the 
state of technology will effect this division, and the 
comparative static effects changes in the exogenous 
variables will have upon the level of employment and the 
trade balance.
Monetary changes in the form of lump sum transfers (or taxes) 
to households cause a radial expansion (contraction) of the 
regimes in (v/,p^) space as figure A3 indicates.
Figure A3
(a) (b) ,
If the system was at a Walrasian equilibrium at A a monetary 
expansion gives repressed inflation. If it was at B a 
monetary contraction gives Keynesian unemployment.
Fiscal expansions financed by lump sum taxes effect the model 
differently depending upon which good the government 
purchases. Neary suggests that an increase in government 
purchases of the tradable has no effect upon employment but 
leads to a pari passu deterioration in the trade balance, 
which will only be the case however if the purchases are 
financed by printing money. If the means of finance is an 
increase in lump sum taxes then a Keynesian unemployment
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regime will arise as in B-»A in figure A3. This suggests that 
the New Cambridge result first pointed out in this context by 
Dixit depends upon the type of financing adopted. If the 
government purchases non-traded goods and finances its 
expenditure with lump sum taxes the effect upon the division 
of wage, non-traded good price space will be as figure A4.
Thus the effect of the increase in government expenditure is 
to create excess demand for non-tradables.
If the assumption of gross substitutability is made then a 
devaluation has the same effect as a monetary expansion, as 
in figure A3. However it should be noted that gross 
substitutability is a sufficient but not necessary condition 
for a devaluation to have this effect. For a more detailed 
analysis providing the necessary conditions see Fender 
[1982] .
Technical progress has differential effects in the two 
sectors. Starting at Walrasian equilibrium technical 
progress in the traded goods sector gives excess labour 
demand in the sector which does not have priority in its 
labour supply. In the non-traded goods sector, again starting 
at Walrasian equilibrium, a rise in productivity gives
Keynesian unemployment.
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The signs of the partial derivatives of changes in exogenous 
variables within a fix-price regime are summarised below.
Reqime Endogenous
w Pi
Exogenous Variable
q2
Variable P2 kl k2 M gl
C L - + + +* + * 0 0 0
K L ? - + ' - +* + + 0
C S ? ? + ? + - ? -
K S _ 1 ? ? + + - - -
R(a) S _ 1 - ? - + - - -
R(b) S ? - ? ? ? + - - -
U S -' ? ? + + - - -
where w wage rate
p^ price of non-traded goods
P2 price of traded goods (and exchange rate).
productivity parameter in non-traded goods sector 
k2 productivity parameter in traded goods sector 
M Households money stock
g^ government purchases of non-traded goods 
g2 government purchases of traded goods 
L employment (total)
S trade balance
'indicates gross substitutability ensures the sign, 
"indicates that result depends upon technical progress 
increasing labour demand at a given real wage.
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Both Dixit and Neary consider one traded good in which the 
country is a small supplier or demander and is never 
rationed. Cuddington [1980] relaxes this assumption and 
examines an economy which produces two tradable goods and no 
non-tradables. The tradable goods are termed exportables 
and importables although both are produced domestically.
The country is assumed to be a large supplier of the 
exportable and may be rationed upon the world market. The 
small country assumption is applied to the importable where 
the economy can always achieve its desired trade. Under the 
assumption that the domestic economy always gets priority of 
supply in exportables Cuddington examines the effects of 
fiscal, exchange rate and incomes control policies inside 
the classical Keynesian and Repressed Inflation regimes, 
where regimes are defined in terms of the exportable and 
aggregate labour markets. Since no constraints are 
encountered upon the importables market changes in 
government expenditure upon this good have a pari passu 
effect upon the balance of trade but have no internal 
effects. The other comparative static results obtained by 
Cuddington are summarised below.
Exogenous Variable
e Eg p W
Exportable output 0 + - 0 + 0 + - + - 0 +
Importable output + + - 0 0 0 0 0 - - - +
Nominal G.N.P. + + + 0 + 0 + 1 1 - - +
Exports - + - - o - 1 - 1 1 0  1
Imports 1 1 1 0 + 0 + 1 + 1 + 1
Balance of Trade + ? + —  - + ? + - - +
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where the first entry in each row refers to classical, the 
second Keynesian and the third repressed inflation regimes.
e exchange rate (devaluation)
Eg government purchases of the exportable 
p domestic price of the exportable 
w domestic wage rate
Although Cuddington's approach may be regarded as an 
improvement over Neary and Dixit in that it explicitly 
recognises the different characteristics of importables and 
exportables; it does not consider the additional 
complications arising from introducing a non-traded good. 
Both Steigum [1978] and Fender [1981] consider models which 
have three goods, an importable, exportable and a non-traded 
good.
Steigum considers a model in which there are two tradable 
commodities, an exportable good produced domestically and an 
importable input good ('raw materials') which is used in the 
production of both the exportable,and a non-tradable. 
Domestic firms can be constrained upon all markets,the 
country is assumed large on both the importables and 
exportables markets. There are clearly numerous constraint 
combinations in this model, Steigum examines four which are 
characterised by unemployment. A classical case arises when 
firms producing both the exportable and non-traded good are 
unconstrained upon output and labour markets. A regime 
termed Keynesian Unemployment with exogenous export occurs 
when producers of both exportables and non-tradables are 
demand constrained. Keynesian unemployment with endogenous
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export describes a situation where firms producing non­
tradable goods are sales constrained whilst firms producing 
exportables can sell all they wish. Finally mixed type 
unemployment describes a situation in which firms producing 
exportables are demand constrained, in firms producing non­
tradables are unconstrained. Little attention is paid to 
importables in the classifications/ indeed the definition of 
the importable is strange. It is described as raw material 
yet it is substitutable for labour in the production 
processes of the two sectors, perhaps it should be described 
as flow of imported capital, this would raise considerable 
problems. Because of the manner in which it is introduced 
it is not very important for the comparative statics-of"t he 
analysis whether the firms are constrained for the 
importable or not. Since Steigum's main concern is to 
evaluate the effectiveness of various policies in increasing 
employment in an open economy of this sort he reports only 
the comparative static effects of changes in exogenous 
parameters upon employment in the various regimes. These 
are summarised below.
Regime Imports Endogenous Exogenous Variable
Variable *1 *2 M W P1 P2 O v‘ h  ~z2 a
C EN L 0 0 0 - + + ?
EX L 0 0 0 - + + + 0 + +
K.GX EN L + + - - ? ? ? ? +
K.EN EN L + 0 - - - + + ?
EX L + 0 - - - + + - - +
M EN L + + - ? ? ? ? ? +
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where g^,w,L,e,M,p^ are as the previous case. 
g2 government purchases of exportables 
P2 foreign price of exportables 
v* foreign price of importables 
z1 and z2 are the constraints on importables to 
the non-traded and exportable producing sectors 
respectively, 
a quantity of exports 
EN endogenous 
EX exogenous
Steigum stresses that one of the most interesting 
characteristics of these comparative static results is the 
difference between the two Keynesian regimes, when exports 
are exogenous most relative price changes have indeterminate 
effects'. In particular, the analysis cannot say whether 
or not devaluation raises employment.
Fender [1981] considers an economy with several 
characteristics in common with Steigum and Neary’s 
treatments. There are three consumption goods importables, 
exportables and non-tradables. Importables are not produced 
domestically and exportables are not consumed domestically.
A large number of the results may be obtained by treating 
exportables and importables as one net traded good. This 
makes the model very similar to Neary's in all but one 
important respect, when there is excess demand for labour it 
is assumed that both domestic production sectors are 
constrained. Neary examines the case where one sector gets 
priority and is unrationed. Fender makes the small country
assumption about both exportables and importables which 
allow regimes to be identified by the constraint 
combinations that arise in the labour and non-traded goods 
markets. Three regimes arise, Keynesian unemployment where 
both the labour and non-traded goods markets are demand 
determined. Classical unemployment where there is excess 
demand for the non-traded good and excess supply of labour. 
Thirdly,Repressed Inflation arises when there is excess 
demand on both the labour and non-traded goods markets. The 
comparative static properties of these regimes are as in 
Neary's treatment,however in the cases where effects are not 
unambiguously signed Fender gives the appropriate 
conditions.
One major drawback with each of the above approaches is that 
only one country is analysed, and the state of the world 
markets in which it trades is exogenously given. In 
treatments which allow rationing upon export markets it is 
desirable that the constraint regimes operating in other 
countries be specified and examined. Owen [1981] approaches 
this problem by examining a world in which there are two 
countries each of which specialises in the production of 
one consumption good. Workers in both countries are 
immobile and consume both goods. The condition of the world 
economy will be characterised by the state of the domestic 
labour markets in the two countries and the state of the 
aggregate markets for each of the two consumption goods. 
Since neither good is storable there are six regimes of 
interest in the two countries summarised below.
350
Country 1
Keynesian
Unemployment
Classica 1 
Unemployment
Repressed
InflationKeynesian
Unemployment 1 4(b) 5(b)
Classical
Unemployment 4(a) 2 6(b)
Repressed
Inflation 5(a) 6(a) 3
The comparative static properties of the model depend upon 
which of the six potential regime combinations occurs. To 
devise the correct stabilization policies, policy makers 
need to know not only the fixed prices but also the quantity 
constraints which obtain in both countries. Single country 
analysis examined earlier suggest a general Keynesian 
tyoe trade off between internal and external balance.
Fiscal expansion gives increased employment but a balance 
of trade deterioration. Here if the government of country 
1 increases its expenditure in regime 5(a) there can be no 
balance of trade deterioration.
This type of approach suggests that co-ordination of policy 
between the two countries may be required,for example if 
country 1 expands demand simultaneously with 2 contracting 
demand in regime 5(a) the net effect may be zero. In this 
analysis of a two country model the actual rationing schemes 
adopted are particularly important, one government may use 
quotas to prevent domestic expansionary policies spilling 
over into the other country. Clearly there are regimes 
where such applications, and adjustments of quota levels 
may be beneficial to both economies.
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Dixit and Norman [1980, chapter 8] present an analysis of a two 
economy international equilibrium very similar to Owens, they 
study in detail only the case of Keynesian unemployment in both 
countries, Owenfe case 1. Using the appropriate effective 
demands equilibrium national income loci are defined for the 
domestic country (h,h) and the foreign country (H,H) as figure 
A5.
Figure A5
Dixit and Norman demonstrate that various policies can be 
examined by shifting the equilibrium loci. Figure A5 
illustrates the effects of an increase in the domestic money 
supply giving higher income in both economies. In the domestic 
economy the impact effect of a rise in the money supply is A>B, 
the extra increase in income &*C arises as a feedback effect 
due to the stimulus provided to the foreign economy. Similar 
experiments can be carried out on the other regimes for other 
policy measures. The important implication here is the same as 
in Owen in that policies undertaken by one government effect both 
economies and may have beggar thy neighbour effects unless
correctly co-ordinated.
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There are some general conclusions and observations which arise 
from the literature on open economy fix-price models. Fiscal 
expansions were shown to have generally beneficial effects upon 
output and employment in the country undertaking them, but to 
cause a deterioration in the countries balance of payments 
position. The New Cambridge result appears in several single 
economy analyses, in that government purchases of tradables 
cause a deterioration in the balance of trade pari passu. 
Noticably this effect does not arise in the two economy models 
where even if government expenditure does have no direct effect 
upon the domestic economy it will still be stimulatory due to 
the international feedback effect. The major message for 
policy makers which arises from this literature is that a 
correct stabilization policy must be devised by recognising 
fixed prices, the regimes operating both domestically and 
abroad, and the size of the country relativeto the world 
markets in tradables.
The second line of analysis of open disequilibrium macro models 
follow the initial contribution of Dixit 11976J who analysed a 
closed economy where input prices were exogenously fixed and 
output prices cleared the markets. Liviatan [1979] takes up 
this approach and examines a small trading economy which 
produces a tradable and a non—tradable good. Under a fixed 
exchange rate, and hence fixed world price of tradables, two 
possibilities are studied/one/where the price of non-tradables 
is fixed and the wage adjusts to clear the domestic labour 
market, and two, the price of non-tradables adjusts to clear 
the market and the wage rate is fixed. Liviatan concentrates 
his attention upon the effects that changes in the models
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exogenous parameters will have upon the balance of trade under 
these two scenarios.
In the case where the price of non-tradables is fixed there are 
four possibilities, either excess supply or demand for non­
tradables, associated with either a balance of trade surplus or 
deficit. A monetary expansion will cause a deterioration in 
the balance of trade, this deterioration will be greater under 
a fixed price of non-tradables than it would be otherwise and 
will also be worse if they are in excess demand. Interestingly 
Liviatan shows that an increase in the price of the non­
tradable must improve the balance of trade unambiguously if the 
good is in excess demand. The idea of a case where wage rates 
are flexible and prices of non-tradable goods fixed is not 
particularly appealing, more interesting is Liviatan's second 
case.
In the fixed wage rate case Liviatan makes the somewhat strange 
assumption that if there is excess demand for labour it'is-. 
rationed in the same proportions that it is allocated in at 
Walrasian equilibrium. With this allocation mechanism he then 
argues that a monetary expansion will cause a deterioration in 
the balance of trade since the price of non-traded goods will 
be bid up and the consumers will substitute tradables,the price 
of whi'ch is determined exogenously. A wage rate increase will 
also cause a balance of trade deterioration due to the 
increased price of non-tradables and the subsequent 
substitution effects.
Dixit and Norman [1980 chapter 8) consider a two country model
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in which there is only one homogeneous output good. The world 
market for the output good clears by price adjustment with the 
relative prices in the two countries depending upon the fixed 
exchange rate. Fixed nominal wages in the two countries allow 
labour to be in excess supply or demand in the two labour 
markets. Dixit and Norman show that for a given exchange rate 
and given money endowments the various labour market rationing 
regimes may be described as figure A6.
Figure A6
r,u and w refer to labour rationing, unemployment and the wage 
rate in the domestic economy. R, U and W indicate the same for 
the foreign economy.
A devaluation by the domestic countries policy makers will shift 
the division of wage space as A7(a) and a devaluation by the 
foreign country will move the division as A7(b).
Figure A7 
WT
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Figure A8
The actual comparative static effects of a monetary expansion 
or devaluation will depend upon the unemployment regimes in the 
two countries. Dixit and Norman note that in a regime where 
there is unemployment in both economies a monetary expansion by 
one economy varies employment in both, as figure A8 suggests, 
but worsens the trade balance of the expanding country to the 
benefit of the other.
Despite its extreme simplicity this last approach does provide 
an intuitively appealing analysis of the interaction between 
two economies with domestic factor price rigidities.
Generally the literature upon open disequilibrium macroeconomic 
models provides a reasonably diverse menu. The analysis' have 
examined situations where some prices are fixed and others
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clear markets, and situations where all prices are fixed (all 
prices flexible gives essentially the monetary approach to the 
balance of payments). The distinctions between traded and 
non-traded goods have been examined as has the distinction 
between exportables and importables. The implications of an 
imported input good (raw material) have been analysed. The 
importance of both labour market and goods market rationing 
schemes have been stressed, and perhaps most importantly the 
implication of both small and large economy assumptions have 
been examined in the context of fixed prices.
In the absence of asset markets the literature can only address 
itself to problems of the current account of the balance of 
payments. The addition of asset markets and the consideration 
of the capital account is an avenue for further enquiry.
The implications for standard monetary and expenditure policy 
instruments of opening up the fix-price and partially fix-price 
models are diverse and depend upon the regimes and 
circumstances which characterise the economy in question.
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